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INTRODUCTION: AN “OWNERSHIP SOCIETY” THAT
WE CAN CALL OUR OWN
The idea of an “ownership society” is hardly new to American
politics or law. Indeed it might be called the seventeen year cicada of
American domestic policy, emerging once per generation onto the
national agenda, generating just a bit of buzz, then receding once again
to leave a mass of empty husks and buried eggs behind. Unlike the
furtively flourishing insects, however, ownership-promoting proposals
seldom have, upon emergence, crescendoed to a deafening din. Nor
have they sounded the same notes to everyone’s ears.1 Rather,
“ownership solutions”2 and their cognates—“homesteading,”3
“stakeholding,”4 “assets for the poor,”5 etc.—have been proffered to or
1 See Cameron W. Barr, Vanguard of Brood X Marks Its Spot: All Over, Cicadas Come of
Age, Right on Schedule, WASH. POST, May 11, 2004, at A1. From time to time, however—
particularly during periods of perceived national crisis—ownership-promoting proposals have
grown noisy if nonetheless vague. See Todd S. Purdum, The President’s Speech Focuses on
Ideals, Not Details, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2005, at A1; Kenneth T. Walsh, Let the Horse Trading
Begin, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 21, 2005, at 32.
2 See JEFF GATES, THE OWNERSHIP SOLUTION: TOWARD A SHARED CAPITALISM FOR THE
21ST CENTURY (1998); see also JEFF GATES, DEMOCRACY AT RISK: RESCUING MAIN STREET
FROM WALL STREET (2001).
3 See the present Article’s sequel: Robert Hockett, A Jeffersonian Republic by Hamiltonian
Means: Values, Constraints and Finance in the Design of an Authentic American “Ownership
Society” (forthcoming 2006).
4 See BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE ALSTOTT, THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY (1999).
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on behalf of differing constituencies for differing reasons, and thus have
tended to mean different things to different people. It is tempting to
hypothesize that it is just this fragmentation and this polyvalence that
account, at least in part, both for the general idea’s recurrence and for its
every time receding.6
This Article is written with a view to synthesis and in the hope of
permanence. It is predicated on the premise that the notion of an
“ownership society” is both so close and so important to us that we
never have stepped back from it to view it as one whole. We have yet
to theorize it and pursue it as one comprehensive public project. We
have spoken more of “programs” than “societies,” leaving the ideal that
animates the programs insufficiently articulated. That ideal, in turn, by
dint of both its being left implicit and its mythic resonance with who we
like to think we are, often has prevented us from thinking through the
detailed and pragmatic requisites of ownership. And so it has resulted
indirectly in some failures of some programs—and an undue pessimism,
in the wake of failure, over what “society” can do to advance
ownership.
By drawing out explicitly the ways in which the mythos of an
“ownership society” has made covert appeal to three distinct but
overlapping strands that constitute our national self-understanding, and
by illustrating how that rough ideal in turn recurs covertly in specific
programs and proposals, we can lay the groundwork for a more
coherent and enduring public project: the commitment to a broader
ownership of value-productive and value-retentive assets by all of our
citizens. That commitment would seem all the more fulfillable today
than in the past, in view of new finance technologies that scarcely could
have been envisaged in the distant past. All that is wanting, then, would
seem to be the aforementioned synthesis and full articulation—and the
institutional design that gives concrete, informed expression to it.
If I am correct in this, then we are faced here—now that
“ownership” and “society” are uttered in one breath, and now that
“finance” can “engineer” what hitherto has not been engineerable—with
a most extraordinary opportunity. We face the chance at last to
reconcile our longest-running, mutually antagonistic views of
government and public policy. We face the chance to usher in what
might be called “a Jeffersonian republic by Hamiltonian means.”7
5 See MICHAEL SHERRADEN, ASSETS AND THE POOR: A NEW AMERICAN WELFARE POLICY
(1991); ASSETS FOR THE POOR: THE BENEFITS OF SPREADING ASSET OWNERSHIP (Thomas M.
Shapiro & Edward N. Wolff eds., 2001); see also RICHARD FREEMAN, THE NEW INEQUALITY:
CREATING SOLUTIONS FOR POOR AMERICA (1999).
6 Perhaps such fragmented appeal and valence account even for the idea’s merely flickering
appearance in one seminal work of political philosophy. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE 242, 245 (1999).
7 See Hockett, supra note 3. The Jefferson/Hamilton clash figures into the discussion infra,
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In Part I, then, this Article provides a brief elaboration of our three
political self-understandings—what I will call the civic republican,
classical liberal and pragmatic consequentialist traditions.
It
emphasizes in particular the first two understandings’ shared and still
compelling vision of a free—and freeholding—citizenry who jointly
constitute a virtuous res publica, and the third tradition’s emphasis upon
“results,” experimentalism, basic fairness and efficiency. My claim is
that these three traditions still, between them, add up to our vision of
ourselves as a society, and that they are fully reconcilable for purposes
of thinking through and bringing in an “ownership society.”
Part II synthesizes one self-understanding from the three traditions
laid out in Part I, with the aim of shifting from a retrospective and
contemporary to a forward-looking point of view. It braids the
overlapping strands together into one coherent, systematic public
understanding of what “ownership society” should broadly mean. And
in doing so it sketches two broad strategies for realizing that society.
Part III then lays out the detailed contours, requisites, and full
significance of “owning” in that “ownership society.” In effect, it
bridges broader policy to detailed program. It does so by translating
ethically intelligible “resource” and “opportunity” into legally and
psychologically cognizable “asset” and “ownership.” In effecting that
translation, Part III arrives at more specific prescriptions and strategies
for putting into place a distinctively American ownership society.
Part IV translates Part II’s values and Part III’s constraints into a
foundational financial engineering schema that amounts to the optimal
method by which to foster the development of a recognizably American
“ownership society.” That schema, as the Article’s sequel will
chronicle, is implicit in the most successful ownership-promoting
programs that we have pursued to date—and now awaits is application
in respect of spreading further asset types.
The final Part concludes the Article and sets the stage for the
sequel’s shift from ideological, legal and financial synthesis to policy
and programmatic synthesis. That shift finds its consummation in both
(a) a consolidation and reinterpretation of past “ownership society”
programs and proposals, and (b) a unified package of programmatic
proposals of its own which share the strengths and skirt the weaknesses
of those past attempts at realizing aspects of an ownership society.
“Consolidation” and “reinterpretation,” “strength” and “weakness” there
are understood by reference to those synthesized ideals and
Part I.A, as well as in this Article’s sequel. The idea here, in brief, is that while Jeffersonians
favored a republic of freeholders of agricultural assets and Hamiltonians a commercial and
industrialized society wrought in part through modalities of public finance, it now appears
possible, in a way that it was not before, to engineer, financially, a republic of freeholders of
commercial and industrial assets.
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prescriptions that the present Article develops.
The Conclusion also cautions against confounding “ownership
societies” with polities in which we are simply “on our own.” An
efficient equal-opportunity republic, that is to say, is not to be confused
with a banana republic. My hope is that the earlier Parts’ full
elaboration of our fully shared self-understanding, and of that
understanding’s partial realization in informed institutional design, will
have served to minimize the risk of that conflation.
I. OWNING UP TO WHO WE ARE: THREE POLITICAL
SELF-UNDERSTANDINGS
This Part briefly adumbrates three dominant traditions of
American self-understanding. In a crucial sense, these traditions
constitute three comprehensive views of who we are. Like others at
least in respect of the first two, I call them the “Civic Republican,”
“Classical Liberal” and “Pragmatic Consequentialist” traditions. An
American ownership society (OS) will have to be reflective of all three.
A.

Civic Republicans

Civic Republicanism (CR) and its late twentieth century
rediscovery are well surveyed and discussed in the legal, historic and
normative political-theoretic literatures.8 Here the focus is on CR’s
basic tenets and enduring presence in American public policy.
Ownership—or “freeholding”—figures prominently in those tenets and
in that enduring presence.
Like most ideological traditions, CR constitutes an integrated
cluster of ethical, political and economic ideals. It is the latter-day
expression of an earlier-elaborated idealization of a particular form of
life, lived by a particular segment of Roman society, prior to the coming

8 In the legal literature, see, for example, Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival,
97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988); Jerry Mashaw, As If Republican Interpretation, 97 YALE L.J. 1685
(1988); Frank Michelman, Forward: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986);
Frank Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); see also other articles in
Symposium, The Republican Civic Tradition, 97 YALE L.J. 1453 (1988). Recent philosophic
work with a republican cast includes PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM
AND GOVERNMENT (1997); PHILIP PETTIT, THE COMMON MIND: AN ESSAY ON PSYCHOLOGY,
SOCIETY, AND POLITICS (1993) [hereinafter PETTIT, COMMON MIND]; MICHAEL P. ZUCKERT,
NATURAL RIGHTS AND THE NEW REPUBLICANISM (1994); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM
AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982); see also infra note 21 (citations to the burgeoning literature
on “deliberative democracy”).
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of Empire from about 60 B.C.E. to 14 C.E.9 The idealization process
began in earnest with the nostalgic Roman poets and historians of the
late Republican and early Empire periods,10 then resurfaced in
Renaissance Florence during the sixteenth century. The loci classici are
the philosophic and historic writings of Machiavelli and Guicciardini,
who cast their city-state as a revived Roman republic.11 The
Florentines’ elegiac theorization of republican Rome made its way
northward, through the Netherlands and ultimately into Britain, over the
subsequent century.
In Britain the most celebrated republican
exponents were the Whig polemicists of the late seventeenth and early
eighteenth century English “Country” opposition, notably Bolingbroke
and Harrington, who deplored the era’s centralization of political and
financial power in the Crown and in London.12 These writers
assimilated the Roman and Florentine ideals to the “freedomvindicating” English common law, particularly in its storied AngloSaxon form in which the local freeholder, as juror, played a conspicuous
role in applying and sometimes nullifying, and thus developing, the
law.13 The Whigs also assimilated the Roman/Florentine ideal to the
agrarian way of life familiar to the English country squire.14
Through Bolingbroke, Harrington and the pamphleteers and
9 See generally J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL
THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION (1975) [hereinafter POCOCK, MOMENT];
J.G.A. POCOCK, POLITICS, LANGUAGE AND TIME: ESSAYS ON POLITICAL THOUGHT AND
HISTORY 80-147 (1960); J.G.A. POCOCK, VIRTUE, COMMERCE AND HISTORY (1985). An
entertaining recent iteration of this idealization is the Ridley Scott film, Gladiator.
10 See, e.g., POLYBIUS, ROMAN HISTORIES (W.R. Paton trans. & ed., 1960); TACITUS,
ANNALS (R.M. Ogilvie trans. & ed., 1980); VIRGIL, ECLOGUES, GEORGICS (G.P. Goold trans. &
ed., 1999).
11 See POCOCK, MOMENT, supra note 9, at 83-330; see generally NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI,
FLORENTINE HISTORIES (Laura F. Banfield & Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr. trans., 1988); NICCOLO
MACHIAVELLI, DISCOURSES ON LIVY (Harvey C. Mansfield & Nathan Tarcov trans., 1996);
FRANCESCO GUICCIARDINI, DIALOGUE ON THE GOVERNMENT OF FLORENCE (Alison Brown
trans. & ed., 1994); FRANCESCO GUICCIARDINI, THE HISTORY OF ITALY (Sidney Alexander
trans. & ed., Collier-Macmillan Ltd. 1969) (1561); HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, MACHIAVELLI’S
VIRTUE (1996); MACHIAVELLI AND REPUBLICANISM (Gisela Bock, Quentin Skinner & Maurizio
Viroli eds., 1990).
12 See sources cited infra note 14. On the centralization of political and financial power, see,
e.g., NIALL FERGUSON, THE CASH NEXUS: MONEY AND POWER IN THE MODERN WORLD, 17002000 (2001); JOHN BREWER, THE SINEWS OF POWER: WAR, MONEY AND THE ENGLISH STATE,
1688-1783 (1988).
13 Juries, in this sense, of course constituted a form of partial self-government.
14 See HENRY ST. JOHN, VISCOUNT BOLINGBROKE, POLITICAL WRITINGS (David Armitage
ed., 1997); JAMES HARRINGTON, THE COMMONWEALTH OF OCEANA (J.G.A. Pocock ed.,
Cambridge University Press 1992) (1656); JAMES HARRINGTON, A SYSTEM OF POLITICS (J.G.A.
Pocock ed., Cambridge University Press 1992) (1700); see also ISAAC KRAMNICK,
BOLINGBROKE AND HIS CIRCLE: THE POLITICS OF NOSTALGIA IN THE AGE OF WALPOLE (1968);
JOYCE OLDHAM APPLEBY, ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND IDEOLOGY IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY
ENGLAND (1978); J.C.D. CLARK, ENGLISH SOCIETY 1660-1832: RELIGION, IDEOLOGY AND
POLITICS DURING THE ANCIEN RÉGIME (2d. ed. 2000); QUENTIN SKINNER, LIBERTY BEFORE
LIBERALISM (1997); see generally POCOCK, MOMENT, supra note 9, at 333-505.
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playwrights who popularized them,15 the images and ideals of the
Anglo-European republican tradition exerted a critical formative
influence upon the attitudes, the thinking, and the very self-conceptions
of those radicals who led the American revolt against the British
Parliament and Crown.16 Those same radicals included many who
would frame and promote, as well as many who would oppose and
resist, ratification of the United States constitution.17 Many of the same
persons and their ideological descendents, in turn, prominently set or
opposed much nationally formative public policy through the new
American republic’s early decades as a nation.18 And as we shall see,
many of their ideals continue, in only minimally altered form, as our
ideals.
Central to CR, again as to most ideological traditions, is a defining
conception of human nature at its basest and most elevated. And there
is a corresponding view of the appropriate forms and roles of political
and economic, therefore legal, organization. To CR thinking, baser
human nature seeks dominion, unchecked ownership. It seeks dominion
not just over nature for the satisfaction of one’s basic needs, but over
more than what is needed. Unchecked, the lust for power and property
issues forth in tyranny, the grab for full control over resources, over
one’s fellows—in essence, merely a species of resource—and indeed
15 Addison, Gordon, Sidney and Trenchard probably best known among them. See JOSEPH
ADDISON, CATO (William-Alen Landes ed., 1996); ALGERNON SIDNEY, COURT MAXIMS (Eco
Haitsma-Mulier & Ronald Janse trans. & ed., 1996); JOHN TRENCHARD & THOMAS GORDON,
THE INDEPENDENT WHIG & CATO’S LETTERS: ESSAYS ON LIBERTY, CIVIL AND RELIGIOUS, AND
OTHER IMPORTANT SUBJECTS (Ronald Hamowy ed., 1995).
16 On self-conception in this context, see, e.g., STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE
AGE OF FEDERALISM 37 (1994) (“The sum of what [George Washington] was could be plainly
seen in the appearance he made and the acts he performed. And by the same token, ‘reputation’
had as much to do with his own judgment of himself as with that of his community.”)
17 The prominence of the name “Brutus” among the writings of the “Antifederalists” who
opposed ratification of the U.S. Constitution, for example, is not fortuitous. As slayer of the
Roman Republic-desecrator Julius Caesar, Brutus, like Cato, enjoyed iconic republican status.
See generally HERBERT J. STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR (1981); THE
ANTIFEDERALISTS (Cecelia M. Kenyon, ed., 1966); sources cited infra note 18.
18 See generally POCOCK, MOMENT, supra note 9, at 506-52; GORDON S. WOOD, THE
CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: 1776-1787, at 1-124, 391-467 (1969) [hereinafter
WOOD, CREATION]; GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 95225 (1991) [hereinafter WOOD, RADICALISM]; BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1-54 (1967) [hereinafter BAILYN, IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS];
BERNARD BAILYN, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN POLITICS (1970); JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL
MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1996); ELKINS &
MCKITRICK, supra note 16; see also DOUGLAS G. ADAIR, THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF
JEFFERSONIAN DEMOCRACY: REPUBLICANISM, THE CLASS STRUGGLE, AND THE VIRTUOUS
FARMER (Mark E. Yellin ed., Lexington Books 2000) (1964) (presenting nuanced accounts);
JOYCE OLDHAM APPLEBY, ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND IDEOLOGY IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY
ENGLAND (1978); JOYCE APPLEBY, CAPITALISM AND A NEW SOCIAL ORDER: THE REPUBLICAN
VISION OF THE 1790S (1984) [hereinafter APPLEBY, NEW SOCIAL ORDER]; JOYCE APPLEBY,
LIBERALISM AND REPUBLICANISM IN THE HISTORICAL IMAGINATION (1992) [hereinafter
APPLEBY, LIBERALISM AND REPUBLICANISM].
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over all that one is able to acquire or subdue.19
One’s fellows, however, offer one redemption of a sort. Not only
do they check the spread of one’s dominion; they constitute a means by
which to check and to transmogrify one’s power-lust itself. For one
must reason—or at least must bargain—with one’s fellows if a constant
state of wasteful war would be avoided. One has, and to some
unspecified Aristotelian degree is even naturally disposed, to cooperate
with others to address the challenges posed to all by resource-scarcity
and potentially wasteful, destructively competitive activity. And one
must deliberate, even come to share a common sense of purpose, with
one’s fellows if one would work effectively with them through time.20
The acts of deliberation, cooperation and coordination in
communion with others transmute one’s baser human nature into
something nobler in the CR story. The desire for dominion over
resources becomes productive economic activity and conduces to
nongluttonous self-sufficiency—a partial liberation from, rather than
obliteration of, the natural environment. The desire for dominion over
one’s neighbors becomes the sense of self-worth and fundamental
dignity essential to effective, while not overreaching, action, and
therefore to effective self-government. Rather than a world of one or
several power-maddened tyrants owning all and lording over everyone
such as each person’s boundless will, unchecked, would seek, CR sees a
world of many virtuous and sober nobles. Each such noble holds a
humbler realm—his “estate”—and each regards the others as rough
equals in shared thought and action. Will is modulated into “virtue”—a
critical republican watch-word—which in turn is seen at least in part in
19 See BAILYN, IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS, supra note 18, at 55-93; WOOD, CREATION, supra
note 18, at 1-83.
20 See POCOCK, MOMENT, supra note 9, at 462-505; WOOD, CREATION, supra note 18, at 4665. On the importance of deliberation and community to contemporary CR, the title of one recent
republican monograph is suggestive. See PETTIT, COMMON MIND, supra note 8. The literature
on “deliberative democracy,” its self- and society-constitutive roles, its political virtues and vices
have grown prodigiously in recent years. See, e.g., DEBATING DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
(James S. Fishkin & Peter Laslett eds., 2003); AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON,
DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT (1996); DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY (Jon Elster ed., 1998);
CARLOS SANTIAGO NINO, THE CONSTITUTION OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY (1996); see also
cites to SUNSTEIN, infra note 62. An interesting, if modest proposal aimed at bringing a greater
degree of reasoned deliberation back to American electoral politics is BRUCE ACKERMAN &
JAMES FISHKIN, DELIBERATION DAY (2004). In a similar though more ambitious vein, see
ETHAN J. LEIB, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: A PROPOSAL FOR A POPULAR
BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT (2004). Probably the most influential precursor of and contributor to
the revived interest in deliberative politics and rationality is Jürgen Habermas. See, e.g., JÜRGEN
HABERMAS, REASON AND THE RATIONALIZATION OF SOCIETY (Thomas McCarthy trans.,
Heinemann Educational Books 1984) (1981); JÜRGEN HABERMAS, LIFEWORLD AND SYSTEM: A
CRITIQUE OF FUNCTIONALIST REASON (Thomas McCarthy trans., Polity Press 1987) (1981);
JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY
OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans., Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1996)
(1992).
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social terms—in this case, the value of a social equilibrium of roughly
equal, moderated wills and equal, moderated spheres of human action.
Society and individual, then, are mutually dependent in a
fundamental symbiosis to the CR way of thinking. And both as cause
and as effect, in turn, of the virtuous republic, CR sees each citizen as
owning some proportional allotment of the aggregate of substrate
resources—the stuff on which the peoples’ lives are made.21 As effect,
because one crucial reason for and product of the binding together of
persons into society is the stable apportionment of life-sustaining
materials among potentially competing claimants.22 And as cause,
because in order truly to participate responsibly on equal terms in
shared public life, one must both hold a stake in the aggregate of
resources with which public life is fundamentally concerned, and
possess that dignity and self-respect and partial independence which
such stakeholding confers.
It is not surprising, then, that the idealized Virgilian or Virginian
“yeoman farmer”—and that polity which he and counterparts had
seemed to constitute in republican Rome, in post-Magna Carta England,
and in parts of British North America—came to occupy a hallowed role
in the CR imagination. Arable land, at least until a century ago, was the
productive, autonomy-conferring resource par excellence. And it bound
the owner to his community: the freeholder was a more noble and
accountable, less exploitative and irresponsible figure than the
“absentee landlord.”23
The early Roman citizen-soldier-farmer,
beneficiary of Greek learning yet free of corrupting Athenian urbanity,
was the very prototype of sober-minded, nature- and natural lawrespecting Stoic dignity. And he was, of course, the prototype of the
American “Minute Man.” The Roman Senate was in turn the prototype
of purposeful and public-spirited deliberation—as well, of course, as of
the U.S. Senate. And the seizure of power by, and the subsequent
imperium and “mob”-dependence of, Julius Caesar and his successors
constituted a mythic “Fall” of nearly Biblical proportion.24 It illustrated
both the constant vulnerability of virtue to lust, immoderate acquisition
and corruption, and the ever-present danger that virtuous republican
political-economy and self-government might degenerate into
21 See, e.g., BOLINGBROKE, supra note 14, at 83-86; KRAMNICK, supra note 14, at 114-17;
HARRINGTON, supra note 14, at 27-56; POCOCK, MOMENT, supra note 9, at 385-87, 539-45.
22 There is of course an anticipation here of the fictitious “social contract” more commonly
associated with the Classical Liberal (CL) tradition adumbrated in the next Subpart. I suggest
below that this is probably no accident.
23 See William H. Simon, Social-Republican Property, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1335, 1343 (1991)
(“It is the possession of land . . . which, linking the possessor to the State, constitutes true
citizenship” (quoting nineteenth century French Republican Anne Robert Jacques Turgot)).
24 See note supra 17; see also BAILYN, IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS, supra note 18, at 23-26;
WOOD, CREATION, supra note 18, at 35-36; POCOCK, MOMENT, supra note 9, at 52-54.
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plutocracy, demagoguery and dictatorship.25
Before turning to the enduring appeal of CR thinking in American
political and economic life, we will do well to take explicit note of the
ambivalent role that rough material equality plays in that tradition. On
the one hand, the place of egalitarian thinking in CR seems manifest. It
is the rough equality of human capacities, along with the rough identity
of human interests and corruptibility, that render mutual support rather
than mutual antagonism so well-advised. And the coordinately
idealized image of “every man [as] a king”26 (his home being his
“castle”) implicit in the vision of that “sturdy yeomanry” which serves
as backbone to republican self-government bears obvious egalitarian
significance. It is doubtless partly for this very reason that the
ascendancy of “Jeffersonian democracy” in early nineteenth century
America is seen both as a triumph of CR—Jefferson having been the
arch-republican of early American politics—and of democratic
egalitarianism.27
Yet on the other hand, to remain with Jefferson for a moment, that
arch-republican also held aristocratic pretensions, as did many of his
peers including that other great republican icon, George Washington.28
Both men actually owned human beings, moreover, and saw themselves
as members of an almost “natural” ruling class. That class’s lot—worn
ostentatiously as “burden”29—was periodically to serve the people
notwithstanding the alleged distastefulness of public life, then retire in
noble dignity to their “ranches” or estates once national emergencies
were past.30 Beyond that, what was to be done once all new lands were
appropriated? Were we then to take from the over-endowed to give to
the under-endowed if ownership imbalances came to afflict the republic
and threaten effective self-government? This faultline over who should
be “equal” and how equity should be maintained, possibly the product
25 There is an alternative take on Caesar, wherein he figures as the egalitarian hero. See, e.g.,
MICHAEL PARENTI, THE ASSASSINATION OF JULIUS CAESAR: A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF ANCIENT
ROME (2003).
26 The allusion is to Huey Long, the Louisiana Governor and presidential candidate whose
egalitarian depression-era “Share Our Wealth” campaign so worried Roosevelt (and others)
during the lead-up to the 1936 election. See FRANK FREIDEL, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT: A
RENDEZVOUS WITH DESTINY 241-57 (1990); HUEY P. LONG, EVERY MAN A KING: THE
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF HUEY P. LONG (Harry Williams ed., 1996).
27 See, e.g., DREW R. MCCOY, THE ELUSIVE REPUBLIC: POLITICAL ECONOMY IN
JEFFERSONIAN AMERICA (1980); LANCE BANNING, THE JEFFERSONIAN PERSUASION:
EVOLUTION OF A PARTY IDEOLOGY (1978); ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN
(1970); SEAN WILENTZ, CHANTS DEMOCRATIQUES: NEW YORK AND THE RISE OF THE
AMERICAN WORKING CLASS 1788-1850 (1984); see also ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 16,
at 750-54.
28 See, e.g., ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 16, at 37; see also APPLEBY, NEW SOCIAL
ORDER, supra note 18, at 125 (discussing the “elitism” of many Federalist republicans).
29 See, e.g., ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 16, at 37.
30 Id.
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of incompletely worked-out ideals, possibly that of an incomplete
commitment, runs throughout the CR tradition as it unfolds through
American political and economic history.31
Present-day historians are broadly united in attributing the
essentials of CR to the political-psychological and interpretive
predispositions of those late-eighteenth century Americans who led the
revolt against the British Parliament and Crown and founded one of the
first modern republics.32 The vocabulary, style of thinking, even style
of dress of the American founders all were quite self-consciously
republican in nature. CR attitudes and thinking also are quite prominent
in early policies and controversies advocated, implemented and/or
argued over during the first decades of the American republic.
Of greatest consequence for present purposes are early American
land, trade and industrial policy. One of the first American changes to
the English common law was the abolition of fee tail and primogeniture,
this with a view to broadening the incidence of freeholding across the
population.33 Early efforts to restrict the franchise to land-holders also
are well noted, if not indeed notorious. 34 And these need not be thought
as inegalitarian as they are simply stakeholder-voter-oriented.35 The
Northwest Ordinance, in turn, immediately opened federal lands to
westward migrants. The aim in this case was not simply to subject
those lands to productive cultivation—a pragmatic consequentialist aim
31 See WOOD, CREATION, supra note 18, at 70-75 for more on CR ambivalence over equality;
see also Simon, supra note 23, at 1347-48 (“Historically, republicans have been ambivalent as to
whether just distribution of property should be treated as a subject of politics or as a prerequisite
to it.”). Simon notes one common form of resolution: “A frequent republican strategy of
compromise—common to ancient Rome, revolutionary France and America, and nineteenth
century America (as reflected in the minor land reform efforts of the Reconstruction and the
Homestead Act)—has been to focus efforts to achieve economic equality on the distribution of
land conquered from outsiders or confiscated from the losing side in civil wars.” Id. at 1348.
This strategy reappears at Part II, infra, as well as in the sequel.
32 See BERNARD BAILYN, PAMPHLETS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1975); see also
BAILYN, IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS, supra note 18, at 1-54; WOOD, CREATION, supra note 18, at 1124; WOOD, RADICALISM, supra note 18; POCOCK, MOMENT, supra note 9.
33 See, e.g., LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 230-57 (1973); MORTON
HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 31-62 (1977); C. WILLARD
HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED
STATES (1956).
34 See CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES (The Free Press 1986) (1913); see also FORREST MACDONALD, WE THE
PEOPLE: THE ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION (1958); ROBERT A. MCGUIRE, TO
FORM A MORE PERFECT UNION: A NEW ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION (2003).
35 Those who wished to restrict the franchise to landowners justified their positions by
reference to the need for voters to hold “stakes” in the republic in order to vote responsibly. See,
e.g., MACDONALD, supra note 34, at 358-99. Many of the same people advocated easy landcredit policies in order to ensure that all who wished to work could acquire such stakes. See
Hockett, supra note 3. Such people can be fairly described as both egalitarian and franchiserestricting.
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which I discuss below—and certainly not, in conception, to enable
existing land-owners simply to enlarge their estates. The aim was,
rather, to foster the expansion of a populace of responsible republican
freeholders.36
Jefferson’s Louisiana Purchase, of doubtful
constitutionality but a perceivedly exigent opportunity, was actuated by
essentially the same ideological vision—simultaneously egalitarian,
national resource-expanding, and broad, productive ownershipfostering.37
Similar understandings prompted the Jeffersonians’—including
Madison’s—opposition to tariffs on imported manufactured goods.38
The republicans rejected tariffs not as early, pre-Ricardian exponents of
the efficiencies of free trade, or as prophets of an early nineteenth
century WTO. Rather, they opposed them because tariffs appeared
likely both to harm the interests of American farmers and to foster
American industrialization and consequent urbanization—both of which
the Jeffersonians rejected on CR ideological grounds.39 Jefferson and
his many influential followers simply sought a different America than
that sought by Hamilton and his allies. Hamiltonians saw a more or less
autarkic, independent state with a well developed internal division of
labor and advanced industrial capacity, able to participate on equal
terms with other economically advanced states on the world stage.
Jeffersonians saw a nation of autarkic households, all of whom owned
enough land to support themselves and purchase inexpensive
implements from the “slave house” manufactories of Europe. Those
households therefore would possess sufficient productive autonomy and
leisure to take part on more or less equal terms with one another in the
strictly limited affairs of collective self-government.40 Yet both sides
argued their positions in similar terms—the terms of CR selfsufficiency.41
In the end, of course, neither Hamilton’s nor Jefferson’s vision of
America decisively edged-out the other. And this, as we will see below,
is because those visions actually are complementary. Jefferson was
more than magnanimous, he was in a way prophetic, when in his first
inaugural he announced that “we are all republicans—we are all
federalists.”42 What is more immediately relevant to present purposes is
how Jeffersonian visions—even as the trajectory of economic
development steadily rendered America more Hamiltonian and urbanindustrial than Jeffersonian or rural-agrarian—continued to resonate in
36
37
38
39
40
41
42

See MCCOY, supra note 27, at 185-208.
Id. at 76-119.
ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 16, at 133-62.
Id. at 375-449; MCCOY, supra note 27, at 75-124.
MCCOY, supra note 27, at 75-124.
See ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 16, at 133-62, 357-402.
Id. at 753.
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American political discourse and public policy.43
Perhaps most conspicuous among latter-day Jeffersonian national
policies has been the Homestead Act of 1862, discussed at greater
length in this Article’s sequel. At a time when the United States already
had begun to rival Britain as the most thoroughly industrialized society
among the community of nations, and when the urban-industrial
North—under the new “Republican” Party’s first president, Abraham
Lincoln—was decisively and Hamiltonianly federalizing the nation in
disciplining the ersatz-Jeffersonian, “anti-federalist,” plutocratic
plantation-based agricultural South,44 national policy aimed nonetheless
to take population pressure off of the cities, develop internal lands, and
in so doing broaden the class of independent, responsible, productive
freeholding citizens.45 The terms in which this legislation was
advocated could have come from Jefferson or Harrington or Tacitus
himself.46 Similar actuating aims prompted early proposals to afford
each freed slave in the U.S. “forty acres and a mule,” these latter
resources to be derived from the break-up of the large, extended
Southern haciendas.47 CR thinking also is evident in the continual
romanticization, to this day, of “the family farm,” “the small farmer”
and his simple virtues in connection with federal farm and even estate
tax-reduction policies. And this is notwithstanding that such policies
tend actually, nowadays, to benefit agricultural conglomerates and
dynastic families rather than the humble Stoic free-holder.
Chords similar to those sounded by nineteenth century land and
trade policy continued to resonate, until early in the twentieth century,
in labor and industrial policy debate. While it is by now commonplace
to associate labor and wage income in near Pavlovian fashion, that
association was hotly contested through most of the nineteenth
century.48 Much of the agenda of the labor movement up until the
1890s did not concern itself with raising wages, shortening the work
week or improving working environments. Rather, that agenda aimed
at abolishing the wage system altogether and replacing it with a system
43 See generally PAUL K. CONKIN, PROPHETS OF PROSPERITY: AMERICA’S FIRST POLITICAL
ECONOMISTS 136-255 (1980); see also RICHARD FRANKLIN BENSEL, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIALIZATION, 1877-1900 (2000).
44 See generally RICHARD FRANKLIN BENSEL, YANKEE LEVIATHAN: THE ORIGINS OF
CENTRAL STATE AUTHORITY IN AMERICA, 1859-1877 (1990).
45 See id.; CONKIN, supra note 43..
46 CONKIN, supra, note 43.
47 Id. On the significance of the source of the lands, see supra note 31; see also infra Parts
III.A.3, III.B.2.
48 See generally ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE
REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR (1970); ERIC FONER, POLITICS AND IDEOLOGY IN
THE AGE OF THE CIVIL WAR (1980); BRUCE LAURIE, ARTISANS INTO WORKERS: LABOR IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1989); see also WILENTZ, supra note 27; CONKIN, supra note
43; MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC
PHILOSOPHY 168-249 (1996).

14

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:1

of worker ownership and consumer/producer cooperatives—early
prototypes of today’s ESOPs.49 The displacement of artisanal and craft
production by highly centralized, bureaucratically organized modes was
seen, and constantly described, as a threat to the dignity of work and the
independence of the citizenry—hence, to the enduring of republican
self-government itself.50 Though it seems to be forgotten now, today’s
Republican Party during its early years in the late 1850s—as well as,
again, its first successful U.S. presidential candidate, Abraham
Lincoln—were as opposed to “wage slavery” in the North as they were
to chattel slavery in the South.51 And the most influential labor
organization in America up into the 1880s, the Knights of Labor, both
devoted itself to the abolition of wage labor and articulated its positions
in starkly CR terms.52
The same terms figured into late nineteenth and early twentieth
century industrial policy, sometimes simply as advocated by sizable
numbers of Progressive and Democratic Party-members and platformformulators, sometimes as actually implemented. Woodrow Wilson’s
“New Freedom,” for example, sought to diminish the size of at least
non-”natural” business concentrations53 on grounds that, on the whole,
less concentration meant more business-owners, hence more CR
citizens. Louis Brandeis, an architect of Wilson’s early policies,
advocated business-fragmentation on the same grounds even where
economies of scale might render concentration “natural” or efficient.54
The early history of American antitrust policy featured arguments along
the same lines, even to the point of permitting some forms of
49 See sources cited supra note 48. For more on how the ideology of the cooperative
movement finds expression in enterprise-organizational form, see HENRY HANSMANN, THE
OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 66-226 (1996). For contemporary defenses and further economic
analyses of cooperative and worker-owned firms, see, e.g., DAVID P. ELLERMAN, THE
DEMOCRATIC WORKER-OWNED FIRM: A NEW MODEL FOR THE EAST AND WEST (1990);
JAROSLAV VANEK, THE GENERAL THEORY OF LABOR-MANAGED MARKET ECONOMIES (1970).
50 See sources cited supra note 48.
51 See Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Cooper Institute, New York City, Feb. 27, 1860, in
ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1859-1865, at 111-29 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed.,
1989). Some Southern political economists, in an irony attributable to the strange bedfellowmaking wrought by political disputation, found common cause with Northern advocates of free
labor in their defenses of the life-conditions of southern chattel slaves as compared to those of
northern wage laborers. See CONKIN, supra note 43, at 135-67. It is perhaps partly for this very
reason that more purist northern abolitionists, anxious to broaden northern opposition to chattel
slavery as widely as possible, sought to decouple chattel slavery from “wage slavery” as a
national issue.
52 See sources cited supra note 48.
53 In the jargon of the time, “natural” business concentrations were integrated firms or
conglomerates whose size could be accounted for on the basis of increasing returns, network
effects or scale economies rather than collusion or predation alone.
54 The thought was that while horizontal integration might result in higher prices, the gains in
dispersed ownership that it facilitated were politically worth that cost. See generally THOMAS K.
MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION: CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, JAMES
M. LANDIS, ALFRED E. KAHN 80-142 (1984).
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integration—resale price maintenance arrangements, for example,
which resulted in higher consumer prices. The reason was that such
arrangements nonetheless facilitated republican freedom by ensuring a
larger number of independently owned and operated retail
establishments.55 Consumer interests—hence, lower prices and perhaps
therefore greater social efficiency in the form of aggregated welfare—of
course ultimately became the sole touchstone of antitrust policy. But
“producer” interests—at any rate, shop-owner interests—for a long
while figured prominently, both in legislative argument and in court
decisions, again for explicitly articulated, CR-grounded reasons.56
We find CR thinking and its exaltation of nonurbane simplicity,
plain-spokenness, moderation, hard work, productive virtue,
independence and self-sufficiency in more than land-talk, farm-talk, taxtalk and early labor and antitrust talk. We find it in the continuing
deploring of “dependency,” “indignity” and “laziness” which some have
claimed to find associated with U.S. welfare programs prior to the “end
of welfare as we [knew] it.”57 We find it in attacks upon “the special
interests in Washington” and “beltway thinking” by the self-styled
“outsiders” who run for (Washington, beltway) office. We find it in
some calls for campaign finance and electoral reform, and for an
associated return to a more “deliberative democracy.”58 We find it in
calls for “restorative justice” and “alternative dispute resolution” to
replace “liberal” rights- and rules-oriented litigation, on grounds that the
former, in contrast to the latter, foster shared understanding and civic
cohesion.59 We find it in advocacy and implementation of term limits
55
56

Id.
See, e.g., Hubert Humphrey, Senate Debate, CONG. REC., 82nd Cong., 2d Sess., 98 (July 12, 1952), 8741m 8823:
Do we want an America where . . . all we have is catalogue houses? . . . Or do we want
an America where there are thousands upon thousands of small entrepreneurs,
independent businessmen, and landholders who can stand on their own feet and talk
back to their government or to anyone else? . . . [The small enterprise] produces good
citizens, and good citizens are the only hope of freedom and democracy. So we pay a
price for it. I am willing to pay that price.
Brown Shoe Co., Inc. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 315-16, 344 (1962) (“[W]e cannot fail to
recognize Congress’s desire to promote competition through the protection of viable, small,
locally owned businesses. Congress appreciated that occasional higher costs and prices might
result from the maintenance of fragmented industries and markets. It resolved these competing
considerations in favor of decentralization.”); United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S.
526, 541-43 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring in part):
Control of American business is being transferred from local communities to distant
cities where men on the 54th floor with only balance sheets and profit and loss
statements before them decide the fate of communities with which they have little or
no relationship. . . . A nation of clerks is anathema to the American antitrust dream.
57 See generally JOEL SCHWARTZ, FIGHTING POVERTY WITH VIRTUE: MORAL REFORM AND
AMERICA’S URBAN POOR, 1825-2000 (2000); ALAN F. ZUNDEL, DECLARATIONS OF
DEPENDENCY: THE CIVIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION IN U. S. POVERTY POLICY (2000).
58 See sources cited supra note 20.
59 See, e.g., ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION:
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for legislators and executives, and the correlative deplorings of a
“professional political class.”60 We find it still enshrined in our very
constitution, in the Guaranty Clause.61 (Some find it in the First
Amendment too.62) And we find somewhat attenuated CR thematics at
work in a great many proposals of recent years advocating
“stakeholding” in the forms of employee-owned enterprise, “privatized”
Social Security “personal retirement accounts,” ever more taxadvantaged “individual retirement accounts,” matching-funded
“individual development accounts,” “universal savings accounts,” and
even lump-sum transfers to all newborn children or adults upon
attainment of adulthood.63
What most if not all of these disparate proposals and rhetorical
posturings have in common are their idealizations of individual
responsibility, self-sufficiency, civic participation, and in many cases
greater relative equality on the one hand; their associations of these
virtues with a secure, healthy, well-functioning, self-governing
democratic-republican polity on the other. Probably for this very
reason, most of these proposals also exert a certain attraction over the
thinking of “capital letter” Republicans and Democrats alike. Again,
Jefferson was prescient in proclaiming that, at least in one sense, “we
are all [Civic] Republicans.” I will exploit that fact below and in the
sequel, in a synthesis of national self-understanding that can animate a
distinctively American “ownership society.”
B.

Classical Liberals

Before the relatively recent revival of interest in CR and its role in
the American political tradition, the role of classical liberalism (CL) had
figured prominently in the work of an earlier generation of historians.64
RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION (1994); MARY ANN
GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1991); GERALD N.
ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991); Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem-Solving,
31 UCLA L. REV. 754 (1984); ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING
AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (1981).
60 See, e.g., JOHN MCCAIN, WORTH THE FIGHTING FOR (2002).
61 U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a
Republican Form of Government . . . .”)
62 See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH, at xvi
(1993) (“Madisonian First Amendment” intended to foster a “deliberative democracy.”); CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 162-64 (1993) (same); see also sources cited supra note
20—ACKERMAN & FISHKIN in particular.
63 See Hockett, supra note 3.
64 See generally LOUIS HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA (1955); see also
APPLEBY, LIBERALISM AND REPUBLICANISM, supra note 18; JOHN PATRICK DIGGINGS, THE
LOST SOUL OF AMERICAN POLITICS (1984); STEVEN M. DWORETZ, THE UNVARNISHED
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CL and its modern variants might in fact constitute the only ideological
tradition more discussed, defended and elaborated through the years in
the periodic legal and philosophic literatures than CR itself.65 Once
again, then, we can here confine ourselves to laying out the broader
contours, highlighting some inner tensions, and indicating some
ownership-pertinent currents in American public policy that are readily
appreciable as CL in spirit.
CL has little—though certainly something—to do with
“liberalism” understood in that pejorative sense employed by self-styled
“conservative”66 pundits and politicians. Again like CR and other
ideological traditions, it constitutes an integrated cluster of ethical,
political and economic understandings—understandings largely held in
common by present-day “liberals” and “conservatives” alike. As with
CR, we find in CL a view of human nature, a coordinate view of the
proper role of social organization, and thus a view about appropriate
political, economic and legal arrangements. Also as with CR, we find
an ambivalence—now sharpened—toward equality. Indeed we might
view CL as a sharpened, streamlined version of CR itself, a successor to
that earlier tradition in societies that have moved from being
homogeneously agricultural to heterogeneously commercial and
industrial in nature.
On the question of human nature, CL is more subtle than CR. In
keeping with its relative modernity, it purports to be noncommittal on
the metaphysics or psychology of the subject. Yet CL would seem to be
committed nonetheless to some conception of the self by virtue of what
it demands on selves’ behalves.67 Central to CL is the concept of
autonomy, the fundamental right of individuals to shape their lives, their
destinies, their very personalities or selves.68 Hence the canonical CL
rights to “life,” to “liberty,” to “the pursuit of happiness” and
“property.”69 The first is the self’s organic substrate, the second its
DOCTRINE: LOCKE, LIBERALISM, AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1990); KRAMNICK, supra
note 14.
65 See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980); RONALD
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978); NATURAL LAW, LIBERALISM AND MORALITY
(Robert P. George ed., 1996); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993); JOSEPH RAZ, THE
MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986); SANDEL, supra note 8; ROGERS M. SMITH, LIBERALISM AND
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1985); JEREMY WALDRON, LIBERAL RIGHTS (1993).
66 The problematic relations between CL and today’s pejorative use of “liberal” is mirrored
by problematic relations between classical (Burkean) conservatism and today’s “conservatism.”
See, e.g., KEVIN PHILLIPS, WEALTH AND DEMOCRACY: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN RICH (2002); MICHAEL LIND, UP FROM CONSERVATISM (1997); GEORGE F. WILL,
STATECRAFT AS SOULCRAFT (1983); PETER VIERECK, CONSERVATISM REVISITED (rev. ed.
1962).
67 See SANDEL, supra note 8.
68 See sources cited supra note 65.
69 See THOMAS JEFFERSON, A Declaration by the Representatives of the United States of
America, in General Congress Assembled, July 4, 1776, in THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 19
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sphere of unconstrained activity. The third connotes the self’s selfchosen ends in acting—in contemporary terms, its “plan of life”70—and
the fourth is that material which selves must use in seeking ends and in
becoming, shaping or determining themselves. The notion of an
“ownership society,” we will see, requires that we think about the
proper boundaries of and relations among these four CL autonomyrelated rights.
The only restriction of autonomy typically recognized as
legitimate by pure CL finds expression in the proverbial kicker, “as
consistent with the freedom of others.”71 Drawing the line of
demarcation between legitimate autonomy and externality implicit in
this formula of course has proved to be conceptually and practically
perplexing.72 But intuitively the notion strikes one—at any rate the
typical American—as more or less “natural.” It is implicit in the
familiar ideas that “what you do in your own home—though not in
public—is your own affair”;73 that “my right to swing my fist ends at
your nose”; that “I have the right to control my own—but not your—
body”; that “with freedom comes responsibility—the responsibility to
respect the equal freedom of others”; and so on.
The CL shrinkage of the locus—as it were the beneficiary—of
autonomy from the CR household to the individual, and its counterpart
expansion of the sphere of autonomy to all materials that might go into
fabrication of the self—as distinguished from the autarkic familial
estate—results in a metamorphosis of the CR conceptions of virtue and
value. Value in the CR tradition is that which is valued by jointly
deliberating and cooperating freeholders sharing a more or less
common, agricultural, form of life. Ends, and with them value,
accordingly are more or less homogeneous among CR’s constituent
households. It unproblematically makes sense to speak of “social
value” in the CR tradition. Value to unadulterated CL, by contrast, is,
like CL’s constituents and their forms of life, more disaggregated and
various. “Social” value, in so far as the phrase bears meaning, therefore
(Martin E. Segal ed., 1984); see also JOHN LOCKE, Second Treatise of Government, in TWO
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 299 (Peter Laslett ed., 1960).
70 See RAWLS, supra note 6, at 79-80, 358-65 (rev. ed. 1999).
71 See, e.g., id. at 171-227 (discussing a “four stage sequence” for attainment of system of
“equal liberty”).
72 Particularly illuminating mappings of the boundaries of self, responsibility and externality
are Samuel Scheffler, Responsibility, Reactive Attitudes and Liberalism in Philosophy and
Politics, 21 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 299 (1992); Arthur Ripstein, Equality, Luck, and Responsibility,
23 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3 (1994); and David O. Brink, Utilitarian Morality and the Personal Point
of View, 83 J. PHIL. 417 (1986).
73 Billie Holiday’s formulation is particularly compelling: “T’aint nobody’s business if I do.”
BILLIE HOLIDAY, ‘Tain’t Nobody’s Bizness If I Do, on GOD BLESS THE CHILD (MCA Special
Products, January 1, 1995). Compare to the CR counterpart referenced at Part I.A: “A man’s
home [though only his home] is his castle.”)
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comes to be seen as a dynamic composite of or shifting equilibrium
among many distinct individual valuations. Markets therefore ought,
though oddly seldom do, to figure prominently as preferred sites of
valuational expression and allocation in at least a thorough-going CL
thinking.74 (Part II will exploit this role.) They are sites where the
aggregation of relative valuations of disparate goods traded by disparate
persons potentially provides, in the form of relative prices, the only
ethically cognizable relative “social” valuation of goods.75
In the less market-oriented idiom more familiar to Rawlsian
liberals, a “thick” conception of the good—i.e., a widely shared, more
detailed specification of what constitutes the good life76 —yields in CL
to a “thin” conception. Under the latter, “the” good life is simply any
life that is rationally planned in accordance with the autonomous
agent’s view of what constitutes a good life. “Comprehensive views”—
conceptions of “the” good life—are restricted to like-minded
individuals, hence to the “private” realm. “Public” life, by contrast, is
governed only “thinly” by such minimal principles as conduce to each
person’s roughly equal capacity to formulate and pursue her own
“thick” conception of the good life. It is as though the CR respect for
the rough equality of “power” among freeholders has been modernized
to respect for the rough equality of individuals’ “life-planning” or
“happiness-pursuing” autonomy.
One aspect of the CL respect for equal life-planning or happinesspursuing autonomy—at least where it is thorough-going and
consistent—is respect for every person’s equal claim upon the stock of
resources exogenously available for such pursuit.77 Full solicitude for
CL’s right to liberty, that is, requires that special attention be paid CL’s
right to property. This takes us to the importance of the aforementioned
liberty/externality boundary to the realm of ownership itself, not just to
the realm of action: What one may own, not just what one may do,
becomes a politically critical question. The material implications of
equality thus come to constitute yet more acute a matter for CL even
than for CR. Part II seeks to work a resolution to the problem in
synthesizing CL with CR and with the other dominant American
political tradition. For the moment I simply wish to highlight the
74 See infra Part II.C; see also Robert Hockett, The Deep Grammar of Distribution: A MetaTheory of Justice, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1179 (2005) [hereinafter Hockett, Deep Grammar]. The
first liberal-justice theorist to have called attention to the utility of markets as metrics for
purposes of just distribution appears to have been Dworkin. See RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN
VIRTUE 65-119 (2000); see also FREIDRICH A. HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER
(1948).
75 See infra Parts II.C, II.D; Hockett, Deep Grammar, supra note 74.
76 See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 6, at 347-50.
77 By “exogenous” here I mean what Part II.B, infra, defines as “ethically exogenous.”
Roughly, that which is ethically exogenous is that for the holding or non-holding of which one is
not responsible. Holdings of such items are “windfalls,” not holding them “hard luck.”
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importance of the problem to CL in its “sharpened” form.
The liberal conception of the self as work of art can grow
particularly nettlesome when attention turns to the artist’s materials.
For CR the matter was in some ways simpler than it is for CL.
Worthwhile life took essentially one form, namely agrarian.
Households accordingly sought ownership of a more or less
homogeneous good: arable land. Rough equality in holdings of that
resource was both a predicate and a goal of successful republican selfgovernment. What to do, then, in theory was clear: Allocate land more
or less equitably. And rough equality in holdings of land, in view of its
relative homogeneity, would have presented but minimal measurement
difficulties. It was only in practice that problems might have arisen—
problems rooted in the psychology of ownership charted infra, Part III.
For CL, by contrast, where many forms of worthwhile life, not just
agrarian life, are pursued, a greater variety of resource-types go into
happiness-pursuit.
Those resources are heterogeneous, perhaps
incommensurable. Thus it is no longer immediately apparent what
roughly “equal claims” to such resources can mean. Add to this the fact
that CL historically has emphasized community, hence mutual
responsibility, less heavily than has CR, and it grows particularly
puzzling just what “we” are required to do, if anything, about disparities
in happiness-pursuing opportunity. State action to redistribute resources
in keeping with fair distribution principles, moreover, would involve
organized coercion—the abusive use of which is something against
which both CR and CL counsel that the citizenry remain ever-vigilant.
In view of uncertainty, then, in addition to traditional CL suspicion of
authority and CL down-playing of responsibility, concerted
egalitarianly-motivated action can seem, superficially at any rate—
especially to those from whom the state might confiscate—an affront to,
rather than a vindication of, liberal autonomy itself. CL therefore bears
within itself in practice, if not in theory, an ambivalence toward equality
quite counterpart to that displayed by CR. That ambivalence finds
expression in the divide between self-professed “libertarian” and
“egalitarian” adherents to the liberal tradition.78
On the other hand, by CL’s own lights, it cannot be the case that
we are required to do nothing about resource inequities. It is “selfevident” that one’s successful “pursuit of happiness” depends critically
upon her holdings of “property.” What sense is there in the claim that

78 Those commonly classed as egalitarian liberals include ACKERMAN, supra note 65;
DWORKIN, supra note 74; and RAWLS, supra note 6. There are of course many others. The bestknown libertarian liberal is Nozick. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA
(1974). Again there are others, including, on some understandings of “libertarian,” Epstein and
Fried. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN (1985); CHARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG (1978).
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“all men are created equal,” and in the consequent exaltation of each
person’s equal right to pursue happiness, if the practical capacity to
realize that right might differ quite dramatically from individual to
individual according to one’s birth, altogether faultlessly and arbitrarily,
to different parents, into different educational and social opportunities,
and so on? For liberalism not to degenerate into mere libertinism, then,
and for the freedom of one to be consistent with the equal freedom of
others, some degree or form of “initial” opportunity- or resourceequalizing must be advocated by the thoroughgoing liberal. It is the
counterpart, in the realm of material ownership, to the CL “fist and
nose” question that arises in the realm of action. Unearned inegality is
externality as surely as is legally discouraged, tortious behavior.
The CL tradition, complete with inner tensions, figures
prominently in many of the seminal writings and debates that, in tandem
with the CR tradition, both stamped and reflected the thinking of the
American founders. Most American secondary school or university
students are exposed to the CL notion of a voluntarist “social contract”
that has so influenced our society’s self-understanding from its earliest
days.79 Most students probably also have been exposed to the writings
of those sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth century CL philosophers
from whom the notion derives, and are familiar with the influence that
those writings—particularly those of Hobbes, Locke, possibly Rousseau
and certainly Montesquieu—directly exerted over the minds of the
American founders.80 Indeed, the best known product of the mind of
that most celebrated of American civic republicans—Jefferson’s
Declaration of Independence, from which the earlier mentioned
enumeration of rights to life, liberty, etc. derives—is widely observed to
read nearly as an abstract of Locke’s Second Treatise on Government, a
classic liberal sourcebook.81
The “individualism,” as distinguished from CR “solidarism,” that
is characteristic of the CL sensibility also has been a commonplace
among the “ordinary people” of America from early on in the republic’s
social history. That feature finds expression to this day in, among other
places, the fact that our most frequently encountered interpretations of
the aforementioned “social contract” seem to involve more conditions
that we impose upon “society” in return for our “consent” to join, than
conditions to which we agree to subject ourselves in return for society’s
protection. Probably the most authoritative historical observer of this
American liberal individualism was, of course, de Tocqueville, who
79 Our written constitution and constitutional traditions themselves appear to have sprung
from the contracts—or “compacts”—that were the early colonial charters. See, e.g., KERMIT L.
HALL ET AL., AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY: CASES AND MATERIALS 10-23 (1991).
80 See sources cited supra note 64.
81 Id.; see also sources cited supra note 69.
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both charted the rootedness of individualism—hence, CL—in American
communal localism—CR—and drew attention to the ever-present
danger that the former might subvert the latter.82 We find this very
tension singled-out and worried-over to this day, most recently in a
spate of Tocquevillian-ringing critiques of contemporary American CL
sensibility.83
Probably those great American public debates in which CL and its
tensions have figured most prominently have been legal—above all,
constitutional—in nature. Much of First Amendment jurisprudence can
be read as an attempt by judges to demarcate classic CL boundaries—
the boundary between “public” and “private,” and the boundary
between legitimate liberty and impermissible cost-externalization
broadly defined. With respect to the public/private divide, one
conventional view of the courts’ Religion Clauses jurisprudence is that
it is aimed simultaneously at safeguarding individuals’ right to form and
live-out their “comprehensive views” of “the good life” free of state
coercion, and at preventing the state from favoring some such
comprehensive views over others.84
With respect to the
liberty/externality divide, the courts have famously judged the
proverbial shouting of “Fire!” in the crowded theatre to fall squarely on
the externality side of the divide.85 But they of course struggle to this
day over where “hate speech,” some forms of commercial speech and
pornography, and political campaign expenditure fall.86
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment “substantive” due process
jurisprudence tracks First Amendment jurisprudence in its puzzling over
where to draw the line of demarcation between private and public,
liberty and externality.87 Lochner infamously favored libertarian-liberal
freedom of contract over egalitarian-liberal equalizing of de facto
bargaining power and consequent opportunity.88 Those decisions of the
82 See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 506-513 (George Lawrence
trans., 1969).
83 See, e.g., SANDEL, supra note 8; GLENDON, supra note 59; ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL.,
HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE (1985); ROBERT
D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY
(2001); JEDEDIAH PURDY, FOR COMMON THINGS: IRONY, TRUST AND COMMITMENT IN
AMERICA TODAY (2000).
84 See, e.g., ROBERT AUDI & NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF, RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SQUARE:
THE PLACE OF RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS IN POLITICAL DEBATE (1997); KENT GREENAWALT,
PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS (1995); KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS
CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE (1988).
85 See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 50 (1919) (Justice Holmes) (“The most
stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre,
and causing a panic.”)
86 See, e.g., KENT GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WORDS (1995); sources cited supra note 62.
87 See generally EDWARD KEYNES, LIBERTY, PROPERTY, AND PRIVACY: TOWARD A
JURISPRUDENCE OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS (1996).
88 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); see also PAUL KENS, LOCHNER V. NEW YORK:
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1930s circumventing or implicitly repudiating Lochner—not
surprisingly through the collectivity-concerning Commerce Clause—
emphasized effects beyond the farm wrought by the farmer, so to speak.
They did so at the forthrightly acknowledged cost of individual farmers’
more immediate and uncoordinated freedoms.89 The “civil libertarian”
decisions of the later 1950s through the early 1990s90 resurrected
substantive due process, this time on behalf of so-called “civil” as
opposed to “economic” rights. The latter, oddly, were—and oft still
are—said to have been “discredited,” rather than simply incorrectly
demarcated, by Lochner.91 Quite like Lochner itself, however, certain
of these civil libertarian decisions arguably strengthen the autonomy of
some by permitting perceivedly unjust cost-externalization onto others.
To some abortion rights opponents, for example, it seems a mother’s
rights to liberty and the pursuit of happiness since Roe v. Wade92 may
inappropriately trump a living child’s—an “unborn person’s”—right to
life itself.93
It is of course not to present purposes to attempt a definitive
solution to all public/private and liberty/externality CL conundra. What
matters for the present is to recognize that, in so far as we continue to
struggle with these problems, we are classical liberals, sometimes with a
touch of civic republicanism added to our mix.94 And we sometimes
find our CL struggle taking place within the context of ownership
itself—e.g., in debates over tax policy and in continuing constitutional

ECONOMIC REGULATION ON TRIAL (1998); HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED:
THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE (1993).
89 See, e.g., Hegeman Farms Corp. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 163 (1934); Schecter Poultry Corp.
v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144
(1938); see generally JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS (2d ed. 1998); WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG,
THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT
(1995).
90 See generally WILLIAM F. SWINDLER, COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN THE 20TH CENTURY:
THE NEW LEGALITY 1932-1968 (1970); KEYNES, supra note 87; see also SAMUEL WALKER, THE
RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RIGHTS AND COMMUNITY IN MODERN AMERICA (1998).
91 See KEYNES, supra note 87, on the oddity.
92 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
93 See, e.g., KEYNES, supra note 87; RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT
ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM (1994); LAWRENCE H. TRIBE,
ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES (1990); MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE
IN WESTERN LAW (1987).
94 One argument in favor of campaign finance regulation, for example, distinct from the
egalitarian-liberal (“level the playing field”) argument set against the libertarian-liberal (“more
speech, not less”), is the more republican-ringing “foster deliberation by limiting sound bites”
argument. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH, supra note 62
at 241-52. Likewise, one finds not only CL (child’s right to life) arguments against CL (mother’s
right to make reproductive choices) arguments, but some more CR-ringing (“culture of life”)
arguments as well. See GLENDON, supra note 93. One might say, paraphrasing Jefferson again,
“we are all classical liberals, we are all civic republicans.”
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controversy over takings and “unconstitutional conditions.”95 What will
prove more helpful in the subsequent portions of this Article is that
nonetheless, where ownership is our interest, there is much room for a
broad overlapping consensus among classical liberals and civic
republicans alike as to how we should understand and foster ownership.
We will also see that that consensus is wide open to our other
constitutive political tradition.
C.

Pragmatic Consequentialists

Not all public policies need be advocated or defended by reference
to systematic ideologies. Probably most distinct proposals advocated in
America—if not indeed in most English-descended societies with their
empiricist, experimentalist intellectual traditions—can by dint of their
simple instrumental purposes be argued to conform to any number of
sophisticated normative visions. They are simply “good ideas” in any
number of senses, are value-wise overdetermined. And this valueoverdetermination can itself be advertised as a value—a sort of metavalue rather in the way that tolerance constitutes the CL meta-virtue. It
therefore would be convenient to recognize a residual or second order
value-space in American public policy, additional to those determined
by CR and CL even were “pragmatism” or “results-orientation” not a
critical part of our American self-understanding.
As it happens, however, pragmatism or results-orientation does
constitute a critical part of our self-understanding. We have prided
ourselves precisely on our being a “practical,” as distinguished from a
“doctrinaire,” “closed-minded” or “ideological” people. And indeed the
so-called “school” of “pragmatism,” as a philosophic orientation,
commonly is said to have originated in America in the nineteenth
century—among others, in the thought of Dewey, Pierce and James.96
Americans’ best-known intervention in the realm of legal theory—socalled “American Legal Realism”—in turn, for its part can be, and often
is, viewed as a kind of “legal pragmatism,” or “instrumentalist”
orientation toward the law itself.97 In the realms of law and policy
95
96

See infra Part III.B.3.
See generally PRAGMATISM: A READER (Louis Menand ed., 1997) and, somewhat more
entertainingly, LOUIS MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB: A STORY OF IDEAS IN AMERICA
(2001).
97 See NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 65-159 (1995); HORWITZ,
supra note 33, at 1-30; MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 18701960, at 169-212 (1992). Probably the most oft-quoted characterization of American law,
Holmes’s “The life of the law has not been logic, it has been experience,” is both a classic
expression of the pragmatic attitude and a perfect exemplar of the ultimate emptiness of
pragmatism until it is filled-in with a criterion of value. On the need for such a criterion, see infra
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alike, then, Americans are thought to care about “results.” We
consistently have looked to likely consequences “on the ground” in
addressing legal controversies and public policy proposals, and have
prided ourselves for that.98
Even self-described pragmatists, however, require some criterion
or criteria by which, implicitly or otherwise, to judge results as good or
ill. Meta-values are not helpful absent values. One place to look for
such criteria on the American scene, of course, would be the CR and the
CL traditions just discussed. In practice, however, the style of thought
that I shall call “pragmatic consequentialist” (PC) in the AngloAmerican tradition—including both the legal and the legislative
traditions—has tended toward two simple, stripped-down focal points as
“goodness” determinants. It is these tendencies—both the tendency to
settle upon simple rules of thumb, and the contents of those simple rules
themselves—that most (though only somewhat) distinguish PC from
CR, CL, and other policy-evaluative traditions. We shall see in the next
Part, however, that the PC rules of thumb are reconcilable with one
another. And we will see that, in so far as each is modulated by the
other, both are consonant with CR and CL where the notion of an
“ownership society” is concerned. In fact, it looks as if the PC focal
points are simply stripped-down versions of CL values themselves,
rather in the way that CL can be viewed as a “streamlined” version of
CR.
The first PC focal point is aggregated wealth or welfare. The rule
of thumb associated with that aggregate is to maximize it. The degree
of success that a polity attains in seeking to maximize is the degree of
“efficiency” that it achieves. In its earliest formulations, this rule of
thumb was proffered simultaneously with the second PC rule of thumb,
considered infra, namely equalization. As articulated by the first
consequentialists in the Anglo-American policy tradition—Bentham
and his “Utilitarian” followers—appropriate legislation and adjudication
were such as would maximize “the greatest good for the greatest
number.”99 Strictly speaking, of course, that formulation is incoherent;
absent one particular happy accident that I shall in a moment specify, it

this Subpart. The Holmesian quote is from OLIVER W. HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in
COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167 (1920). On Holmes’s relations with the early American
pragmatists, see MENAND, supra note 96.
98 For an articulation and defense of a contemporary legal pragmatism, see RICHARD A.
POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW (1995). For celebrations of the Supreme Court’s own putative
pragmatism, see, e.g., JAMES F. SIMON, THE CENTER HOLDS: THE POWER STRUGGLE INSIDE THE
REHNQUIST COURT (1995); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE ASCENT OF PRAGMATISM: THE BURGER
COURT IN ACTION (1990).
99 See Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789),
excerpted in JOHN STUART MILL & JEREMY BENTHAM, UTILITARIANISM AND OTHER ESSAYS
86-89 (Alan Ryan ed., 1987).
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cannot guide. For it imports two analytically distinct optimanda100
while providing no instruction as to how we are to rank-order in
circumstances—if any—where they cannot both be optimized. As it
happens, however, the divergence between optimanda is more stark
where wealth rather than welfare is what would be maximized.
Where welfare, not wealth, is maximandum,101 it often has been
thought that a fair degree of equalization among persons’ consumptions
is consistent with the maximization of aggregate “welfare,”
“satisfaction,” “happiness” or “utility.” Bentham and his immediate
followers evidently believed so. The guiding thought is that the more or
less familiar phenomenon of diminishing marginal utility implies that
“total happiness” is maximized if all consume a gracious plenty of
consumables rather than if some consume a great deal while others
consume little.102 “Fairness,” then, in at least a simple-minded, equalholdings sense, could be efficient in a pre-Paretian or Paretian, welfaremaximizing sense.103 Hence some English PC-predecessor advocates—
including Bentham in the nineteenth century, Pigou and Lerner in the
early- to mid-twentieth century—as well as some exponents of the
“optimal taxation” movement in the later twentieth century, have
advocated some degree of income-equalization as a means to utilitymaximization.104 But of course not everyone has agreed upon the
implicit definitions here of “fairness” and “efficiency.” Nor have all
agreed upon the empirical question of the shapes of our utility
functions.
As it happens, there has not proved much enduring occasion to sort
these matters out for purposes of mainstream American public policy, at
least not in connection with utility-maximization.
For more
fundamental difficulties attending utility-measurement and interpersonal
comparison—difficulties we shall treat of more in Part II—themselves
resulted in rapid movement, by the early middle twentieth century, on
the part of consequentialists from Utilitarian aggregation to another
form of aggregation—that of “wealth”—and thus to a new criterion of
100
101

That is, values to be optimized.
That is, value to be maximized, sometimes abbreviated as “maximand.”
102 See, e.g., John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM AND OTHER ESSAYS 272,
supra note 99, at 335-36; HENRY SIDGWICK, METHODS OF ETHICS 416 (7th ed. 1907); R. M.
HARE, FREEDOM & REASON 112-36 (1963).
103 See VILFREDO PARETO, THE MIND AND SOCIETY, VOL. 4: THE GENERAL FORM OF
SOCIETY 1459-74 (Andrew Bongiorno et al. trans., 1935) (1907) (especially pages 1465 to 1469);
VILFREDO PARETO, MANUAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (Ann. S. Schwier trans., 1971) (1906).
Pareto-efficiency is considered at Part II.D, infra.
104 See ARTHUR CECIL PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (1952); ABBA P. LERNER, THE
ECONOMICS OF CONTROL (1944); J.A. Mirrlees, An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum
Income Taxation, 38 REV. ECON. STUD. 175 (1971); J.A. Mirrlees, The Theory of Optimal
Taxation, in HANDBOOK OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS 1197 (K.J. Arrow & M. Intriligator
eds., 1981).

2005]

OWNERSHIP SOCIETY

27

efficiency, namely so-called Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.105 Roughly, the
idea here was that dollar (or pound sterling) value is a close enough
proxy for happiness, while being more readily measurable both in
aggregate and as between persons in the holding, as to constitute a more
appropriate maximandum for purposes of policy.
For a number of reasons and in a number of ways, this shift from
welfare to wealth has proved ethically and indeed conceptually
unsatisfactory, though that has not deterred some PC advocates. First,
the continued focus upon aggregate-maximization subjects wealthmaximization to the same potential distributive fairness and ethical
intelligibility problems that plague strict Utilitarianism.106 But second,
the shift to wealth as maximand severs the link between equality and
efficiency that Utilitarianism could boast, at least given certain
properties of utility functions. For while diminishing marginal utility
might mean that more equitable distribution yields higher aggregate
utility, it does not mean that more equitable distribution yields higher
wealth. Relatedly, the shift from welfare-maximization to wealthmaximization renders maximization more overtly fetishistic; we’re
maximizing a physical substance, not a spuriously personified
“society’s” purported “pleasure.” And it invites analytic incoherence,
as manifest in the notorious proof that two distributions can be KaldorHicks superior to one another.107 We will address such problems
squarely, with a view to solving them for the American OS, in the next
Part. For present American tradition-mapping purposes, it suffices
simply to highlight this fact: that a conspicuous strand of the American
PC tradition in legal and policy discussion is what we can call the
“wealth-maximizing,” or “GDP-max” strand. Lawyers of course will
recognize the prominence of this strand in the “law and economics”
movement.108 Followers of policy debate more generally will recognize
the presence of such thinking in the oft-encountered justifications of
policies or proposals in terms of their effects upon aggregated
“economic growth.” And they will find it implicit in constant
recitations of GDP, DJI, “productivity” and other aggregate-related
figures in both policy debates and daily news reports.
The second PC focal point in the American legal and policy
105 See Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons
of Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549 (1939); John R. Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49
ECON. J. 696 (1939); John Hicks, The Valuation of the Social Income, 7 ECONOMICA 105 (1940).
106 More on this infra, Part II.D.
107 See Tibor De Scitovszky, A Note on Welfare Propositions in Economics, 9 REV. ECON.
STUD. 77, 88 (1941); see also HAL R. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 405-07 (3d ed.
1992).
108 See Richard Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics and Social Theory, 8 J. LEG. STUD. 487
(1979); Richard Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law
Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487 (1980) [hereinafter Posner, Ethical Basis], in which Posner
acknowledges that “wealth-maximization” is policy made pursuant to the Kaldor-Hicks criterion.
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tradition is fairness. Even aggregationists often seek to justify, or
mitigate, their maximizing prescriptions by reference to fairnessimporting or other distribution-germane observations. We saw this
already in connection with egalitarian utility-maximizers. Examples in
the realm of wealth-maximization include such wearying adages as that
“a rising tide lifts all boats”; that maximized wealth “trickles down”;
that “the poor are lazy” or otherwise fault-worthy; that those who are
paid most are those who contribute most (i.e., that they are paid
according to their marginal product); that all persons “would” consent
to wealth-maximization as social choice rule were they selecting such
rules from behind a veil of ignorance; and so on.109 All of these familiar
claims suggest that aggregationists are aware, however obliquely, of the
ethically objectionable fetishism that characterizes maximization when
employed as a rule of thumb when that rule is stripped of distribution or
fairness considerations as co-operative constitutive concerns.
But even apart from such fairness-hedging of the aggregationist
position, we find fairness-oriented or prioritarian110 legislation and
jurisprudence themselves as principal kinds additional to those geared
toward wealth-maximization.
Indeed, probably the most longremembered, epoch-making court-decisions and legislation of recent
decades are of this type—or of the type that can be viewed as
simultaneously maximizing and equalizing. The social insurance
programs put into place during the New Deal, the Employment Act of
1946, the “War on Poverty” and “Great Society” legislation of the
1960s, and much of the civil rights and anti-discrimination legislation of
the 1940s through the 1990s are among the best-known cases in point.
We shall see in the next Part that maximization of any wealth that
is conceptually cognizable—rather than simply labeled—as wealth is
complementary with the equalization of—i.e., the fair distribution of—
wealth-creating opportunity. That complementarity is central to
showing PC’s rules of thumb as CR- and CL-resonant norms.

109 See, e.g., Posner, Ethical Basis, supra note 108. The veiled-consent argument has of
course appeared (rather earlier) in the writings of utility-maximizers as well. See John Harsanyi,
Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 63 J. POL.
ECON. 309 (1955); John Harsanyi, Cardinal Utility in Welfare Economics and in the Theory of
Risk-Taking, 61 J. POL. ECON. 434 (1953); William Vickrey, Utility, Strategy, and Social
Decision Rules, 74 Q. J. ECON. 507 (1960).
110 “Prioritarian” policies are such as would benefit the perceivedly worst-off. Rawls’s
“difference principle” is prioritarian in this sense, as are the U.S. Internal Revenue Code and the
Social Security system. See generally Derek Parfit, Equality or Priority?, The Lindley Lecture,
University of Kansas (1991). Rawls’s “difference principle,” pursuant to which only such
departures from inequality of holdings as inure to the benefit of the “worst off” are to be
permitted, is elaborated in RAWLS, supra note 6, at 65-73.
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II. DRAWING OUT THE COMMON CORE: OUR EFFICIENT
EQUAL-OPPORTUNITY REPUBLIC
An ownership society that we can call our own should give
expression, in so far as it is possible, to the three political traditions that
constitute our national self-understanding. With a view to that end, this
Part synthesizes a unified political self-understanding from the three
traditions of American self-understanding laid out in Part I. It does not
pretend to find agreement among the three traditions in respect of all
points that matter to them. The claim is simply that the three traditions
can be seen as one on the question of what an American “ownership
society” (hereinafter “OS”) should be. What is needed is first to show
that this is so, and second, for purposes of mutual intelligibility, to forge
a neutral vocabulary, usable by all, which prevents misunderstanding
and incorporates the synthesis.
The synthesis proceeds by attending carefully to three constitutive
“variables” that any normative political tradition, if it is to be complete,
must fill. In particular, a tradition must assign values to those three
variables if it is to specify the basic contours of an OS. The variables
that must be filled are the gaps opened by the questions (a) “who owns,”
(b) “what is owned,” and (c) “by what general principle or principles are
ownership rights determined.”111
I claim that the three American political traditions adumbrated in
Part I do in effect fill the gaps, albeit with differing degrees of
explicitness, and that there is broad agreement among them in respect of
their filling. That means that the values assigned to the variables are
effectively invariant among traditions, meaning in turn that my
synthesis’s values are “our”—American—values where an OS is
concerned. The American OS is in that sense the joint product of the
three traditions. It is what we might call, borrowing from the language
of all three of those political self-understandings, an “efficient equalopportunity republic” (EEOR).
A.

Autonomy as Responsible Liberty

All three American political self-understandings effectively
construe citizens as autonomous, boundedly responsible agents.112 That
111 The variable-filling approach to theory-mapping also figures into Hockett, Deep Grammar,
supra note 74.
112 In this connection, the recent work of historian James Block is both interesting and
corroborative. See JAMES E. BLOCK, A NATION OF AGENTS: THE AMERICAN PATH TO A
MODERN SELF AND SOCIETY (2002); see also Hockett ,supra note 74, at 138-41 (construal of
“distribuees” as agents said to be the modern trend in theories of distributive justice). We find the
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is what “liberty,” when fully thought-through, connotes. Responsible
agents effect or affect their own well-being. But they also are
constrained, to indeterminate degree, in so doing by features of the
environments into which they are born. Their inherited capacities—
themselves features of those environments—permit them wide, but
nonetheless limited, latitude in altering or exiting their environments.
As an empirical matter, this construal of citizens as agents is
consonant with our own experience of action—of our “moral
experience,” so to speak. We experience ourselves and others as free
and as freely choosing. That experience itself is reflected in our
familiar capacities to experience feelings of guilt, shame, frustration
with self, resentment of others, and cognate emotions the reasonability
of which presupposes the proposition that people often can choose other
than as they do.113 Yet we also know that we and others are bounded—
constrained and affected—by our backgrounds and environments.
Hence we also sometimes experience, again reasonably, feelings of
mercy, forgiveness, and charity toward self and toward others.
As a conceptual matter, the view of citizens as agents underwrites,
or is coordinate with, our belief that others are to be respected. It hangs
together with our belief that others bear dignitary interests and certain
fundamental rights—including that to liberty or autonomy—which are
coordinate with such interests. It is because we see others as agents,
and respect them as such, that we hold them self-evidently endowed
with rights not only to life, but to liberty and the pursuit of happiness—
the rights to build “prosperous” or “meaningful” lives. That it is “their”
pursuit stems from their agency.
It is critical to note in this connection, though it seems to be oftoverlooked at least in the CL tradition, that respect for others’ agency
entails more than respect for their freedom to choose and to act. It also,
and equally, entails respect for their living with many of the
consequences of their choices and actions. It entails, that is, our holding
others—again, boundedly—responsible. To let others too often “off of
the hook,” for example, with the observation that “they cannot help it,”
would be to view them not as agents—active forgers of fate—but as
patients or addicts—passive objects of fate.114 To let them never off of
perceived value of agency reflected in popular culture via the increasingly common, though
strictly speaking redundant, notion of the “free agent.” That term of course figures frequently in
descriptions of sports figures, but also, increasingly, in the popular business literature. See, e.g.,
DANIEL H. PINK, FREE AGENT NATION: THE FUTURE OF WORKING FOR YOURSELF (2002).
113 See, in this connection, BERNARD WILLIAMS, SHAME AND NECESSITY (1993); Peter F.
Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, 48 PROC. BRIT. ACAD. 1 (1962); see also Scheffler, supra
note 72.
114 See Hockett, Deep Grammar, supra note 74; see also Robert Hockett, Three (Potential)
Pillars of Transnational Economic Justice: The Bretton Woods Institutions as Guarantors of
Global Equal Treatment and Market Completion, 36 METAPHILOSOPHY 1 (2005); DWORKIN,
supra note 74, at 285-303; Daniel Markovits, How Much Redistribution Should There Be?, 112
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the hook, of course, also would be unreasonable. Mercy or charity, in
this connection, can be viewed as a kind of compromise, a reasonable
compromise, which as agents we make with our recognition of the
limitations of our own agency. In circumstances that we recognize to be
beyond the agency of nearly any among us save heroes, we “cut”—or
recognize—“some slack.” But to allow such exceptions to swallow the
rule—to let the whole rope go slack—would be to eschew the category
of responsibility, hence of respect and of agency, altogether.
The appreciation of bounded, responsible agency ultimately
underwrites the CR view of citizens as independent and acquiring but
nonetheless corruptible and hyper-acquisitive beings whose
corruptibility and hyper-acquisitiveness are modulated as they
respond—and are thus rendered responsible—to others who are their
rough equals in capacity and vulnerability. It also underlies the CL
view of citizens as autonomous but potentially over-reaching selves
who impermissibly externalize costs in so far as they take more than
their legitimate shares of benefits—selves who must therefore be held to
account. Responsible agency does not, on the other hand, figure
prominently into the PC tradition. But neither is there anything in that
ad hoc and minimalist tradition that need contradict agency.115 Indeed,
it will be apparent below that the only intelligible accounts to be given
the familiar PC fairness and efficiency must be understood by reference
to responsible agency. Responsible agents are the only beings in
connection with whom it makes sense to speak of “wealth” as bearing
“value” and of “allocations” as being “fair.”
B.

Responsible Liberty as Equal Opportunity

The consensus view of citizens as responsible agents suggests a
view of ethically and politically salient assets—what we shall see in
Part III to constitute the stuff of ownership—as anything which citizens
themselves autonomously value. Assets are what citizens use in seeking
their self-chosen ends, in “pursuing happiness.” Salient liabilities, in
turn, are just the converse. If citizens are agents whose autonomy in
defining and pursuing happiness is to be respected, then the assets that
will be of concern to the laws and policies of the CR, CL or PC polity—
the EEOR—will be such distributable items as concern those citizens
YALE L.J. 2291 (2003).
115 Utilitarianism, on the other hand, at least in its non-veiled, non-Harsanyian form, would
contradict it by treating citizens as patients or addicts, i.e., as passive objects of policy or as needy
desirers wishing that they were free of their desires. See Hockett, Deep Grammar, supra note 74,
at 191-205; DWORKIN, supra note 74, at 11-64 (“addicts”). But PC merely borrows a
maximizing imperative from Utilitarianism; it is not coextensive with it.
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themselves.
For purposes of a shared civic vocabulary in the EEOR or
American OS, the best way to designate such items of concern—at least
the desired ones (assets), so as both to denote them in agent-neutral
terms and to render transparent the fact that their political cognizability
is dependent upon their relevance to life-building agents—is as generic
“resources,” or “opportunities.”
Those are the stuff of which
worthwhile lives—as judged by independent, valuing citizen-agents
themselves—are made. Citizens do the life-making, and resources and
opportunities are the materials with which they do that making.
Resources and opportunities, then, are the material correlates of agency
itself. Construing citizens as agents commits us to the view that
resources and opportunities are the “assets” that a political society of
agents like the American EEOR must view as ethically or politically
relevant. They are that in which ownership rights should inhere.116
It is critical—though again, seemingly oft-overlooked in this
connection—that just as agent-relevant autonomy or liberty is
responsible and accountable autonomy or liberty, so is agent-relevant
resource or opportunity equitable resource or opportunity.
Opportunity-equality is the material correlate of agent-responsibility,
just as opportunity shorn of equality is liberty shorn of responsibility,
which is libertinism.117 One is not responsive to the agency of others—
one does not think, opine or act responsibly toward or “account” to
them—in so far as one, explicitly or implicitly, demands greater
exogenously given opportunity than they. One does not respect them as
agents, as one’s moral equals—one does not even recognize them as
agents at all, rather than as resources themselves—in so far as one
makes or effectively commits oneself to such demands.118 Call this the
“equal opportunity principle” (EOP).
As abstract propositions, these claims, like the construal of citizens
as agents, all are consonant with the constitutive valuations of the CR,
CL and PC traditions, hence of the American tradition. CR is
inchoately rooted, as observed in Part I.A, in an equilibrium of roughly
equally empowered persons who would grab all the land that they
physically could were they not constrained by others’ equal grabbing.
CL in turn is rooted, as observed at Part I.B, ultimately in the notion of
an equilibrium of equal freedoms—practical, not just theoretic
freedoms—held by equal agents. And PC, as noted at Part I.C, settles
116 Part III, infra, is devoted to the more precise legal contours and psychological significance
of ownership in the EEOR or American OS.
117 “Libertarianism,” as articulated by such as NOZICK, supra note 78, and EPSTEIN, supra
note 78, is libertinism—irresponsible liberalism, attending to liberty while ignoring responsible
liberty.
118 Nor of course does one respect one’s self, or act responsibly toward oneself or toward
others, in so far as one does not honor one’s own equal right to equal opportunity as well.
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on the focal points of fairness and efficiency in its assessments of such
public policies as effect distributions of benefit; while fairness and
efficiency, we shall see, in turn are best construed as properties of
distributions that reflect equality of opportunity and differential result of
differential responsible diligence. In theory, then, all three American
political self-understandings effectively commit themselves to equal
“real” or “material”—not just formal—opportunity.
It might be thought that there cannot be a consensus view among
CR, CL and PC on the matter of responsible liberty’s entailing equal
opportunity, at least in so far as the latter term is taken to embrace
material resources. For there does not appear to be an easy consensus
even within each of these traditions on the appropriate distribution of
the latter. Did not Part I, in fact, take explicit note of “ambivalence” in
CR, CL and PC over equality? In fact, however, the appearance of
disagreement within traditions is misleading. That appearance owes to
two related factors.
The first and more easily dispatched factor is a semantic ambiguity
in the term “resource”—an ambiguity that also can afflict the term
“opportunity,” though it tends not to do so owing to the more common
“default” understanding of the term. “Resource” or “opportunity” can
be taken to denote anything that enters into a “production function,”
irrespective of the circumstances under which the producer has acquired
that “input.” Or it can be taken to denote only such inputs for the
possession of which the producer is not actually responsible. We tend
generally to understand “opportunity” in the latter sense, “resource”
often in the former sense, though it is not strictly incorrect to understand
either word in either sense.
In order to eliminate the semantic ambiguity, I generically
employ—and hereby propose that the EEOR or American OS employ—
the modifier “ethically endogenous” to designate resources and
opportunities for the enjoyment or holding of which agents can
reasonably be held responsible. I propose “ethically exogenous” to
designate those for which they cannot.
Ethically exogenous
opportunities or resources are “windfalls”; ethically exogenous deficits
are “hard luck.” Ethically endogenous opportunities, resources or
deficits therein have been “earned,” or are “deserved.” The ethically
endogenous component of one’s holdings, then, is that component for
the holding of which the citizen, conceived as a responsible agent, is
appropriately credited or debited—held ethically deserving or
accountable. So far as we know or are led by our experience of agency
to suppose, she could voluntarily have acted or felt, and thus held,
differently. And it is profoundly to disrespect her fundamental
agency—to treat her as a passive object of fate rather than as an active,
fate-altering agent—to hold otherwise.
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The ethically exogenous portion of one’s holdings is that portion
for which she is not responsible—that portion over the holding of which
there is good reason to suppose, in view of our experience of agency,
that she bore no choice, or for which she deserves no credit or blame.
And it is profoundly disrespectful of her equal ethical standing, prior to
acting, not to regard her unequal holdings of this material, vis-a-vis
other citizens, as actionable absent some compelling countervailing
consideration. It is disrespectful of citizens’ responsible agency, then—
their equal self-constitutive rights, their equal liberty, their equal worth,
their equal moral autonomy and equal accountability—not to work to
equalize, so far as this is possible, their ethically exogenous resources or
opportunities. And it is equally disrespectful of citizens’ responsible
agency not to respect variations—inequalities—in their holdings of
ethically endogenous opportunity or resource—i.e., opportunities or
resources that they have opened or created or squandered for
themselves, items that they have earned or forgone.119
The second, more difficult factor that sometimes gives rise to an
appearance of disagreement is implicit in the just-drawn
endogeneity/exogeneity divide itself. And it is indeed implicit in the
earlier characterization of agency itself as “bounded.” That factor is the
difficulty, at least at the margins, of drawing the boundary. We might
call this the “tracing” problem—the problem of tracing portions of
one’s holdings separately back to ethically endogenous choice and
ethically exogenous circumstance. Where the problem gives rise to
disagreement, we might call that disagreement, borrowing the
suggestive language of the American Homesteading era, the “boundary
dispute.” (I shall employ both locutions.) It is, in fact, simply the
difficulty noted above, at Part I.B, in connection with CL’s conundra
over the private/public and autonomy/externality divides. The same
difficulty, in fuzzier form, we observed in the CR and PC traditions.
The EEOR or American OS must face it head-on.
The tracing problem bears both a conceptual and an empirical
aspect, though both aspects intermeld. The conceptual aspect of the
problem comes in part with our uncertainty, in “borderline” cases, over
what it is appropriate to hold people responsible for. There is
uncertainty first over whether responsibility should be understood by
reference to choice or to what might be called “ratification.”120 And
119 See Hockett, Deep Grammar, supra note 74, at 1318, for more on the trend among those
there labeled “responsibility-tracing” justice-theorists to alight upon functional equivalents to this
divide. Those functional equivalents take the form of (a) particular characterizations of
distribuenda—that which is distributed—(b) particular characterizations of the appropriate
distribution principle, or (c) both.
120 I adopt the term “ratification” here from the law for what I think will be obvious reasons.
The choice versus ratification controversy is rooted in the perceived disrespect of agency entailed
by not holding someone responsible for such conditions as she might not have chosen but with
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there is uncertainty second over, if the answer be choice, what choices
truly are “freely” made. In so far as choice is made the touchstone, the
conceptual aspect of the tracing problem mingles with the empirical
aspect of the same. The problem is that there appear to be differing
degrees of freedom inhering in differing choices. One is not simply free
or unfree; rather, one is more free or less free in making one’s choices.
The concept of responsibility is thus subject to problems in the
application familiar to students of the “logic of vagueness” since the
time of the Sorites paradox at latest.121
Compounding the Sorites-side of the empirical aspect of the
tracing problem is the fact that most resources or opportunities that one
enjoys are the product of concatenated occurrences involving both
chance and choice. Thus, even were it easy, in a binary manner, to
describe any one choice simply as either freely made or forced, it
nonetheless would be daunting to parse out, say, some fraction f of
one’s holdings attributable solely to her responsible choices and a
complement 1– f of that fraction attributable simply to fortune. Add to
this concern the fact that it might be difficult or even impossible—
owing to interpersonal utility-comparability and inter-item
commensurability difficulties of the sort flagged above at Part I.C and
which she nonetheless identifies. Forcing an equal distribution upon an ascetically minded
cripple, for example, notwithstanding his belief in the virtue of a life of self-denial, is thought by
some to be disrespectful of the ascetic cripple’s agency even if he did not choose his handicap and
even if his belief in the virtue of self-denial be in the nature of a “virtue made of necessity”—a
convenient rationalization or endogenous preference. Dworkin and Scanlon probably are the best
known adherents to what I am calling the ratification view. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 74, at
285-303; T. M. Scanlon, The Significance of Choice, in 8 THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN
VALUES 149, 151 (Sterling McMurrin ed., 1988); T. M. Scanlon, Preference and Urgency, 72 J.
PHIL. 655 (1975). Well-known anti-ratificationists include G. A. Cohen and Amartya Sen. See
G. A. Cohen, On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice, 99 ETHICS 906 (1989); AMARTYA SEN, The
Standard of Living: Lecture I, Concepts and Critiques, in THE STANDARD OF LIVING 11 (1987).
We need not resolve the choice versus ratification dispute to proceed with the EEOR. For one
thing, the problem is restricted in scope. For another thing, it seems fair enough simply to regard
ratification in most circumstances as itself a choice; certainly that would seem to be the view
most in harmony with the construal of citizens as agents, though we might make allowances in
marginal cases similar to those we make for addiction. For more on endogenous preferences, on
which there is a vast amount of literature but about which I shall say no more in this Article, see,
for example, Hockett, Deep Grammar, supra note 74; GARY BECKER, ACCOUNTING FOR TASTES
(1996); JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS (1979) [hereinafter ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE
SIRENS]; JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES (1983); ROBERT FRANK, LUXURY FEVER: WHY MONEY
FAILS TO SATISFY IN AN ERA OF EXCESS (1999); DAVID GEORGE, PREFERENCE POLLUTION:
HOW MARKETS CREATE THE DESIRES WE DISLIKE (2001).
121 The Sorites problem is the well-known conundrum concerning how many grains of sand it
takes to constitute a beach, how few hairs Socrates must have on his pate before he will be
considered bald, etc. Logicians have by now developed sophisticated techniques for handling
predicates with vague contours, including so-called “fuzzy logics,” which now are proving
fruitful in artificial intelligence and other cybernetic fields. For the usability of such non-standard
logics for purposes of welfare economics and justice theory, see Robert Hockett, Primary Goods,
Interpersonal Comparisons and Nonstandard Logics (unpublished manuscript, under revision for
ECON. & PHIL.).

36

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:1

elaborated below at Part II.C—to attach a specific dollar value to such
portions for purposes of determining adequate compensation for the
exogenously underendowed, and it grows quickly unsurprising that
there is at least some degree of surface disagreement not just in the
American, but in most political traditions over who should own what.
Such difficulties should not, however, obscure the fact that there is
broad agreement within and among the American political traditions
over the basic principles here stated. As Americans, we are nearly if not
fully unanimous in our belief that citizen-agents should both enjoy
equal opportunity and be entitled to keep what they legitimately earn.
Our disagreements are, in significant if not in full measure, over the
empirics of what actually is earned.122 Immediately below I shall
exploit that fact, on behalf of the American OS, in two ways: First I
shall specify some classes of holdings that we broadly agree to be both
measurable and ethically exogenous in the holding, and rest EEOR
ownership prescriptions in part on that range.123 And second, I shall
sketch a Walrasian market mechanism, set in motion within that range
of agreement, which, by honoring citizens as agents and the EOP as
allocation principle, further addresses the measurement difficulties that
are in large measure responsible for the magnitude of the tracing
problem as we currently find it.
C.

Sidestepping the Boundary Dispute

This Subpart seeks to quarantine the boundary dispute. It does so
by sidestepping the tracing problem that has afflicted each of the three
American political traditions and that therefore threatens, by extension,
our “core” tradition, the EEOR. Three intuitions guide the effort. Each
one is manifest in its own section within this Subpart. The first intuition
is that there is an overlapping consensus both within and among our
three traditions not only that ethically exogenous opportunity
endowments should ideally be allocated equitably, but also that several
easily ascertained classes of readily measured endowment

122 There is significant empirical corroboration of this claim itself. See, e.g., NORMAN
FROHLICH & JOE A. OPPENHEIMER, CHOOSING JUSTICE: AN EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH TO
ETHICAL THEORY (1992); TOM R. TYLER ET AL., SOCIAL JUSTICE IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY (1997);
ROBERT WRIGHT, THE MORAL ANIMAL: EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND EVERYDAY LIFE
(1994); PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS (Barbara A.
Mellers & Jonathan Baron eds., 1993); Kjell Törnblom, The Social Psychology of Distributive
Justice, in JUSTICE: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 177 (Klaus R. Scherer ed., 1992).
123 We can simply bracket those on which we disagree. A similar strategy is employed, to
helpful effect, by John E. Roemer, A Pragmatic Theory of Responsibility for the Egalitarian
Planner, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 146 (1993); see also JOHN E. ROEMER, EQUALITY OF
OPPORTUNITY (1998).
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unambiguously qualify as ethically exogenous. Bracketing the more
difficult cases, we can move ahead together on the ground that we
share. The second intuition is that much of the magnitude of the tracing
problem is attributable not only to chance- and choice-melding
opportunities that we can bracket pursuant to the first intuition, but to
three measurement difficulties that hinder efforts to quantify and
compare, in an ethically salient way, disparate holdings of all of the
heterogeneous benefits and burdens that can be held by separate persons
in the EEOR. A market mechanism well known to economists
specializing in fairness, I claim, enables us to sidestep those
measurement difficulties not sidestepped by the first, bracketing
strategy. It thereby enables us to diminish substantially the magnitude
of the tracing problem. The third intuition is somewhat more technical
in fleshing out, but is fleshed out nonetheless in Subparts C.3 and D. It
is that the ordered set of “second best” markets falling short in their
completeness and neutrality of the ideal (“first best”) market sketched in
Subpart C.2, is ordinally equivalent to the ordered set of “second best”
opportunity allocations falling short in their fairness and efficiency of
that ideal (“first best”) market. The upshot is that even incomplete
progress in the direction here advocated is ethically appreciable
progress.
1.

Core Opportunity-Endowments

Here I begin the process of sidestepping the boundary dispute and
thus moving farther away from ambivalence, and closer to univocality,
on the matter equal opportunity. I list and briefly characterize four
classes of basic opportunity endowment that all or nearly all Americans,
whether they consider themselves adherents primarily of the CR, CL or
PC traditions, are likely to agree to be ethically exogenous in the
holding.
The first such class is that of opportunities for early education.
Agent-citizens begin their lives as children. The younger a child, the
less responsible she is for her opportunities to learn, to develop her
capacities to learn and do more, and to develop a sense of control over
and responsibility for her own future. As a matter of unadulterated
principle, such opportunity should be equitably enjoyed by all children.
Inequalities of such opportunity are to be deplored or regretted, and so
far as possible to be mitigated or eliminated. If San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez124 was correctly decided as a
124 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (holding that inequalities in school financing traceable to differential
wealths of families living in different school districts does not violate Equal Protection Clause of
14th Amendment to the US Const.).
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matter of law, then the “law” applied there is not in keeping with
American values. And if some parents believe that they bear a
fundamental right to seek to advantage their children over others, then
they are mistakenly interpreting fundamental right as not conferring
equal agency rights upon either those other children or even their
own.125 Their preferences are preferences for externalities, for wrongs,
and are inconsistent with the American tradition of responsible liberty.
This is not to say that equity need—or even ought—be sought by
“leveling down.” Rather, the guiding idea should be to maximize the
level of provision that is providable to all.126
The second class of exogenous opportunity endowment comprises
genetic determinants, in so far as we are able to determine them, of
successful life-planning, wealth-making and happiness-pursuit. Such
determinants include all—but only—such aspects of basic human health
and functioning as are not attributable to decisions for which we
reasonably hold ourselves and others accountable. Birth with a
handicap or predisposition to debilitating illness warrants everybody’s
chipping-in to mitigate such handicaps’ or illnesses’ debilitating
effects.127 Debilitation wrought by smoking, drunken driving, etc., does
not—though of course it may elicit charitably provided assistance. This
is not to advocate a “rescue policy”—another instance of “leveling
down”—whereby all must sacrifice near everything to attempt futilely
to compensate “100%” those born severely underendowed, any more
than the EOP dictates “leveling down” in connection with fair access to
educational opportunity.128 The amount with which to address such
disadvantage should reflect the aggregated and averaged social
valuation of contingent claims payable to self-insurers against such
disadvantage; such is the amount entailed by our agency. That
valuation in turn is determined either by simulating or by actually
providing markets in such claims that bear the features laid out in Part
II.C.2, markets in which uncertainty about such handicaps’ emergence
is, in effect, shared.129 For present purposes the point is simpler. It is
simply that the American tradition of equal opportunity regards these
resources as ethically exogenous. And the advance of medical
knowledge can be expected to grant greater clarity as to which of our
125 This is not to say that such is the motivation prompting higher education expenditures in
wealthier school districts. Moreover, as argued at Part II.B, the EOP does not condone
equalization by “leveling-down.”
126 Part II.D explains why this is the only ethically intelligible form of maximization.
127 This value bears a venerable pedigree in the American self-understanding, as expressed,
e.g., in the image of the Westward travelers’ allowing the old, the very young and the infirm to
ride in the wagons while the able-bodied walked beside.
128 The “rescue policy” idea figures in DWORKIN, supra note 74, at 307-50; Ronald Dworkin,
Sovereign Virtue Revisited, 113 ETHICS 106, 123-25 (2002)
129 See infra Part II.C.2.
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infirmities, and to what degree, are beyond control.130
Health, basic functional capacity and education can be regarded as
elements of “human capital.”131 Equalizing early educational and basic
health endowments is equalizing access to ethically exogenous human
capital. A third range of broad American agreement as to what is
ethically exogenous can be characterized as access to non-human
capital. We can think of the right to equal access to such capital as the
equal right to capitalize upon one’s own diligence, an equal right to
wealth-creating opportunity.132 An equal right to wealth-creating
opportunity, to work diligently in satisfying others’ wants and to profit
thereby, is, trivially, a right to productive capital. Human capital is of
course productive in the requisite sense; that is the sense in which it is
“capital.” But it is doubtful that individually held human capital
constitutes the principal portion of capital with which individual agents
produce and profit.133 Access to ownership of or participation in firms
and networks—the varyingly integrated institutional arrangements in
which productive synergies of pooled and organized human and
nonhuman capital result in wealth-production—surely is at least as
important.134
It is potentially more difficult to trace out the ethically exogenous
and ethically endogenous elements of non-human captial holdings than
of human capital holdings. For unlike genetic endowments and early
130 For more on the opportunities, as well as some of the challenges, now being opened by
genetic research, see generally FROM CHANCE TO CHOICE: GENETICS & JUSTICE (Allen
Buchanan et al. eds., 2000).
131 For a wide-ranging study of the importance of at least educational capital to agents’ longterm earning prospects, see GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL: A THEORETICAL AND
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO EDUCATION (3d ed. 1993).
132 “Wealth” in this context is characterized somewhat narrowly: The right to wealth-making
opportunity would be the right to produce as to satisfy others’ wants and to be remunerated
therefore and thus profit thereby. “Wealth” could of course also be understood more broadly,
such that a right to equal wealth-creating opportunity would be an equal right not only to produce
remunerably for others, but also to produce the happiness in one’s self that results from the
exercise of one’s capacities—a very “Greek” form of happiness. See generally JULIA ANNAS,
THE MORALITY OF HAPPINESS (1995). I emphasize the remuneration understanding of wealth
here pursuant to this Part’s aim to identify an overlapping consensus among the three traditions of
American political self-understanding. For that is the understanding of wealth that all three
traditions share in common, while what I have labeled the “Greek” form figures more
prominently in the CL than in the CR and PC traditions.
133 Assuming that such apportionment is possible. See Part II.C.2, infra, on measurement.
134 There is no need to resolve disputes between followers of the heterodox “economists”
Simon on the one hand, Kelso on the other, as to whether “knowledge capital” or “machine
capital” represents the “larger” portion of the value created through productive organization. See
JULIAN L. SIMON, THE ULTIMATE RESOURCE (1996) (“human imagination” the “principal”
productive factor); LOUIS O. KELSO & MORTIMER J. ADLER, THE CAPITALIST MANIFESTO 36
(1958) (“Technological improvements shift the burden of production from workers to capital
instruments.”). Obviously both are critical, and what matters most is access on equal terms
(“equal” understood by reference to ethically exogenous endowments) to productive relations
themselves.
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education, most non-human capital holdings are held by adults, and
adults have lived and acted long enough for both responsible choice and
non-responsible circumstance to concatenate and intermeld over time.
Nevertheless, there are some elements of non-human capital holding
that all can agree to be attributable to fortune, not effort. Large nonhuman capital inheritances or bequests are an obvious example. They
are non-human capital counterparts to genetic endowments. Moreover,
to recognize that many large holdings of non-human capital are
attributable to luck in the birth lottery need not commit us to attitudes of
envy or even to plans of confiscation.135 We can view the recognition
instead as minimally committing us to channeling newly discovered,
opened or openable pools of capital toward those who have not been
born to large holdings already. Examples here would include, among
others, newly usable segments of the electromagnetic spectrum;
minerals found on the seabed or under public—even some private—
lands; new resources eventually found off of the earth through publicly
financed space exploration; and, once again closer to home, new social
cost-saving and wealth-creating opportunities opened through the public
facilitation of new forms of insurance against risks that antecedently
impede enterprise- and wealth-development. Such opportunities are
counterparts to the “new” resources distributed widely and equitably to
the previously less resourced by, e.g., the Homestead Act and the
National Housing Act.136 The sequel to this Article elaborates on these
and other precedents, some actually implemented, others thus far but
proposed. Part III foreshadows that tactic by designing policy strategies
that capitalize upon endowment heuristics—in particular, our greater
willingness to channel perceivedly “new” exogenous resources to the
exogenously underendowed than to redistribute accumulated resources
from the exogenously overendowed.
The fourth and final category of opportunity/resource that we all
can agree to be ethically exogenous is the opportunity to share ethically
exogenous risk—a manner of “backhanded,” or “negative” benefit. The
idea here is that some misfortunes which strike after birth and that are
not reasonably foreseeable during adulthood are misfortunes for which
the victims are not responsible. Such misfortunes are regarded, under
the EOP, as joint misfortunes, at least until there is opportunity for
equally exogenously endowed agents voluntarily to trade their shares of
such misfortunes in keeping with their differential disvaluations of
them—or the differential valuations, ex ante, of claims to compensation
contingent upon their occurrence. The intuition finds expression in the
venerable American tradition of the neighbors’ sharing, before the
135 The envy charge is leveled in Elizabeth Anderson, What Is the Point of Equality?, 109
ETHICS 287 (1999).
136 See Hockett, supra note 3, for detailed treatment of these and other programs.
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widespread availability of farmers’ insurance, in “barn-raising” for one
among them whose farm has been struck by lightning.
Such “all chip in” arrangements, it has been well observed, are in
the nature of rudimentary insurance arrangements.137 And a more fully
developed and fine-grained insurance arrangement will reflect different
participants’ differing valuations of the varying compensations that
might be afforded in return for varying insurance contracts, which
would incorporate varying risk-assessments and varying premiaexactions. Collective political action to distribute risk-mitigation
opportunity in keeping with the EOP in the present day, then, ought
ideally to facilitate the development of actual or simulated markets in
such risk.138 But in doing so it must also, of course, impose or simulate
ethically exogenous informational symmetry—fairness—among market
participants. Such information—that which cannot be had simply by
exercise of diligence—is itself part of the ethically exogenous
endowment that the EOP recommends be equitably shared.139 Under
these circumstances, assessments and payouts will reflect, in effect, the
averaged social valuation of the risks and payouts in which valuation
process each citizen-agent has exercised an equal “vote.”
Among the core endowments just discussed, human capital
presents the least theoretic and practical intractability, at least where
early education and unambiguously genetic incapacity are the focus.
The non-human capital and risk-trading, as well as later education and
mixed genetic-and-behavioral health outcomes, present somewhat more
challenge because they involve adults, who have lived long enough to
mix responsible choice with non-responsible circumstance in arriving at
their present endowments. But we nonetheless can agree over portions
even of these latter endowments which involve only non-responsible
circumstance—e.g., inherited non-human capital or entirely
unforeseeable accident. And we can expect advances in the medical
sciences, particularly now that the human genome is mapped, to enable
us to assign weights to comparative chance and choice factors in
debility. The same can be said of other forms of chance disadvantage
which the physical sciences and refined statistical techniques
increasingly will enable us to foresee and thus both head-off and
137 See, e.g., PARTHA DASGUPTA, AN INQUIRY INTO WELL-BEING AND DESTITUTION 189-217
(1993); DEBRAJ RAY, DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 591-619 (1998); KAUSHIK BASU,
ANALYTICAL DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS: THE LESS DEVELOPED ECONOMY REVISITED 267-80
(1997).
138 See Hockett, supra note 3, on programmatic means; see also Robert Hockett, Just
Insurance Through Global Macrohedging, 25 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 107, 203-57 (2004)
[hereinafter Hockett, Macrohedge]; Robert Hockett, From “Mission-Creep” to Gestalt-Switch:
Justice, Finance, the IFIs and the Intended Beneficiaries of Globalization, 98 PROC. AM. SOC.
INT’L L. 69 (2004) [hereinafter Hockett, Gestalt-Switch]; Robert Hockett, From Macro to Micro
to “Mission-Creep,” 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 153 (2003).
139 See Hockett, Macrohedge, supra note 138, at 183-203.
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attribute to the information accounts of our citizens.140 And we likely
will be able to do so with no less precision than is attained even today
in, for example, comparative fault determinations in courtrooms.
In so far as we work to equalize core endowments, we advance the
cause of our own American EOP. We also facilitate the creation and
operation of that complete and neutral market described in the next
Subpart, which further diminishes the tracing problem and thus enables
our opportunity-equalizing efforts to yield a “multiplier effect” in
realizing the EOP and advancing the cause of responsible agency. Such
is the rough, practical goal that we all can agree to be in furtherance of
the political-ethical consequences of our American commitment to
equal opportunity.
2.

Market, Measurement & Distribution Mechanism

The next step in our quest for univocality is to specify means of
diminishing measurement difficulties that exacerbate the tracing
problem, while doing justice to the EEOR’s understanding of citizens
and material opportunities. This Subpart accordingly describes an
opportunity-allocation mechanism, readily constructible in theory and
approximable in practice, by which to do so. We will see in the next
Subpart that the mechanism realizes the only ethically cognizable form
of “efficiency” as well. It therefore serves as an engine for realizing a
truly efficient, equal-opportunity republic.
Begin by distinguishing three measurement challenges that
historically have constrained answers to the constitutive questions
raised by the EEOR-valued “variables” enumerated at the beginning of
this Part. Those questions, again, were: Who is to own; What is to be
owned; and According to what basic principles such ownable things
should be allocated. For the generic purposes of this Subpart, which
require that we consider what agents disvalue as well as what they
value,141 this Subpart will call that which is owned a desired
“distribuendum” (plural “distribuenda”). Call the principles according
to which such things are to be owned “distribution principles.” (Recall
that our owners are responsible citizen-agents.) The American EEOR
tradition views resources and opportunities as the appropriate desired
distribuenda, and the EOP as the appropriate distribution principle. But
it has not always been agreed that these should be the values filling
those variables. And the reason is measurement. Three distinct
140
141

See id. at 212-57.
Below we will translate disvalued contingencies back into valued items: specifically,
claims to compensation contingent upon those disvalued contingencies themselves—in effect,
insurance policies.
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measurement concerns historically have influenced at least CL’s and
PC’s treatments of appropriate distribuenda and distribution principles.
Call them the simple quantifiability, interpersonal comparability, and
commensurability concerns.142
Simple quantifiability historically has stood in the way of
settlement, in the CL and PC traditions, upon mutually agreeable
distribuenda and distribution principles in the following way: On the
one hand, resource, opportunity and the like are not intelligible as such
apart from some person’s actual or idealized preference for or valuation
of these items—hence, apart from the items’ yielding some manner of
“satisfaction,” “value,” “happiness,” “utility,” “welfare” or “wellbeing,” conceived in some suitable manner, to the person who values
them. Resources and opportunities must, that is to say, be understood as
resources or opportunities for something, and for someone. To suppose
otherwise is, in effect, to fetishize the distribuendum and render
mysterious why citizen-agents, hence the polity, would or should be
concerned with its ownership or distribution at all.143
On the other hand, these latter states—welfare, utility, happiness,
etc.—as noted at Part I.C, do not lend themselves to cardinal
measurement in the attainment, certainly not as a practical matter, and
perhaps not even as a conceptual matter. Relatedly, they cannot be, so
far as we appear to have reason to suppose, directly distributed to
anyone. They are experienced only as subjective outputs of utility
functions the inputs to which must be some objective item or items,
rather than some subjective state or states.144 And while these objective
inputs—resources or material opportunities—are, by and large,
cardinally quantifiable, so long as the outputs that render them ethically
significant are not, it is difficult, even for a Utilitarian who views the
utility-yield as the only relevant factor, to determine how much of any
of them anyone ethically ought to have.
What is more—and now we move from Utilitarianism to more
responsibility-concerned CR and CL—bounded agents are in part
responsible for, and in part not responsible for, their own utility
functions. One can be innately more difficult to satisfy than others, but
142 See Hockett, Deep Grammar, supra note 74, at 1223-27 for fuller, including formal,
treatment of the subjects of the next several paragraphs; see also Claude d’Aspremont, Axioms for
Social Welfare Orderings, in SOCIAL GOALS AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION: ESSAYS IN MEMORY
OF ELISHA PAZNER 19, 19-76 (Leonid Hurwicz et al. eds., 1985) (especially pages 42 to 43)
[hereinafter SOCIAL GOALS AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION]; JOHN E. ROEMER, THEORIES OF
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 16 (1996); A.K. SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE
(1970); A.K. Sen, On Weights and Measures: Informational Constraints in Social Welfare
Analysis, 45 ECONONOMETRICA 1539 (1977).
143 It would also, of course, be to fail to respect distribuees as valuing agents. See Hockett,
Deep Grammar, supra note 74, at 1220-27; see also Robert Hockett & Mathias Risse, Primary
Goods Revisited (under revision for ECON. & PHIL.).
144 See sources cited supra note 143.
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one can also in a manner choose to be more difficult—or expensive—to
satisfy than others.145 So the difficulty of cardinally measuring
happiness intractably afflicts the already, independently difficult task of
separately tracing the ethically endogenous (responsible) and the
ethically exogenous (non-responsible) grounds of one’s utility
function—of one’s translating objective inputs into subjective outputs.
Now consider the interpersonal comparability problem. Even were
welfare cardinally quantifiable as a state of any given person, it is
unclear whether it would be interpersonally comparable as a state-type
enjoyed among multiple persons. For there can appear to be, intuitively,
something radically distinct as between P1’s happiness and P2’s
happiness, presumably owing in some manner to there seeming to be
something radically separate, distinct, or unique about every sentient
being’s subjectivity, or consciousness, itself.146 One might reasonably
feel hesitant, that is to say, about declaring P1 to be “as happy” as P2
even were one able, say by analogy to the operation of a pool of
mercury in a capillary tube, to associate happiness with quanta of
endorphins in P1’s or P2’s bloodstream and assign cardinal measures to
P1’s or P2’s individual states of happiness. And this problem is not
solved simply by moving to “objective” wealth, from “subjective”
welfare, as distribuendum. For again, it is only the welfare-yield that
renders wealth ethically intelligible as “wealth” rather than inert, insipid
matter in the first place.147 And differing persons, both responsibly in
part and accidentally in part, can derive differing degrees of welfare
from the same material items.
Now the commensuration problem: The fact that there are multiple
material inputs—call them benefits and burdens for present purposes—
that appear to affect, differentially, utility and disutility, coupled with
the difficulty attending cardinally measuring the utility and disutility
afforded by such benefits and burdens, would render it difficult, even
were interpersonal comparability somehow unproblematic, to determine
how much of benefit B1 would compensate P1 for a shortage of, say,
B2 relative to person P2. Unless the appropriate distribution formula
were to mandate a distinct distribution of each good and ill over all
agent-citizens independent of the distribution of the other goods and
145 See Kenneth J. Arrow, Some Ordinalist-Utilitarian Notes on Rawls’s Theory of Justice, 70
J. PHIL. 245 (1973); see also Dworkin, supra note 74, at 48-59.
146 See, e.g., DAVID J. CHALMERS, THE CONSCIOUS MIND: IN SEARCH OF A FUNDAMENTAL
THEORY (1996); THOMAS NAGEL, OTHER MINDS: CRITICAL ESSAYS 1969-1994 (1995); THOMAS
NAGEL, MORTAL QUESTIONS (1991); see also Brink, supra note 72.
147 See Hockett, Deep Grammar, supra note 74, at 155-73. The intuition receives particularly
memorable expression in, of all places, a novel by Sartre. See JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, NAUSEA 127
(Lloyd Alexander trans., 1949) (“[T]he diversity of things, their individuality, were only an
appearance, a veneer. This veneer had melted, leaving soft, monstrous masses, all in disorder—
naked, in a frightful, obscene nakedness.”).
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ills—a seemingly implausible suggestion148—we require “rates of
exchange” between goods and ills themselves in order to derive an
index suitable to determining how much “good-or-ill-stuff in total” any
citizen holds. But since utility or happiness-yield is the touchstone of
some objective item’s beneficial or burdensome status to an agent, and
since, as we have observed, measuring this happiness-yield is
problematic, it is not clear how we are to commensurate disparate
benefits and burdens in a manner pertinent to distributive propriety.
Our would-be numéraire—happiness-yield—is itself cardinally nonquantifiable.
Happily, however, as noted before, there is one mechanism which
simultaneously solves—or, better, circumvents—all three measurement
problems. And it does so while—indeed, by—doing justice to the three
constitutive values assigned by our synthesized EEOR political selfunderstanding to the three ownership-pertinent “variables” (viz., again,
responsible citizen-agents, all benefits and burdens adjudged as such by
such agents, EOP-consistent allocation).
The same mechanism
addresses, at least in part, the problem posed by bounded agents’ being
responsible in part, while not in whole, for their own utility functions.
To the degree that we can realize this mechanism “on the ground,” then,
we can simultaneously realize the EEOR and facilitate the principal
measure-theoretic problems’ “taking care of themselves,” so to speak.
And in so doing we diminish the tracing problem and largely sidestep
the boundary dispute. Here, in idealized form, is the mechanism:
Assume a “complete” market—a forum in which all desired, voluntary
trading—and only such trading—occurs.149 Assume first that that
trading is in all goods and services that can practically be made
available and that anyone values—hence, that are politically cognizable
as ethically interesting distribuenda. Assume second that the trading is
in contingent claims to compensation upon the occurrence of any
eventuality that anyone disvalues, payable by anyone willing to take the
opposite sides of what amount to “bets” on the disvalued contingencies.
148
149

Implausible save in the case of the core endowments, as explained infra, Part III.C.3.
Market “completeness” in this sense—all and only desired trading—of course includes
trading in contingent claims. I will describe this more over the course of the next several
paragraphs. The classic sources on the role of contingent claims in completing markets are JOHN
R. HICKS, VALUE AND CAPITAL (1939); Maurice Allais, Généralisation des Théories de
L’Equilibre Economique Général et du Rendement Social au Cas du Risque, 11 ECONOMETRIE,
COLLOQUES INTERNATIONAUX DU CENTRE NATIONAL DE LA RECHERCHE SCIENTIFIQUE 81
(1953); Kenneth J. Arrow, Le Rôle de Valeurs Boursières par la Répartition la Meilleure des
Risques, 11 ECONOMETRIE, COLLOQUES INTERNATIONAUX DU CENTRE NATIONAL DE LA
RECHERCHE SCIENTIFIQUE 41 (1953); GERARD DEBREU, THEORY OF VALUE (1959).
Completeness is of course a technical concept, bearing many ramifications, only some of which
are treated here. For fuller treatment, see Hockett, Macrohedge, supra note 138. For state of the
art comprehensive treatment, see 1 MICHAEL MAGILL & MARTINE QUINZII, THEORY OF
INCOMPLETE MARKETS (1996).
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Assume further that this market is “neutral.” It is neutral in the sense,
first, that each participant enters it with an ethically exogenous initial
endowment of—and largely in the nature of ownership rights to—
ethically exogenous desired assets equal to that with which everyone
else enters it. It is neutral in the sense, second, that regulatory norms
effectively prevent such collusively, strategically or expropriatively
opportunistic behaviors as would result in some participants’ coming to
possess greater or lesser holdings or “price-affecting effective demand
powers” than would be traceable to such ethically exogenous initial
endowments and their ethically endogenous transaction histories
alone.150 This mechanism strait-forwardly instantiates in broad outline
the ownership régime prescribed by our synthesized American EEOR
tradition. It satisfies the prescriptions entailed by the three aboveoffered sample ownership-pertinent “variables,” and simultaneously
addresses the three critical measurement concerns. Here, more
precisely, is how:
The mechanism honors citizen-participants as responsible agents.
They transact voluntarily pursuant to their own, autonomous relative
valuations of items and contingencies that they prefer and disprefer in
keeping with their pursuits of happiness. The mechanism treats as
distribuenda whatever goods or services—which latter include riskbearing services—those agents themselves value or disvalue. Those
goods and services are the material resources or opportunities from
which citizen-agents’ utilities, happinesses or lifeplan-satisfactions
derive. And the mechanism, via the neutrality imposed upon it at the
outset and retained throughout, equalizes what is ethically exogenous—
that which is not traceable in the holding directly to a responsible
choice—while allowing holdings over time nonetheless to vary with
ethically endogenous responsible transactional decisions. Holdings at
time Tn, that is to say, are traceable to equalized holdings at T0 and to
voluntary choices thereafter. 151
The mechanism sidesteps, in an ethically satisfactory way, the
problem of cardinal “happiness” or utility measurement. It does so by
allowing citizen-agents, via voluntary trading activity—by dint of the
“first fundamental theorem of welfare economics”152—to “maximize,”
presumptively, utility in a manner consistent with (a) ethically
exogenous endowment equality among market participants and (b)
consequently equally shared scarcity of the exogenously given
150 Please set aside, for the moment, first the question of the means by which endowmentequalization would be effected, and second the “problem of future generations.” We will get to
that in III.C.3, infra.
151 It should be borne in mind that those latter include labor-expending decisions.
152 See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, An Extension of the Basic Theorems of Classical Welfare
Economics, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND BERKELEY SYMPOSIUM ON MATHEMATICAL
STATISTICS AND PROBABILITY 507 (1951).
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resources from which agents “produce” their own utility.153 It does not
matter for OS purposes, that is to say, what sort of number—cardinal or
ordinal—that we might assign to citizens’ happinesses or utilities, or
whether or how we manage to scale such numbers, so long as we know
that the utilities are the “highest” possible consistent with the correct
distribution principle—the EOP—and the consequently equally
shouldered, exogenously given constraints posed by the material
environment.
Similarly, the mechanism—again unobjectionably—sidesteps the
problem of interpersonal happiness or utility comparison. For so long
as the resource-components—i.e., the ethically exogenous
components—of “utility-manufacture” or “happiness-pursuit” itself—
endorphins, C-fibers, etc. (sometimes called “personal,” or “internal”
resources)—are themselves counted—in the form of drugs,
supplements, or contingent claims to compensation—among the
exogenous endowments that must be equalized over participants, then
whatever the absolute or comparative quanta of happiness or utility
enjoyed by citizens, we shall know that these are the “highest” that they
can be while being consistent with the appropriate distribution
principle—again, the EOP—and the consequently equally shouldered
constraints posed by the exogenously given environment.
Finally, the mechanism “automatically,” as it were, commensurates
distribuenda in the only way that ethically matters, i.e., via the
autonomous implicit comparative valuations of autonomously
transacting citizen-agents.154 We need not worry ourselves over how
much of B2 “would” or will compensate P1 for a deficit of B1, let alone
construct a “perfectionist” index of all goods and ills.155 Our citizen153 In essence, we are describing an economy characterized by so-called “equal division
Walrasian equilibria.” For more on such equilibria, their fairness and efficiency properties, and
ethical interpretations thereof, see Hockett, Deep Grammar, supra note 74, at 1296-317. The
technical literature on the theory of fair allocations is vast, though oddly ignored by economically
oriented legal academics. For a canonical sampling, see, e.g., Terrence. E. Daniel, A Revised
Concept of Distributional Equity, 11 J. ECON. THEORY 94 (1975); Duncan K. Foley, Resource
Allocation and the Public Sector, YALE ECONOMIC ESSAYS 7, at 45-98 (1967); E.A. Pazner &
David Schmeidler, Egalitarian-Equivalent Allocations: A New Concept of Economic Equity, 92
Q.J. ECON. 671 (1978); Elisha Pazner & David Schmeidler, A Difficulty in the Concept of
Fairness, 41 REV. OF ECON. STUD. 441, 441-43 (1974); Hal R. Varian, Equity, Envy and
Efficiency, 9 J. ECON. THEORY, 63, 63-91 (1974); Hal R. Varian, Two Problems in the Theory of
Fairness, 5 J. PUB. ECON. 249 (1976). See generally WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, SUPERFAIRNESS:
APPLICATIONS AND THEORY (1986); William Thomson & Hal R. Varian, Theories of Justice
Based on Symmetry, in SOCIAL GOALS AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION, supra note 142, at 107. A
useful recent synthesis of these results is HERVÉ MOULIN, FAIR DIVISION AND COLLECTIVE
WELFARE (2003). The work from which these studies take their departure is of course LÉON
WALRAS, ELEMENTS OF PURE ECONOMICS (William Jaffé trans., 1954) (1844). Walras appears
to have anticipated, even to have intended, precisely such developments as these. See WILLAM
JAFFÉ’S ESSAYS ON WALRAS 17-52, 326-42 (Donald A. Walker ed., 1983).
154 See Hockett, Deep Grammar, supra note 74, at 1220-33; Hockett & Risse, supra note 143.
155 See sources cited supra note 154. The claim that the need to index disparate resources
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participants themselves will, in effect, construct, autonomously and with
equal voice, the index—a spontaneously emergent price index—which
amounts to an aggregated comparative “social” valuation of goods and
ills, in the construction of which each participant has exercised an equal
“vote.”156 (Again, provided that there exist market completeness and
neutrality in the senses explicated above.) And so yet again, in a
manner that reflects the constraints both of relative environmental
scarcities and of the appropriate distribution principle—equal allocation
of all and only that which is ethically exogenous—we find the
mechanism allowing the measurement question to “take care of itself”
to precisely the degree that the EEOR itself demands that care be taken
at all.
3.

Measuring the Core Endowments & Realizing the Market

Insofar as it can be realized, then, the mechanism—in part,
precisely by equalizing the core opportunity-endowments enumerated in
II.C.1 over its participants—simultaneously assists in realizing the
EEOR that forms the three tradition-synthesizing, theoretic basis of the
American OS and in large part quarantines the tracing problem. Three
challenges, however, might appear to stand in the way of that
realization. Here I note and dispel them.
The first challenge is the matter of equalizing the aforelisted core
endowments. If we have to equalize holdings of those, one might think
we have to commensurate them. But how are we to do that prior to the
operation of the equal-endowment grounded market mechanism, when
it is that mechanism itself that affords ethically satisfactory
commensuration—i.e., social valuation pursuant to a process in which
each citizen bears an “equal vote” by dint of her entering that market
with an equal initial endowment? Market neutrality might be rendered
self-perpetuating once attained, but how is it to be attained when the
market itself affords the measure of market-antecedent neutrality?
Were we able to start all over, of course, this problem would be
diminished. We would simply give each citizen an equal allotment of
coupons with which to bid on unowned resources.157 But of course we
are not able to start all over, and significant portions of what each of us
already owns presumably are traceable, in theory, at least in part to our
commits one to perfectionism—i.e., the position that some goods simply are inherently worth
more than others—figures into a prominent criticism of Rawlsian primary goods leveled by
Richard Arneson. See Richard Arneson, Primary Goods Reconsidered, 24 NOÛS 429 (1990).
The criticism is addressed in Hockett & Risse, supra note 143.
156 See citations listed supra, note 154.
157 Such is envisaged in Dworkin’s “clamshell” auction. See DWORKIN, supra note 74, at 6571.
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ethically endogenous efforts. Nonetheless, there is a plausible “second
best” solution at hand. First, note that the core endowments enumerated
at II.C.1 are limited in number, relatively easily quantified and equitably
distributed, and in little need of commensuration. If we distinguish
between “beneficial” and “burdensome” core assets, we see that this is
particularly so of the beneficial ones—early education and inherited
non-human capital. The burdensome ones, by contrast, are a bit more
difficult, since they include “internal resources,” but still far from
impossible. The hardest one is genetically poor health or handicap.
Some such deficiencies can themselves be valued by reference to
current prices affixed to their mitigation—prostheses, medicines, etc.
There seems no harm in beginning to address such deficits with
compensation equal to the going rates. Other such deficits are not so
readily mitigated. There the best that we can do is estimate the
compensation that would be afforded by insurance policies that
typically are or would be purchased against such contingencies if such
are or were available.158 Clearly there’s more guesswork here, but it
need not be an arbitrary whistling in the dark. We do the best we can to
repair the ship at sea. The more repairing that we do, the better able the
mechanism will grow to fix itself.
The second challenge is rooted in “completeness” as the first was
rooted in “neutrality.” It is this: Is it reasonable to require that “all and
only desired trading” occur? Is that possible, and do we even want it?
Wouldn’t we have to abandon our market-inalienability norms and
“commodify” everything?159 And if we don’t do that, can the
mechanism do what has been charged to it?
This challenge is more easily addressed than that directed to
neutrality. Again we look first to the core opportunity endowments of
Part II.C.1. All of these are subject, in principle, to unobjectionable
market-valuability already. Next we consider what else might be
traded—“all that enters into agents’ happiness-pursuit.” It is easy
enough simply to bracket out of market transactions such things as we
should not wish to see commodified—babies or organs, for example.160
158 See Hockett, Deep Grammar, supra note 74, at 1296-306; DWORKIN, supra note 74, at
307-50. Real, rather than “hypothetical” such insurance is proposed in Hockett, Macrohedge,
supra note 138; and in Alexander Tabarrok, Trumping the Genetic Tarot Card, 9
CONTINGENCIES 20 (1997); see also J.H. Cochrane, Time-Consistent Health Insurance, 103 J.
POL. ECON. 445 (1995).
159 The classic contemporary objection to “commodification” is of course Margaret Jane
Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987). See generally MARGARET JANE
RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES (1996); see also ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS
AND ECONOMICS (1993). Contemporary protests of commodification revive concerns raised
repeatedly in the past. Two classic Victorian-era objections are THOMAS CARLYLE, PAST AND
PRESENT (Robert Thorne ed., 1890), and JOHN RUSKIN, UNTO THIS LAST AND OTHER WRITINGS
155-228 (Clive Wilmer ed., 1985).
160 The allusion is of course to Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of
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There will of course be disagreement as to some of these. It might
appear to be an affront to liberty, for example, to prohibit autonomous
agents’ trading in what ever they wish to trade, at least when the trading
really is consensual and uninfected by objectionable inequities in
comparative bargaining power, and does not itself impinge upon any
third party’s equal liberty. It might especially seem so against a more
equitably spread opportunity backdrop, before which implicit
exploitation fears are less likely to be operative. But the real point here
is that we need not worry over these disputes at the margins of
commodifiability. The mechanism does its work quite well through
trade of those many more goods and services that all agree ought to be
tradable.
That is the desirability side of this challenge. The feasibility side
comes in the transaction- and information-cost barriers to marketcompletion in the technical sense. Is it really reasonable to suppose that
all parcelings of ownable and tradable goods, and that payment-claims
defined in terms of all specifiable contingencies, can be tradable?161
Here the problem, the guise of which is more technical than the guise of
alienability, can be handled in two ways. The first way is to note that it
is by now a well established theorem of general equilibrium- and
stochastic calculus-rooted financial theory that complete markets can be
simulated through a comparatively small number of hedging and
insurance strategies.162 That fact is exploited in the present Article’s
more programmatic sequel, as well as in a predecessor article devoted to
the subject of proposed global hedging markets.163 The second way is
more immediately satisfying. It is to note that the problem has no real
“bite” here, for as the answer to the third challenge shows, more
complete and more neutral always means more consistent with the
EEOR’s constitutive values. There is, that is, an ordered set of “second
bests” that is ordinally equivalent to the set of “more” complete and
“more” neutral markets. So all we have to do is to move further in the
right direction to become the best that we can be.
The third challenge, just presaged, is this: If you cannot achieve
full completeness and neutrality of the sort that characterizes the
mechanism that assists in realizing the EEOR, might it be that seeking
the Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1978), one of the bugbears that prompted Radin, supra
note 159.
161 This question reemerges below, in connection with Part III’s discussion of the legal
dimensions of owning.
162 See Robert C. Merton, Lifetime Portfolio Selection Under Uncertainty: The ContinuousTime Case, 51 REV. ECON. & STAT. 247 (1969); Robert C. Merton, Optimum Consumption and
Portfolio Rules in a Continuous-Time Model, 3 J. ECON. THEORY 373 (1971); Robert C. Merton,
Continuous-Time Portfolio Theory and the Pricing of Contingent Claims, Working Paper No.
881-76, A.P. Sloan School of Management, MIT (1976); Stephen A. Ross, Options and
Efficiency, 90 Q. J. ECON. 75 (1976); STEPHEN A. ROSS, NEOCLASSICAL FINANCE 24-25 (2005).
163 Hockett, Macrohedge, supra note 138.
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more completeness and more neutrality than you presently have could,
ironically, take you farther from the ideal goal? Hasn’t Hart, for
example, proved that such might be the case at least in respect of
completeness?164 I will reply here intuitively, reserving technical
treatment for another venue. The intuitive reply is that the claim that
there is no second best trades on an ethically uninteresting conception of
efficiency. The only politically cognizable conception of efficiency, by
contrast, is one in respect of which it happens that any forward
movement on the completeness or neutrality fronts results in forward
movement on the only ethically intelligible “welfare” front. I complete
the argument in the next Subpart, for it is best made in connection with
a fuller treatment of the other value that is constitutive of our EEOR,
namely efficiency.
D.

Equal Opportunity as Efficiency

Parts II.A & B established, respectively, that CR and CL are
committed, with differing degrees of explicitness, to the conception of
citizens as responsible agents and of appropriate ownership as
ownership consistent with the EOP. PC, in turn, was shown not to be
committed to the contrary of either of those propositions. Part I.C, for
its part, established that PC does commit itself more or less explicitly to
two other propositions: First, that public policies ought generally either
to promote or at least not to offend fairness. And second, that such
policies ought generally either to promote, or not unnecessarily to
inhibit, “efficiency” or economic “growth.” Part I.C also noted that
these two desiderata can appear, superficially, in some circumstances to
be at odds. And it noted that CR and CL for their parts do not, at least
on the surface, take positions contrary to the PC rules of thumb. This
Subpart shows that PC fairness and efficiency, non-superficially
understood, are not at odds. Moreover, PC fairness properly construed
is a rule of thumb to which CR and CL themselves are committed by
dint of their commitment to the EOP. And efficiency properly
understood is a material entailment of success in the pursuit of properly
understood fairness. One upshot is that CR, CL and PC readily reduce
to one political understanding—our EEOR—at least where ownership is
concerned. Another upshot is that ordered sets of variably complete and
neutral markets, and the ordered set of variably efficient markets, are
ordinally equivalent.
First, CR and CL are committed to PC fairness. “Fairness,” both in
164 See Oliver D. Hart, On the Optimality of Equilibrium When the Market Structure is
Incomplete, 11 J. ECON. THEORY 418 (1975).
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its everyday connotation and in its denotation of the salient attributes of
“fairness-promoting” PC legislation, means impartiality or evenhandedness. To render circumstances fair is to “level the playing field,”
to remove barriers that people face through no fault of their own.
Common synonyms of “fair” in this sense are “equitable,” “just,”
“equivalent,” and so on.165 But “fairness” in this sense, then, means
nothing more and nothing less than conformity with the equal
opportunity principle. To treat parties impartially is to treat them as
equals for purposes of the treatment—i.e., to eliminate inequities that
are exogenous to the purposes of the treatment. And to be even-handed
with people is to treat them impartially.
Second, fairness in the equal opportunity sense is efficient in the
only sense in which “efficiency” bears ethical significance. The
argument here bears both a negative and a positive aspect. First we will
explicate the term “efficiency,” then we will consider the negative and
positive sides of the argument that efficiency on any understanding, if
stripped of fairness considerations, is ethically uninteresting.
“Efficiency,” in the everyday sense of the word, connotes the
maximization of output given a stipulated input, or the minimization of
input given a stipulated output. It means “more” for “less.” The more
technical understandings of “efficiency” familiar to welfare economists
are reducible to variations on that theme. Pareto-efficient distributions
of goods or ills to persons are best understood, intuitively, as
distributions the aggregate utility deriving from which cannot be raised
without lowering the individual utility of at least one person.166 Pareto
efficiency is utility-maximization as constrained by, thus consistent
with, the “veto” power wielded by anyone who stands to suffer a utility
loss in the event of some departure from some status quo. It is this
intuition, at any rate, that renders the Pareto criterion ethically salient.
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is yet closer to the workaday understanding of
“efficiency.” Distributions are efficient in the Kaldor-Hicks sense if
there is no departure from them that would render some parties’
aggregated gains greater than other parties’ aggregated losses.167 The
165
166

See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 595 (6th ed. 1990).
Of course the Pareto principle is intended to afford technical means of sidestepping
interpersonal utility comparison and with it, therefore, the standard argument runs, aggregation.
But leaving aside for present purposes the standard argument’s running aggregation and
comparison together, the Pareto criterion trades for its ethical salience upon an intuition which
implicitly imports aggregation. There is no reason for “society” to be interested in a Paretoefficient social choice rule dictating increases in the utilities of some so long as no one else’s
utilities are diminished thereby, unless “society” itself is seen as thereby benefiting in some sense.
That sense, if such there be, is the only sense in which the principle can be ethically interesting,
and it is of course an aggregative sense—as indeed the terms “society” and “social choice” should
indicate right from the start. On the analytic distinction between interpersonal comparison and
aggregation, see sources cited supra note 142.
167 The aggregation—and assumed interpersonal comparability imported thereby—enter via
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guiding intuition, then, again is that the welfare output of a given
distributive input is, given the welfare functions that we have to work
with, the “highest” that it can be.168
Now efficiency on any of these understandings is normatively
uninteresting unless it be understood by irreducible reference to
fairness. This is absolutely crucial, yet surprisingly oft-ignored. First,
from the “negative” side, it is well established—though still,
mysteriously, insufficiently observed—that our merely maximizing an
aggregate, be it of welfare or of wealth, without attending to the fairness
of the means by which that aggregate is maximized, would involve us in
fetishism.169 The claim here is not that maximization shorn of fairness
is not good enough. It is that it is not good at all; it is not so much as
cognizable as “good.” Nobody—CR, CL, PC or otherwise—would
maintain that to render all save one inhabitant of the world miserable in
order to render that one remaining inhabitant, possessed of an eccentric
utility function, so ecstatically happy as to exceed the aggregated
happiness of all others under some other distribution, would be to
“maximize” anything cognizable to normative concern.170 To do so
would be ethically on all fours with an argument that all public policy
should be framed with a view to maximizing the amount of blue-colored
surface space in the universe. It just is not “good,” in any sense, to
enlarge something that has nothing to do with anybody’s equal agency.
Wealth and welfare, then, must be understood by reference to principles
of fair opportunity to engage in wealth- or welfare-creation before they
can be intelligible as values at all. They are “wealth” or “welfare,” as
the “compensation principle.” Note the shared root—“com,” i.e., “with”—shared by both
“comparison” and “compensation.”
168 One “produces” welfare, in the Pareto and the Kaldor-Hicks senses, by distribution
operations. Those are the variable inputs, so to speak, while persons’ utility functions are the
fixed inputs.
169 See Hockett, Deep Grammar, supra note 74, at 1276-83. A classic articulation of the
argument is found in Ronald Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEG. STUD. 191 (1980), and
Ronald Dworkin, Why Efficiency?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 563 (1980); see also Amartya Sen,
Equality of What?, in 1 THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 12 (S. McMurrin ed.,
1980). I hope to render the claim yet more intuitively appreciable here than is the case in those
sources, in hopes of thereby avoiding continuing incomprehension such as once appears to have
been manifest, among other places, in Posner, sources cited supra note 108, and now is manifest
in LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2002), the very title of
which registers a category error (fairness is a distribution principle, welfare a distribuendum). It
bears noting that Posner has come to give distribution something closer to its due. See, e.g.,
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 374-81 (1990); RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 13-15 (5th ed. 1998). But see his blurb aback KAPLOW &
SHAVELL, supra, op. cit. Shavell also appears to have given distribution something more like its
due in STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 2-3 (2004).
170 Herewith of course a variation on Nozick’s “utility monster” objection to utilitarianism.
See NOZICK, supra note 78, at 110 (“Utilitarian theory is embarrassed by the possibility of utility
monsters who get enormously greater sums of utility from any sacrifice of others than these
others lose . . . the theory seems to require that we all be sacrificed in the monster’s maw, in order
to increase total utility.”).
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distinguished from a large endorphin count or a vast blue-colored
surface space—an insipid and lifeless material substance—only in so far
as such is the case.171
Second, from the “positive” side, recall that the EOP requires not
only that ethically exogenous holdings of that from which satisfactions
are derived—opportunities—be equalized, but also that ethically
endogenous such holdings be permitted to vary with responsible effort.
But this means that “satisfaction,” “welfare,” or “wealth” will be
“maximized” in the only ethically intelligible sense of those words
precisely in so far as the inputs of “satisfaction-functions” are
distributed in accordance with the equal opportunity principle. Agentcitizens are permitted to, and face all incentive to, “produce” and indeed
“maximize” their own satisfactions under the EOP, which requires that
they be permitted to retain that which they produce by their own efforts
out of exogenously given resources. So “aggregate” satisfaction will be
“maximized” in the only sense in which satisfaction-maximization is
ethically noteworthy. Every agent’s satisfaction will be the highest that
it can be consistent with the EOP. That is all that is intelligible as
“efficient” where it is satisfaction that would be efficiently or
inefficiently produced. Ethically intelligible efficiency just is what
results from distribution of happiness-inputs in accordance with the
EOP.
Once we see this, we see that the third challenge raised to Part
II.C.2 is dissipated. Proofs that sets of markets which are rank-ordered
in terms of degrees of completeness that fall short of full completeness
are not ordinally equivalent to sets of markets rank-ordered in terms of
their welfare-optimality trade on a conception of welfare-optimality that
is ethically uninteresting. The only welfare that matters—indeed, that
can be viewed as well-faring (by agents capable of faring well) rather
171 Compare the inert matter considered above in connection with the measurement
challenges, supra note 147 and accompanying text. It is the same story here. It is agency—
usefulness to valuing agents—that infuses any substance with value. (A variation here, perhaps,
on the adage that “man is the measure of all things.”) And it is only equal agency that renders the
valuation of such a substance a valuation effected legitimately by us all, hence “value” in a sense
cognizable to “us” all and hence to ethics. The belief that at least aggregated welfare, as
distinguished from wealth, is a value, since it is pleasure or some such humanly experienced
magnititude rather than mere money, does not escape this stricture. For again, welfare,
satisfaction, pleasure, etc. as such do not engage “us” as items to be valued apart from the
propriety of their apportionments. The belief that “aggregated” such magnitudes constitute values
results, I think, from a subconscious elision from thinking in terms of one agent experiencing
welfare, to an “agential” aggregation of persons, conceived inchoately as one person,
“experiencing” such welfare. Once one becomes conscious that one is doing this, one escapes the
illusion. Much the same illusion, incidentally, appears to underwrite Harsanyi’s aggregation and
impartial observer theorems, cited supra note 109. These turn out to be representation
theorems—representations of ordinal measures in cardinal form—rather than theorems “proving”
utilitarianism to be a dictate of rationality itself. See ROEMER, supra note 142, at 138-50, who is
particularly good on this point.
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than as inert substance-growing—is that which is produced by equally
exogenously endowed agents who consume or trade that with which
they are endowed and/or that which they receive through trading when
they are so endowed. There is no reason to suppose that offering more
such trading opportunities to all, or effecting greater equity among the
holdings of ethically exogenous opportunities to all, would result in any
ethically cognizable diminution of the happiness of any.172 Formal
proof can be had elsewhere. I trust for the present that the intuition is
clear enough.
E.

The Efficient Equal-Opportunity Republic is the
Template of Our “Ownership Society”

It should be at least roughly apparent already that the EEOR which
is our American political self-understanding is, in effect, some kind of
OS. Independent and responsible citizens, as agents whose autonomy in
fashioning their lives and pursuing happiness with exogenous
opportunities and resources is to be honored, are owners. They own
their own lives, so to speak, in that they hold exclusive rights to control
and develop those lives, as consistent with the equal self-owning rights
of others.173 And those agents must be recognized to own—rightfully to
control the disposition of—the material correlates of the opportunities
and resources that go into building those lives as well. The fruits of
those resource and opportunity inputs, in turn—what we have called the
ethically endogenous element—also must be owned. Such are what our
agent-citizens bring to, and take from, the idealized market sketched
above. All of these are entailments of the construal of citizens as
responsible agents whose holdings can be ethically assessed in keeping
with the EOP.
But this is of course only to begin to explicate the sense in which
the EEOR is an OS. For ownership is more than holding and
controlling. It is psychologically experienced, and legally protected,
holding and controlling. And there are many differing forms and
gradations—many variations on the themes—of holding and
controlling, and experiencing and legally vindicating such holding
controlling, in American psychology and law. Putting flesh on the bare172 This is not to say that such trading itself cannot bear third-party effects such that over time
ethically exogenous resources come to be centralized in undeserving, overendowed hands. But
that is why market-neutrality above is defined not only in initial endowment terms, but in ongoing
regulatory terms as well.
173 The equal rights qualifier spares the thesis of self-ownership from such objections as Jerry
Cohen raises against such as Nozick. See G.A. Cohen, Self-Ownership, World-Ownership, and
Equality, in JUSTICE AND EQUALITY HERE AND NOW (Frank S. Lucash ed., 1986); G.A. Cohen,
Self-Ownership, World-Ownership, and Equality: Part II, 3 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 77 (1986).
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bones of ownership in an American OS, then, requires more than simply
saying that ownership and what is owned are to be understood by
reference to responsible agency, efficiency and equal opportunity.
Those are the broad features of our ownership society. Filling in the
more specific details requires that we take into account both the more
detailed material entailments of those conceptions, and the “pathdependent” features of American sensibility and law themselves.
III. OWNING AT THE CORE: ASSETS, OPTIONS & ENDOWMENTS IN THE
EFFICIENT EQUAL-OPPORTUNITY REPUBLIC
Part II of this Article might be said to constitute the theoretic
“engine” meant to drive concerted and coherent effort toward an
American OS. Part I supplied that engine’s parts, showing that the
engine’s content is domestic, so to speak. The sequel to this Article
provides the “wheels” which get that OS “rolling” on the ground. If
these similes are fair, then this Part might be called the “clutch” or
“drive” through which the theory must specifically engage with what it
ultimately recommends. The law of ownership and the psychology of
owners mediate between articulated policy and well implemented
program. They thus require care in their own right if an OS is
realistically to be instantiated. This Part is intended to supply that care.
It translates the Part II notion of a “resource” or “material opportunity”
into a legally and psychologically cognizable “asset” whose
“ownership” is defined, delimited and vindicated by an “ownership
society” of responsible agents who cooperatively promote and protect
their free pursuits of happiness through the rule of law.
Three particularly noteworthy upshots emerge below. The first is
that many more items, abstract and concrete, can in principle and should
be legally cognized as “assets” and ownable in the contemporary
American OS than could have been in an earlier CR, CL or PC polity.
Call this the “abstraction effect.”
It yields both (a) specific
consequences pertinent to policy and (b) additional political salience to
the market mechanism sketched above in Part II.C. The second
noteworthy upshot is that in view of the much broader range of
resources that should count as assets in the contemporary American OS,
assets’ autonomy-conferring attributes are in significant and complex
measure dependent upon both the independent tastes and the
cooperative action of agents other than the agent who holds the asset in
question. That too yields additional political salience to the market
mechanism sketched in Part II.C, and bears consequences for the
delineation of responsible ownership below at III.B. The third
noteworthy upshot is that there is a real, practical distinction to be
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drawn between perceivedly “hard-owned” and “accumulated” assets on
the one hand, “merely entitled,” “income”-streams on the other. That
distinction, of course, does not register at the higher level of theoretical
abstraction encountered in orthodox financial economics, and thus
might well surprise practitioners who practice in that orthodox tradition.
But the distinction will not surprise heuristics psychologists or theorists
of “behavioral” finance. And it likely will not surprise many lawyers.
Indeed, the distinction appears to be rooted in the “endowment effect”
and cognate dispositions familiar to behavioral economists, thus to be
rooted in the empirical psychologies of persons not just in the U.S., but
in other jurisdictions as well. In the U.S., however, the effect might
also be grounded partly in the doctrines and the path-dependence of
American law, in this case constitutional and property law—to pun a
bit, a manner of “endowment effect” in its own right. Once again, this
bears policy and programmatic consequences.
Before elaborating upon these results, we must prepare the way by
taking notice of several broad parameters constraining legal ownership
in any OS. “Ownership,” of course, is more than mere possession, even
if the latter really be “nine-tenths of the law.” An asset is “owned”
precisely to the degree that a society through its law vindicates the
asset’s possession and disposition. And “vindication,” of course, takes
not only varying degrees, but varying forms. The law, in turn, will be
reflective of its enacting society’s constitutive “substantive” values as to
what rights and responsibilities its citizens hold for themselves and in
relation to one another. But the law also will reflect its society’s more
“procedurally” oriented values as to how the law should be fashioned,
changed and enforced.
The “substantive” guidance that the American EEOR’s core values
afford to the law of an American OS will ring familiar in light of Part II.
“Ownership” of an “asset” should, for purposes of delimitation and
instantiation in keeping with the constitutive values of the EEOR,
conduce to citizen-agents’, or households of such agents’, capacities
freely to make life-planning or happiness-pursuing choices. They
should conduce to citizen-agents’ capacities to make such choices both
independently and in keeping with the EOP, which latter equilibrates
the independence of all ethically equal agents. Owned assets should
conduce to citizens’ capacities to make such choices without undue
subordination to the preferences of others, but not without due regard
for the equal agency rights of others. “Undue” subordination and “due”
regard, of course, are understood by reference to the EOP honored by
the EEOR as described in Part II. Once the sphere of legitimate
independent agency is delimited in keeping with the equal opportunity
principle, an asset—an ownable resource—will be something the
possession of which realizes, enhances or secures that legitimate sphere
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of choice as a practical reality.
Those general substantive principles direct us toward a number of
more particular, “procedurally” oriented features of what should count
as ownable assets in the American OS. We draw those features out first
by examining the variety of ways in which asset-holding realizes
practical autonomy. That is the focus of Subpart A, in which the stress
is on liberty. Subpart B then focuses upon autonomy’s delimitation by
the EOP; the stress there is on that form of liberty which is valued in the
American OS—responsible liberty.
A.

Ownership & Liberty

First, then, on liberty. We will begin with formal legal liberty—
simple legally permissible action—then see how asset-holding enhances
the sphere of autonomy beyond mere legal permissibility. For purposes
of policy we will emphasize in particular how both the law and
ownership-psychology appear to manifest the endowment heuristic
familiar to theorists of behavioral economics and behavioral finance.
And we will draw some programmatic consequences from this in
anticipation of the sequel’s detailed blueprint of the full American OS.
1.

In Theory & In Law

Begin with a simple hypothetical. Mr. A might as a formal legal
matter be free to till or not to till the soil of Ms. B, his neighbor. He
might, that is, face no penalty imposed or recognized by any formally
constituted authority for not so tilling. He is not, legally, a chattel slave
or an indentured servant. If B is the only possible source from whom or
which A might acquire a basic livelihood—minimal caloric intake,
shelter from the elements, etc.—however, he will of course not as a
practical matter be free not to work for B for food or shelter. He will
not “really,” or “pragmatically” be free. If by contrast A holds
substantial livelihood-conferring assets, he will not be practically
required to till for B, though of course he might contract to do so
nonetheless for additional income. And presumably that will be for
more income than he could have held out for had he not held any
livelihood-conferring assets other than his labor. An asset, then, first
and most simply is something that will practically widen an agentcitizen’s sphere of politically or legally—“formally”—permitted choice.
It will be a resource or material opportunity, in Part II’s terms—the
material correlate of agency itself. Ideally it will afford the owner some
degree of ongoing material self-sufficiency, by generating a continuous
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stream of sustenance or “income.” It will prove useful to single out this
latter quality—call it the “fecundity” or “generativity,” perhaps the
productivity—of an asset.
A’s right to his own labor in the previous example is itself an asset
in as much as it permits A at least to choose to work for B rather than to
starve or steal. But A might also hold more specialized or well
developed talents—skills, or human capital, per the terms of Part
II.C.1—as well as other resources—e.g., land or nonhuman capital,
savings, etc. In so far as, given environmental, technological, cultural
and market—hence, social—conditions, these enable A to achieve a
greater number of desired aims in a greater variety of ways, they too
will be assets. And they will augment A’s holding of that more basic
and less generative asset that is just his “unskilled” labor. Assets, then,
clearly come in many shapes, and with varying degrees of “assetness,”
as conferrers of practical autonomy. And they seem to come in many
more shapes and gradations today than they did in the past. The modern
EEOR or American OS is capable in principle of affording its citizens a
great deal more practical independence than the CR or the CL polities
of the past were able to afford.174
One distinctive quality of modern assets is that many of them
provide the means of generating not just income, as did assets in the
past, but more assets—more “hard,” or accumulated assets.175 Call this,
echoing the penultimate paragraph up, the “generativity” of some assets.
In general, the more kinds or quantities of additional asset that a
particular form of asset can produce, the more “generative” it is. A
machine tool, for example, used in the production of other tools—a sort
of “second order,” “ur-” or “meta-tool”—will in this sense be more
generative than a non-machine tool, at least if we hold the generated
income constant. Land, which ultimately yields many kinds of assets
indeed, might be called the most generative of—“the mother of all”—
assets. But in light of possible market and liquidity restraints as well as
other factors we will discuss below, this thought must be ringed with
caveats.
We can define “wealth” in the EEOR along the lines just sketched
as either of two magnitudes of assets. More kinds or qualities of assets
translate into more wealth, and so does a greater quantity of any
particular kind of asset. Wealth, then—the total of accumulated
assets—will by definition be the fungible or portative, as it were
“fluidic,” material correlate of EEOR agency itself. More wealth means
174 The critical role of assets in affording practical freedom is well laid out in, among other
places, AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 108 (1999). See also DASGUPTA, supra
note 137. Sen’s and Dasgupta’s work focuses on “developing” economies, but the lessons are
readily extended to “developed” economies—particularly to their less developed sectors.
175 More on the problematic but nonetheless critical notion of “hardness” below.
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more options, which in turn means more agency. And wealth that
markets or other mechanisms diffuse throughout the polity in keeping
with the EOP is wealth that realizes responsible agency.176
But there is more to be said about wealth. Wealth, at the level of
abstraction adopted by some economists, is either what can be expected
with reasonable certainty in the future to be, or is already, accumulated.
At the lower level of abstraction employed by other economists,
however, a level which proves to be salient for OS purposes, wealth is
only that which is—not what in future might be—accumulated.
Pursuant to the endowment effect and cognate heuristics documented by
experimental economists, wealth that one holds appears to be “worth”
more than wealth that one “might” or “will” hold.177 And that effect
seems to be rooted in more than risk-aversion or diminishing marginal
utility.178 The distinction, as thus far stated, of course remains very
crude. For, like the behavioralists themselves, we have not yet defined
“holding,” which in turn we shall see to be inflected both by physical
characteristics and by legal protection. We will do that inflecting
below. Suffice it for the moment simply to have flagged the broad
distinction. More accumulated wealth is more wealth.
There are two metrics related to and in addition to the simple
partative-magnitudinal metric along which wealth can vary that are of
particular interest to citizens of the EEOR or American OS: the security
of wealth and the liquidity of wealth. The former, we soon shall see,
bears upon accumulation. The latter, “liquidity,” refers to the rapidity
with which an asset of one form can be transformed, through trading
activity, into an asset of another form—most commonly the “purest,”
most abstract form of “pure purchasing power,” namely money—
176

Again, please see Parts II.A through II.C, supra, on agency, responsible agency and the
equal opportunity principle. And see Part III.B, infra, for more on the EOP’s expression in
law.
177 I will not here distinguish between endowment effects, loss-aversion or willingness-toaccept/willingness-to-pay gaps. Nor will I distinguish between these and the more clearly
conceptually distinct, though nonetheless empirically entangled, phenomena of status quo bias,
commission/omission disparity or disposition effects. There is of course a vast and growing
literature on these and cognate subjects. Useful surveys include Kahneman et al., Anomalies: The
Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193 (1991); Richard
H. Thaler, Mental Accounting Matters, in ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS (Colin F.
Camerer et al. eds., 2004); and Colin F. Camerer, Individual Decision Making, in HANDBOOK OF
EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 587, 665-70 (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds., 1995)
(“Endowment Effects and Buying-Selling Price Gaps”). Fuller collections of seminal work
include JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et al.
eds., 1982); CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000);
QUASI-RATIONAL ECONOMICS (Richard H. Thaler ed., 1991); ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL
FINANCE (Richard H. Thaler ed., 1993); ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS, supra, op.
cit.;HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS, supra, op. cit. A popular-audience-targeted
treatment of these phenomena is RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER’S CURSE (1992).
178 See Matthew Rabin, Risk-Aversion and Expected-Utility Theory: A Calibration Theorem,
68 ECONOMETRICA 1281 (2000).
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without diminishing the rate of exchange at which it can be so
transformed by dint of the transformative transaction itself.179 The less
liquid an asset is, the smaller the number of exchange transactions in
which it can be employed within a given span of time, hence the more
restricted the sphere of choice opened by the asset to its owner. Greater
liquidity means greater disposability at greater rates of time and
exchange. And greater disposability at greater such rates in effect
means more asset, more choice. The more liquid an asset, then, the
more “generative,” in a sense, it will be. For liquidity is an asset’s
capacity to bring—to exchange for—other assets. It should be noted in
this connection, however, that the relation between liquidity and
generativity entails that land and real estate are not always as generative
as they might be thought to be. They might be generative in their yields
of additional resources that spring from or are buried within them, while
not being so generative of such resources as might be, in a more liquid
market, exchangeable for them. This proves significant to the sequel’s
treatment of “homesteading” and “capital homesteading.”
It is also helpful to note in this connection that the less “deep” or
“thick” the market is for a particular asset—that is, the fewer parties
there are who desire and are willing to exchange for the asset (hence,
who regard it as an asset)—the less liquid (thus less generative) it will
be. We therefore find that the wealth represented by, or again as it were
the “degree of assetness” of, an asset—hence, the increment of
autonomy that the asset confers—will generally ride in significant
measure upon the desires of persons other than the asset’s owner. And
it will ride upon other factors—legal, physical, etc.—that affect the rate
of transformability of one asset into another. Thus, although assets free
one person partly from the wills of other individuals who might
“unduly” coerce her in the absence of her asset-owning, they do not free
persons altogether from the desires of those who make up the
community. Rather, just as would have been expected in view of the
discussion at Part II, they conduce to responsible liberty—liberty that
takes account of the liberty of others—not unchecked libertinism.
Turning from liquidity to security, the “security” of an asset refers
to its durability and reliability through time as an expander of choice for
its owner.180 Security is therefore both a legal and a physical-cumfinancial category. The physical-financial aspect of security requires
little comment. An asset that rapidly depreciates is less “asset-like.” It

179 See, e.g., MARTIN SHUBIK, 1 THE THEORY OF MONEY AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 399427 (2000); see also JAMES TOBIN, MONEY, CREDIT, AND CAPITAL 12-14 (1998) (emphasizing,
however, only the temporal rate at which the asset can be converted to cash).
180 Durability is related to, but nonetheless distinct from, Tobin’s “predictability.” See TOBIN,
supra note 179, at 16-20, 23-26. “Predictability” refers to the degree to which an asset’s cash
value at future dates can be accurately anticipated. Id.
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confers less autonomy. Along the physical-financial durability metric,
then, land might again be thought the “mother of all assets,” not only
owing to its earlier noted generativity, but owing to its regenerativity or
value-retentivity. Real estate is one of the comparatively small number
of assets which in most localities does not unambiguously and
inexorably depreciate, at least not for protracted periods, but tends
rather in most cases to appreciate over time.181 As will be discussed
presently, it happens that real estate and buried stores enjoy, at least
within the American legal tradition, a special form of legal security as
well.
The legal aspect of assets’ security is more interesting and
practically variable than the physical. My assets are secure only to the
extent, not merely that they do not rapidly depreciate, but also that the
law—and thus my fellow citizens—protect me from uncompensated
seizures.182 In so far as the law “entitles” me to possession and to
disposition of an asset, the latter is more secure, and thus more solidly
or reliably “asset-like,” more valuable, conferring of more wealth and
more autonomy as the EEOR understands such terms. And of course
such entitlement, if it is to be a practical rather than merely a formal
reality, must be practically vindicable and enforceable.
It of course cannot be said, in view of the foregoing, that
entitlement is an all-or-nothing affair—either as a practical or as a
formal matter. The variability of legal security as a practical matter is a
function of that aforementioned vindicability and enforceability. The
degree to which the law secures the possession and disposition of assets
as a formal matter is more complicated. To begin with, there is the
familiar observation that legal ownership constitutes a “bundle of
rights.” The owner of property under American law generally, though
not exceptionlessly, holds the right to exclusive use and enjoyment
thereof, to alienate the property freely, and to considerable extent to
subdivide it both spatially and temporally. On the one hand, bundling
bears directly upon choice and autonomy—more sticks, more choices—
but the matter of subdivision in particular reveals that the bundling of
property rights is bound up also with transformability and liquidity as
discussed above.
In the civil law tradition, for example, where property types and
relations are strictly limited by the numerus clausus principle and
unamendable by contract, entitlements are limited to certain coarse-

181 See George Sternlieb & James W. Hughes, The Evolution of Housing and Its Social
Compact, in FEDERAL HOUSING POLICY AND PROGRAMS 143 (J. Paul Mitchell ed., 1985)
(emphasizing housing’s role as “safe haven” against ravages of inflation as much as from “the
elements”).
182 My fellow citizens might also protect me by agreeing to pool risk with me and thus insure.
More on this form of joint-indemnification below.
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grained forms. One cannot easily, if at all, sell a “watch for a day” or a
“half-ownership of a home.”183 What we above called the “abstraction
effect,” then, is by definition less developed and less honored in such
jurisdictions. Asset types are thereby limited, asset markets therefore
less complete, and autonomy—the sphere of choice—accordingly is
limited as well, at least in theory.184 In common law jurisdictions,
where contract, property and tort are more fluidic and thought to be
more facilitative of private ordering, and where assets therefore may be
subdivided into more finely grained spatio-temporal “slices,” assets are
in principle more liquid, asset markets more complete, and choices and
autonomy—as well, therefore, at least in theory, as wealth and
welfare—are for that reason greater.185 The legal security of an asset’s
liquidity itself, then, is in part a function of the legal system’s degree,
optimal or suboptimal, of accommodatingness—i.e., the degree to
which the law honors the abstraction effect by recognizing, facilitating,
and protecting autonomous asset-delimiting and exchange decisions
hence private ordering, consistently with the need to economize on
information costs.186 The same observation, duly modified, will hold of
the law’s role in facilitating securitization and contingent claims
transactions, more on which below.
We therefore see that law secures autonomy in at least two ways,
both mediated through the parceling of and transacting around assets:
first, by protecting autonomy-enhancing asset-ownership itself; and
second, by recognizing, facilitating and enforcing autonomously agreed
parcelings and delimitings of assets and transactions that derive in part
from title to them. The latter is not only to protect the choices involved
in those parcelings and transactions themselves. It is also to enhance or
183 See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry
E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface (Draft 10/28/00, on file with Yale Center for Law,
Economics & Organization); Henry E. Smith, Two Dimensions of Property Rights (Draft 3/31/00,
on file with Northwestern University School of Law).
184 But see Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: Form, Context, and Audience, 55
STAN. L. REV. 1105 (2003), on the role that such limitations might, under some circumstances,
play in facilitating liquidity and choice by economizing on the information costs that afflict
markets in ownable goods; see also JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND (2000), and ELSTER,
ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS, supra note 120, on circumstances under which constraining choice
might enhance autonomy.
Analogy with language seems particularly apt. The latter dramatically extends the range of
thoughts and objects of thought that one can entertain, hence, in a sense, one’s cognitive
autonomy. More property types mean more autonomy just as more vocabulary means more
thought. But some coherent set of rules bounding and governing these matters—the structuring
of language by definitions and grammar, the delimitation and vindication of property-holding and
-exchange by law—also are required lest autonomy degenerate into a cacophonous and
incoherent heteronomy.
185 With the caveat mentioned in the previous note. On the relations among such market
completeness, choice, autonomy and welfare, see, again, Parts II.C-D, supra.
186 See supra note 184.
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optimize asset-liquidity, which itself increases the degree to which
asset-ownership enhances autonomy.187 The law, then, as public
facilitation of private ordering pursuant to the abstraction effect, can, by
optimizing the security and liquidity of asset-holding, be seen yet again
to amount to public action facilitative of private EEOR liberty. That, of
course, once again is how the EEOR itself, and hence the American OS,
should be viewed—public action in support of private liberty.
Beyond the abstraction effect—the legal bundling and parceling of
entitlements—and consequent liquidity considerations, the law’s formal
securing of effective ownership must be viewed along a simpler metric.
This one might be called the basic “hardness” of entitlement, in both
property and contract form, within the doctrines and protections of the
law. “Hardness,” like the notions of “accumulation” and “wealth”
mentioned above, is a rather open-ended and elusive concept, bearing
no distinct or singulary status in either legal or financial theory. But it
nonetheless appears to capture something now well documented in the
literature of behavioral and experimental economics. What we are after
here is reminiscent of, though analytically distinguishable from, both
material durability and practical legal enforceability. It is the formal
legal analogue to these, and even reminiscent, in a manner, of liquidity
again. The fact is that American law traditionally has recognized and
protected some forms of property and other entitlements (e.g., contract
rights) longer than, and continues to treat some as in a puzzling sense
“more fundamental” than, certain others. It also offers differing forms
of protection—differing forms and degrees of entitlement—with
variable implications for autonomy. And these differing forms and
degrees appear both to reflect and to perpetuate certain psychological
attitudes toward these differing forms of entitlement.
A few examples familiar to lawyers help flesh the point out and
give it concrete expression. In a still celebrated article,188 Professor
Reich suggested years ago that the welfare state had ushered in a “new
[form of] property” which should be recognized as such both in order to
maintain citizens’ independence from government and to vindicate
constitutional values. Entitlements conferred by statute, Reich argued,
even if entitlements to nothing more than conditional income-streams,
were entitlements conferred by law. Such entitlements accordingly
warranted the status of property—protected by constitutional due
187 Tobin also singles out what he terms an asset’s “divisibility” as a fundamental attribute.
He limits his discussion, however, to fractional unit sizes, as it were along a single dimension—
that of simple quantity. See TOBIN, supra note 179, at 15.
188 Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964); see also Charles A. Reich,
Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245 (1965);
Frank I. Michelman, Forward: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83
HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969); William H. Simon, Rights and Redistribution in the Welfare System, 38
STAN. L. REV. 1431 (1986).
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process rights against state-expropriation or encroachment. They were
owned, just like anything else to which the law attached title. The
United States Supreme Court of course soon agreed in large measure, in
effect constitutionalizing Reich’s argument in Goldberg v. Kelly.189
“Entitlement” could be like title.
Even in the Reich and Goldberg era, however, there were limits on
the linkages between the ownership of “older” and of “newer”
property.190 Due process protected individuals against capricious caseby-case denials by administrative bodies of legislatively conferred
entitlements. But it did not protect the entire class of such recipients
from wholesale repeal of the entitling program itself.191 Nor were
welfare or social security checks, like title to land or other “old”
property, assignable.192 As if to underscore the point, all it took was a
new appointment or two to the Court and a few short months before the
new property came once again to look like less than property at all.193
Moreover, a few appointments more and another fifteen years saw even
non-welfare check government entitlements looking less secure, while
more traditional entitlements grew even more secure—though in a
“cognizable stake” rather than “secure from takings” sense—than they
had been in previous decades. The allusion here, of course, is to
Supreme Court justiciability doctrine since the later 1980s. It has
almost come to seem that very “old”—traditional common law—
property is as it were “more owned,” so far as the federal courts are
concerned, as a public law matter.194 In so far as this is the case, assets
of long American-legal pedigree—ideally, traceable to ancient common
law vindicability—might be expected to be more formal-legally secure
than others. They are more “owned,” precisely because they are more
“concrete,” or “hard.”195
189
190

397 U.S. 254 (1970).
See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484 (1970) (now the Burger Court,
upholding a Maryland regulation having the effect of holding maximum AFDC grant below the
established needs of some families; observing that “here we deal with state regulation in the
social and economic field, not affecting freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights”).
191 See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
192 See Philpott v. Essex County Welfare Bd., 409 U.S. 413 (1972); see also 42 U.S.C. § 407
(2000).
193 See note infra 190.
194 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) [hereinafter Lujan II]; Lujan v.
Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990). One might have thought that an Article III “case”
would be presented any time that a cause of action had accrued, that causes of action in turn
accrued with injuries, and that injuries in turn were defined by law—including, then, by statute.
Yet by requiring that a very special and ill-defined kind of injury—“concrete and particularized”
(see Lujan II, 504 U.S. at 560)—be suffered before access could be had to the federal courts, the
Supreme Court began in the 1980s to appear to hold that those forms of injury, thus those forms
of right or entitlement cognizable in 1787, would be the most readily vindicated in the federal
courts today.
195 If we add to this consideration the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court’s “takings”
jurisprudence under the 5th Amendment appears to be bringing greater security to “old” property
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Another example, this one from private rather than public law, is a
bit less dramatic but no less important. In another celebrated article a
decade less venerable than Reich’s, Professors Calabresi and Melamed
seminally distinguished between “property rules” and “liability
rules.”196 The distinction is drawn in terms of the form of specific legal
vindication afforded a legal entitlement. Property protection, of course,
is such as requires any taker of another’s entitlement to pay a price set
by the holder. Liability protection is such as requires the taker to pay a
price determined by the law itself, broadly conceived—e.g., by legal
doctrine or by a trial court’s application of a broadly stated legal
standard, which might but need not incorporate a market’s valuation of
the entitlement in question. Assets that are “property,” in this sense,
accordingly are more “asset-like”—conferring of more choice—than are
assets, such as contractual rights, that are vindicated by “mere” liability
rules. For they permit the holder to determine price. But both, of
course, are assets to a greater degree than are “mere” government
“entitlements” per Reich, at least legally speaking.197
A critical fact, in this connection, is that the law affords most
protection—confers most “assetness”—upon precisely those assets that
we will see tend to be appreciated by holders as more asset-like—
“hard,” “accumulated” assets.198 Property rules, for example, typically
protect holders of physical or otherwise accumulated objects and
capital, even though of course such objects might be variously divided
along spatio-temporal lines. Liability rules, in turn, protect rights to
performance (contract) or rights to be free of “performance” (tort). And
even against democratically decided actions by the state, traditional assets definitely look to be
increasingly “asset-like” along the legal security metric relative to more newfangled entitlements.
They are the assets that “nobody can take away from you.” Hence they are the assets most
“owned.” More on this infra, Part III.B.3.
196 Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 92 (1972).
197 As a practical matter, of course, a government entitlement might nonetheless be more
secure in some instances once we take into account the law’s other realms that bear upon the
security of a contractual entitlement. The federal government—at least up to now—does not go
bankrupt, for example.
198 I must emphasize here again that what I am calling an asset’s “hardness” is not an
altogether satisfactory, or even indeed ultimately theoretically intelligible, concept. The fact that
now proliferating intellectual property forms are “hard” in the requisite sense makes that plain.
“Hardness” is an attribute that appears to be grounded in pre-theoretic intuitions—in endowment
heuristics—rather than in any coherent theory. It is tempting to place the emphasis on
“accumulated” rather than “hard,” in as much as it appears to be the perception of the asset’s
being as it were a fait accompli—something that one now possesses—rather than its tangibility
that underwrites the perception that one is now “endowed” with it. But even here we have not
found a satisfactory interpretation, for many financial assets—accounts receivable and bond
instruments, for example—are both presently held and yet little more than claims on future
income streams. Hence my earlier remark, atop page 164, that “hardness” is an “open-ended and
elusive concept, bearing no distinct or singulary status in either legal or financial theory.” A
consequence, I fear, of pretheoretic endowment psychology itself—a psychology that seems to
find expression, as I argue here, in legal doctrine itself.
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due process rights, so far as entitlement is concerned, at best protect
rights to be free of certain forms of state expropriation of originally
state-conferred or commonlaw-recognized entitlement. The more
venerable the provenance and traditional the form of an entitlement,
then, the “harder” and more protected by the law it seems to be. The
“endowment effect,” in a sense, appears to be enshrined in as well as
enhanced or perpetuated by the law itself.
2.

In Citizen-Psychology

Responsible liberty is not merely a theoretical ideal or legal value.
It is a lived reality, a reality in relation to which the EEOR’s ideals and
laws are understood. The American OS as EEOR, then, will take
account of real citizen-psychology in legally defining, vindicating, and
fostering the spread of the ownership of autonomy-conferring assets.
As it happens, a vast amount of recent empirical research supports
the long-held American intuition that asset-owning, in the senses
elaborated in Part III.A.1, conduces to the rich form of responsible
agency elaborated in Part II. Owning spawns thoughtful, hopeful,
forward-looking, active, participative, healthy, educated, confident,
secure-feeling, achieving, creative, civically and familially engaged,
productive and responsible citizens. The same research might partly
explain, and in turn be explained by, the law’s affording greater
protection to “old,” “hard” property than to “new” property, and to
property than to contractual and other entitlements. For it seems that
“accumulated” and “hard-owned”—i.e., fully property-law-protected—
wealth produces the autonomy-enriching effects more starkly than does
unaccumulated “income”—either of the liability rule-protected form,
the “government entitlement” form, or any other form. Assets in the
EEOR or American OS, that is to say, are more like “stocks” than
“flows.”
One dramatic, though perhaps, in view of the endowment heuristic,
ironic effect of accumulated wealth-holding on individual psychology is
its inducing an orientation toward the future, and a consequent attitude
of control thereover. Those who hold accumulated assets take present
choices specifically with an eye toward affecting their long-term future
environments. They “invest.” They take responsibility for the future,
and they regard the future as in a sense more real, more concrete. Those
who do not hold wealth tend to orient choices only to the present or
very near future.199 These effects have been observed even when
199 The causality, one might expect, should run both ways. An “investment mentality” would
seem more likely to result in asset-accumulation than would a profligate, “live for the moment”
mentality. Studies controlling for the bidirectional causal effect have found nonetheless that
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controlling for differential income-flows as between those who have
accumulated and those who have not, and when controlling for the
obvious causative role that an antecedent propensity to save presumably
would have played in accumulating in the first place.200 Asset-holding
carries with it an investing, future-affecting and caretaking mentality,
which in turn fosters an attitude of autonomy—the sense that one is not
merely a passive object of fate and future, but a part-controller of the
same.201
Asset-holding also broadens the range of choices that people
actually do make—and over time, therefore, that they actively seek out
or work to ensure that they will face. One illustrative example here is a
long-observed difference in behavior between participants in defined
benefit and defined contribution pension plans.202 Both are well settled
legal entitlements that enjoy due process protection, though defined
contribution plans technically enjoy property protection while defined
benefit plans enjoy more contract-like protection.203 The latter also,
through vesting and drawing rules (forms of contingency), more tightly
constrain rights of action. They also, by definition, entitle their owners
merely to “flows,” not to “stocks.” And accumulated funds are
controlled by fiduciaries rather than by the merely passive,
“beneficially” owning pensioners. Such defined benefit pensioners, it
has (unsurprisingly) been established, report feeling more dependent
upon the firms for which they labor. And they retire at a single
prescribed age.204 Participants in defined contribution plans, by
asset-holding itself fosters investment attitudes that lead to more asset-holding. See Gautam N.
Yadama & Michael Sherraden, Effects of Assets on Attitudes and Behaviors: Advance Test of a
Social Policy Proposal, Working Paper No. 95-2, Center for Social Development (1995);
Deborah Page-Adams & Michael Sherraden, What We Know About Effects of Asset Holding:
Implications for Research on Asset-Based Anti-Poverty Initiatives, Working Paper No. 96-1,
Center for Social Development (1996); S. Beverly et al., A Framework of Asset-Accumulation
Stages and Strategies, Working Paper No. 01-1, Center for Social Development (2001); Amanda
Moore McBride et al., The Effects of Individual Development Account Programs: Perceptions of
Participants, Working Paper No. 03-06, Center for Social Development (2003); Michael
Sherraden et al., Overcoming Poverty: Supported Saving as a Household Development Strategy,
Working Paper No. 04-13, Center for Social Development (2004); see also Sherraden, supra note
5, at 151-57.
200 See sources cited supra note 199.
201 See sources cited supra note 199.
202 Defined benefit plans guarantee a payment stream to beneficiaries, while the assets from
which those payments are derived remain under the control of the pension fund manager.
Defined contribution plans involve facilitation and (in many but not all cases) supplementation of
beneficiary savings in their own accounts. See generally JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK,
PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 42-55 (3d ed. 2000); E. PHILIP DAVIS, PENSION FUNDS:
RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY AND CAPITAL MARKETS, AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
230-44 (1995); PENSIONS IN THE U.S. ECONOMY 139-60 (Zvi Bodie et al. eds., 1988).
203 It is not clear that property rules and liability rules diverge, however, when the property in
question is monetary.
204 See Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L. J. 451 (2004);
James Stock & David A. Wise, The Pension Inducement to Retire: An Option Value Analysis,
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contrast, are both more likely to retire before the age of 60 and, perhaps
more surprisingly, after the age of 65 than are participants in defined
benefit plans.205 And they report stronger perceptions of control and
autonomy. Once again, there is nothing particularly shocking in this.
Those who legally possess more—and less conditioned—individual
control over assets simply face, trivially, more options than other
people. And they tend to exercise those options. This in turn develops
a more broadly-sweeping “menu mentality,” which in turn assists in
developing an autonomous—discriminating and evaluating—
personality, the personality of an American EEOR citizen-agent.206
One particularly salient type of choice-making and choice-seeking
attitude that asset-holding tends to support, a type especially valued by
the CR tradition, is that of civic engagement and political and economic
participation. Social scientists and political theorists alike repeatedly
have observed that materially independent people, because they need
not obey the naked, non-reason-mediated wills of others for their
sustenance, must be persuaded by those others to do what those others
wish. They thus come to be treated as rational, autonomous deciders,207
and not surprisingly come to regard themselves as such.
In
consequence, as empirical work confirms, they become more involved
in their communities, in clubs and boards and organizations than do
non-owners—in effect transforming their physical capital into social
capital.208 (They “bowl alone” less than do others.209) Relatedly,
owners are more energetically approached for support by those who
seek positions of political and other forms of leadership, a variation on
the “need to persuade” theme noted just above.210 Commensurately,
owners are more active participants in democratic political processes.211
This tendency is reinforced, of course, by the owners’ holding of
intelligible stakes in the socioeconomic-cum-political system, and in
NBER Working Paper No. 2660 (1988).
205 See Stock & Wise, supra note 204.
206 See sources cited supra note 199.
207 At any rate, as people who must be deceived or manipulated rather than simply ordered
about.
208 See, e.g., C. WRIGHT MILLS, WHITE COLLAR: THE AMERICAN MIDDLE CLASSES (1951);
GABRIEL KOLKO, WEALTH AND POWER IN AMERICA (1962); G. WILLIAM DOMHOFF, THE
HIGHER CIRCLES: THE OWNING CLASS IN AMERICA (1970); Anthony F. Shorrocks, UK Wealth
Distribution: Current Evidence and Future Prospects, in GROWTH, ACCUMULATION, AND
UNPRODUCTIVE ACTIVITY 29 (Edward N. Wolff ed., 1987); Denis Kessler & André Masson,
Personal Wealth Distribution in France: Cross-Sectional Evidence and Extensions, in GROWTH,
ACCUMULATION, AND UNPRODUCTIVE ACTIVITY, supra, at 141 (Edward Wolff ed., 1987); see
also sources cited supra note 199.
209 The allusion is of course to PUTNAM, supra note 83. The claim, of course, is not that
insufficient stakeholding is the only cause of “bowling alone.” It is only that stakeholding
constitutes a countervailing influence.
210 See sources cited supra notes 199, 208.
211 See sources cited supra notes 199, 208.
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society at large as community leaders, etc. Owners accordingly
perceive themselves both as more influential and as more called upon to
wield influence as responsible “owners” of their polities, economies and
social systems.212
They become precisely those responsible,
autonomous, politically and socially participative freeholders
envisioned by CR ideology from the time of its earliest formulations.
They also tend, of course, to become responsibly autonomous lifeplanners and life-builders of the kind envisaged by CL.213 In doing so,
they act productively in the way valued by PC.
Beyond economic, political and civic engagement, asset-holding
also has been found empirically to correlate with familial engagement
and cohesion. This correlation could have been anticipated after earlier
studies linking family strife and dissolution with the pressures wrought
by poverty.214 But what newer studies show is that owned and
accumulated assets bear a more pronounced countervailing effect than
do income-flows, even when controlling for income-differentials
between those who hold accumulated assets and those who do not.215 In
light of the observations made just above, again this will not surprise.
In so far as accumulated assets conduce to engagement and a sense of
responsibility, and in so far as they conduce to a sense of security and
general well being, they can be expected to foster healthy relations with
intimates.
Telescoping from political, civic and familial well being to
individual well being, accumulated asset-owning correlates with
superior cognitive function, academic achievement, emotional
adjustment and physical health among both adults and children.216
Again, these findings are robust when controlling for differential
income-flows among those who do and those who do not hold

212 William Simon makes a similar point as a conceptual rather than as a social-psychological
matter. See Simon, supra note 23, at 1350-88; sources cited supra note 208; see also McBride,
supra note 199.
213 See sources cited supra notes 199, 208; see also A.M. McBride et al., Civic Engagement
Among Low-Income and Low-Wealth Families: In Their Words, Working Paper No. 04-14,
Center for Social Development (2004).
214 On that correlation, see, e.g., ROBERT HOCKETT, CHAKA’S WINDOWS: WORKS AND DAYS
IN THE LIFE OF A HOMELESS ENTREPRENEUR (unpublished manuscript on file with the author);
ELLIOT LIEBOW, TALLY’S CORNER: A STUDY OF NEGRO STREETCORNER MEN (1967); DANIEL
PATRICK MOYNIHAN, FAMILY AND NATION (1965).
215 See McBride, supra note 199; Sherraden et al., supra note 199; McBride et al., supra note
213.
216 See T.R. Williams, The Impacts of Household Wealth on Child Development, Working
Paper No. 04-07, Center for Social Development (2004); A.M. McBride et al., Asset Building:
Increasing Capacity for Performance Measurement and Effects, Working Paper No. 04-12,
Center for Social Development (2004); Deborah Page-Adams et al., Assets, Health, and WellBeing: Neighborhoods, Families, Children and Youth, Working Paper No. 01-9, Center for Social
Development (2001); Sherraden et al., supra note 199; McBride et al., supra note 199.
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accumulated assets.217 And of course, where children are the subjects of
study, superior cognitive function cannot be claimed to be the cause of
the familial asset-holding.218 Asset-owning in the senses elaborated in
Part III.A.1, then, appears from quite an early stage, at quite a “micro”oriented level of observation, to conduce to the development of healthy
citizen-agents of the kind extolled by the American EEOR.
It bears notice in this connection that the effects here observed to
correlate with asset-holding are empirically observed in other
jurisdictions, outside of the U.S., as well as in the U.S. The endowment
effect is not confined to American holding. What we should expect of
ownership in the American OS, then, might not be entirely contingent
upon that OS’s being American. There might be “universal” appeal to
an OS, or at least universal “Western” appeal.219 Studies of attitudes
and self-reported welfare in Sweden, for example, where all have been
entitled to impressive magnitudes of state-provided welfare payment
streams for many decades,220 indicate that many people suffer from a
sense of disempowerment and childlike dependence upon choices made
by others—in this case, state functionaries.221 The source of these
feelings is said to be the lack of personal control over the expenditures
made upon each subject’s behalf—even with the payment streams quite
customarily secure, and even when more or less the same expenditure
choices would have been made by the subjects themselves had they
directed them.222 Also at work here, evidently, is the implicit
knowledge that those who give—in this case, state functionaries—could
in theory take away, both corroborating Reich’s claims and suggesting
that pre-welfare state forms of property rights are such forms as most
conduce to an independent EEOR citizenry.
Cross-national studies also suggest that, even after controlling for
income and education levels, citizens who own and control accumulated
assets tend more highly to value initiative and self-directedness on the
part of themselves and their children, to be more flexible and creative,
and to be more chance- or risk-welcoming intellectually—corroborating
a “wealth effect,” cognate with the endowment effect, oft-observed by
217
218

See sources cited supra note 216.
Though of course it might be for parents. More study is required here, controlling for
causation in the other direction. A reasonable working hypothesis would be that among adults
causality proceeds in both directions.
219 World Bank and other international civil servants speculate on the prospects of “ownership
society”-like proposals in the developing economies in CURING WORLD POVERTY: THE NEW
ROLE OF PROPERTY (John H. Miller ed., 1994).
220 See generally JONAS PONTUSSON, THE LIMITS OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY: INVESTMENT
POLITICS IN SWEDEN (1992).
221 See HUGH HECLO & HENRIK MADSEN, POLICY AND POLITICS IN SWEDEN (1987); Tony
Horwitz, Welfare Stagnation Besets Smug Sweden, WALL ST. J., April 5, 1990, at A15.
222 See sources cited supra note 221. The reports of defined benefit pensioners discussed
supra, notes 202-205 and accompanying text, come back to mind.
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behavioral economists.223 This suggests, again, that owner-citizens are
likely ultimately to prove more productive, hence more of the PCappreciable type. It might, again, be thought that causality here could
run the other way—that people with such attributes simply tend to
become the owners of accumulated and legally protected assets in the
relatively developed countries where they reside. There is strong
evidence, however, that at least in certain environments such attitudes
do not themselves alone bring differences in income or in wealth.224
Much, of course, remains to be done in empirically mapping these
correlations and their causal directions. But the substantial results that
we find confirm our intuitions. And as a matter of common sense it
would seem reasonable to hypothesize a symbiosis in any event: Secure,
accumulated, and personally controlled—owned—assets encourage a
sense of independence and capacity to choose and change the future,
while such attitudes in turn prove in large part to be self-fulfilling,
resulting in accumulations of yet further wealth.
With actual
responsibility comes a “responsible personality.”225 And responsible
persons make for agent-citizens of the sort envisaged by and celebrated
in American self-understanding—the self-understanding of inhabitants
of the productive equal-rights republic—the EEOR or American OS.
3.

In Sum, Working With the Abstraction & Endowment Effects

The observations elaborated in Parts III.A.1 and III.A.2
recommend some basic policy parameters, or what might be called
strategic considerations bearing upon how best to implement an
American OS. The EEOR which is the American OS is interested in
ownership as a means of facilitating the successful and responsible
happiness-pursuit of independent, though it is also interested in
interdependent, citizen-agents. That, along with exogenously given
citizen-psychology and the only gradually, incrementally changing
nature of the exogenously given American legal tradition, suggests that
some pathways are clearer than others in delimiting assets and optimally
promoting their widespread ownership.
First, an American OS will recognize and foster ownership of the
greatest variety of choice-enhancing resources and opportunities

223 See Melvin Kohn et al., Position in the Class Structure and Psychological Functioning in
the United States, Japan, and Poland, 95 AM. J. SOC. 964-1008 (1990).
224 Id.
225 See JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 310-13 (1988); and Gregory S.
Alexander, Pensioners in America: The Economic Triumph and Political Limitations of Passive
Ownership, in A FOURTH WAY?: PRIVATIZATION, PROPERTY, AND THE EMERGENCE OF NEW
MARKET ECONOMIES 33, 42-43 (Gregory S. Alexander ed., 1994).
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possible.226 Innovative parcelings of assets along material, temporal,
and even contingency lines (so as to handle risk in addition to
opportunity)—generally effected now by contract—should be
facilitated. These are rooted in the “abstraction effect” noted above.
And they have the effect of enhancing asset-generativity, hence agent
autonomy. Where possible, such privately ordered asset-determination
should be more fully secured by law. This might counsel affording
something more like property protection even to some contractual
rights, e.g., by permitting liquidated damages clauses in contracts, at
least where contracting parties do not manifest unequal bargaining
power.227
Second and relatedly, the American OS will facilitate and foster
the spread of markets in which such spatio-temporal and contingency
parceling and trading of parcels is effected. This is one aspect of
facilitating such parceling itself, and additionally is one aspect of
“completing” that critically important market mechanism serving at the
heart of the EEOR/American OS described at Part II.C. But it also,
more directly to the point of this Part, has the effect of enhancing assetliquidity per the terms of III.A.1, which again enhances agent-citizen
autonomy.
Third, the American OS will do such as it can to foster the spread
of “durable,” “accumulated” and legally secure assets among its
citizenry. For, as we saw, those assets are in a sense determined both by
law and by owner-psychology, “more owned” than other assets; they
afford more legally vindicated autonomy, and are maximally correlated
with the attitudes, practices, and other indicia of ownership catalogued
above. And they therefore conduce more strongly toward that practical
and experienced autonomy that characterizes the American EEOR’s
agent-citizens. Those three features—durability, accumulatedness and
legal security—are for their parts, as discussed at III.A.1, not practically
orthogonal, even if analytically distinct. For legal security in the
American legal tradition appears to ride pragmatically in part upon
durability itself—the vintage form of property, so to speak. And the
empirical correlations between citizens’ agent-psychology on the one
hand and “accumulated” asset-holding on the other might in turn stem
partly from the implicit knowledge that one owns more legally-securely
what one physically possesses. In any event, these interrelations
226 “Possible” here of course presumably will be bounded by information and transacting
costs. See notes supra 183-84 and accompanying text.
227 I say “might” here because full assessment of the advisability of doing this would require
much more discussion that I can embark upon here—indeed a full grappling with the extensive
literature on the good sense of liability over property rules in many contexts. I hope that I may be
forgiven, then, for confining myself here to doing no more than highlighting the possible interest
of an American OS in revisiting some of the classic discussions inititiated by Calabresi &
Melamed.

74

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:1

themselves yield a provisional policy prescription. First, as advised per
the first strategic counsel regarding the abstraction effect, we should
“propertize” even liability-rule-protected and government entitlements.
Second, to the degree that we do not believe that we can do that owing
to the “endowment effect” that is the only gradually changing American
law itself, we should work to foster the spread of “hard” or
“accumulable” assets—the kind already enjoying property rule
protection. Such are those as will foster the ongoing mentality of EEOR
agent-citizens.
In connection with the “propertization” counsel, we should
perhaps, before moving on, dispel one possible doubt rooted in the
EEOR principle as to the desirability of “propertizing” contract rights
and tort immunities.
Recall that the EEOR values not merely agency, but responsible
agency. And responsible agency entails equal agency, at least in the
sense that it requires that the responsible agency’s material correlate—
access to ethically exogenous resources and risk—be equitably spread.
But we also noted that the only way to render the notion of “equal
spread” of heterogeneous goods and ills that are not separately
equalized (ad seriatim, as it were, good by good and ill by ill) over
agents intelligible is to index through the operation of complete and
neutral markets, which amount to democratic determinations of the
relative worths of heterogeneous goods and ills, by citizens endowed
with equal “votes” in those markets. This might seem to suggest, then,
that the appropriate remedy for violation of a legal right is the (complete
and neutral) market—the social, or “true”—valuation of that right, not
the right-holder’s possibly idiosyncratic—or deliberately exaggerated—
valuation. And that, in turn, would suggest vindication of the right by
liability rules of a particular kind, rather than by property rules: victims
would be limited to court-determined recoveries, and courts in turn
would be limited to market-determined amounts. All remedies, in
effect, would be like “takings” remedies, requiring “just” compensation
defined as (complete and neutral) market value compensation.
Notwithstanding the initial “bite” of this objection, the preferred
EEOR path is nonetheless to favor practicable propertization, at least in
respect of contract rights, and in a sense to be explained, in respect of
tort immunities as well. The reason is rooted in that crucial distinction,
described in Part II, between ethically exogenous and ethically
endogenous holdings. That distinction in the present context is
isomorphic to the ex–ante/ex-post distinction vis-a-vis the operation of
complete and neutral markets. If, and only if, holdings of ethically
exogenous resources have been equalized over citizens prior to their
entering complete and neutral markets, and if their holdings after entry
into those markets are traceable to those equalized initial holdings and
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their trading activity in those markets, then their holdings are consistent
with the requirement of boundedly responsible, hence equal, agency.
They hold what they ought to hold, and the social valuation—market
value—of those holdings is of no further ethical interest to us. The
social valuation of agents’ assets is ethically interesting only prior to
our agents’ entry into the market, when we are seeking to determine
what everyone ought to start out with—hence how much they are to be
compensated when victimized by hard luck, by the workings of blind
fate. After we have done that, post-market-entry holdings are ethically
endogenized. People have what they deserve, and are viewed as being
ethically entitled to it. There is no further public salience to what it is
that what they have is “worth,” at least not so long as it is held.
Given that posture, the question then becomes, how should
legally entitled ethical deserts be valued and compensated if and when
they are subsequently violated or taken (rather than denied at the outset,
ex ante), not by hard luck—by blind fate—but by voluntary entitlementviolative behavior by a transgressor. The first part of the question
seems to be easily answered: Since legitimate transfers of title take
place by voluntary exchange at prices mutually agreed by transferors
and transferees paid by the latter, the legitimizing—correcting—of an
involuntary “exchange” likewise should involve exaction of a price
from the transferee. In effect, the taker has performed one part of an
involuntary transaction, and she owes back her part of the “bargain.”228
Her part of the bargain, in turn, is what the wronged party “would” have
charged—at a minimum, her reservation price prior to transacting—in
exchange for what was taken. This general guideline constrains our
answer to the second question.
The second question, which concerns the amount that should be
exacted of the transgressor, is a bit more complicated, but not much.
Begin with the case of contract, in which transacting as such is
voluntary, and only the subsequent history of the transaction might
possibly turn out to be involuntary in some respect. If all of the
generally required predicates of fairness (i.e., equal opportunity)—
competence on the part of both parties, rough transparency and rough
parity of bargaining power—attend the initial agreement, there seems
no reason not to view the parties’ joint—bargained—valuation of the
transaction and the cost of breach as the ethically salient one, and thus
as the appropriate answer to the counterfactual “would have charged”
question. For the charge has in fact been agreed, ex ante. Responsible
agency and equal opportunity among citizens are not implicated, let
alone offended, by whatever valuation the parties jointly place upon the
228

Where she has taken more than she can pay, even out of what she has taken, the overage in
effect becomes a case of hard luck—ethically exogenous—so society is the appropriate
compensator. The overage is as it were an “act of God.”
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terms of their autonomous transaction. Since autonomy here does not
require limitation by responsibility (apart from the mutual responsibility
of the two contracting parties) in the transaction, there seems no reason
not to afford autonomy maximal vindication through propertization of
the contractual entitlement. Arguably specific performance, therefore,
and certainly stipulated damages, should be enforceable in the
American OS. That is the appropriate legal expression given the
EEOR’s constitutive value of responsible agency in the context of
contracting.
The case of tort is somewhat more difficult, but again, not very
much. The added difficulty is simply an empirical/informational one
bearing upon administrability, not a principled one bearing upon
conceivability or appropriate guiding ideals. The question is, how do
we know, or determine, what the wronged party in a tort case “would”
have charged or paid in order to relinquish or insure her entitlement to
immunity from harm? And, given the difficulty of satisfactorily
answering that question—a difficulty of which the tort victim herself is
aware—might there not be a danger that the victim will exaggerate ex
post what she claims would have been her ex ante reservation price or
guaranteed insurance payout?229
In view of such difficulties, there is a practical problem afflicting
the administration of any “propertized” system of tort remedies, at least
if the latter is to be taken to mean a system in which victims literally
stipulate their own damages. So while in principle the tort system is on
the same footing as the contract system and thus should be propertized
in respect of remedies (again especially, e.g., for such torts as
conversion and nuisance), in practice the implementation of the
principle requires limitation.230 The appropriate response of the
American OS, then, would seem to be to select the most plausible proxy
for actual reservation price or insurance policy. The question becomes,
what is it most likely that the victim actually would have charged, or
would have insured for? This might involve the gathering of statistical
data from which average—hence most likely—amounts are derived;
these amounts can then be suitably adjusted in view of special features
of the victim that we should think reasonably would have led to a
reservation price or insured value greater than or lower than that
average—e.g., a particular sentimental attachment to the house in which
229 An analogous difficulty, of course, arises in the eminent domain and benefit tax contexts of
contemporary American property law—viz., the “holdout” problem presented by owners’
capacity to overstate what their condemned property “really” is worth to them, and the “freerider” problem presented by their capacity to understate what their shares in some tax-financed
appurtenant public good, e.g. a school, a park, a sewer system or police force, are worth to them.
See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 196, at 883.
230 Again, analogous contexts arise, now in contract, where transaction costs are thought to
render actual contracting infeasible.
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one was born or the heirloom handed down to her, or a particular
physical or psychical weakness or vulnerability suffered by the victim.
To some degree, tort law appears already to do this, as, for example, in
such doctrines that “the tortfeasor takes the victim as he finds him,”
operationalized in the “thin skull rule”.231
This is of course not the place to forge a full doctrine of
appropriate tort liability and compensation. The point is, rather, that, in
so far as the American OS might propertize much of contract in the
interest of EEOR autonomy that does not offend ethically salient
equality, so it might quasi-propertize tort doctrine by forging it
consciously with a view to simulating, in the remedies that it affords,
the set of reservation prices or insurance amounts that potential tort
victims plausibly would have decided upon in advance had they been
able, as they are in the case of voluntary, contractual relations, to
stipulate damages ex ante.232
The replacement of liability rules by property or quasi-property
(property-simulating) rules might appear to amount to favoring the CR
and CL agency tradition over the PC “efficiency” tradition in law. For
it is of course notoriously argued that tort and contract law are in
various respects more Kaldor-Hicks efficient, or “wealth-maximizing,”
than they would be were they to involve property rather than liability
rules,233 and that such property law entitlement-limitations as adverse
possession, the “doctrine of waste,” and the rule against perpetuities
themselves in turn are more efficient than would be their contraries.
It of course can be, and has been, contested whether such claims
are empirically correct. In so far as those contesting claims are viable,
the possible tension between CR and CL propertization on the one hand
and PC liability rule retention on the other is dissipated. But we need
not rely on any particular outcome in the dueling empirical claims of
Posnerians and anti-Posnerians about the efficiency or otherwise of the
common law as currently constituted. For in so far as the PC tradition
has extolled GDP-maximization, it never has done so as more than a
general, rough and ready background norm routinely trumpable by more
carefully delineated and compelling specific aims. Those aims
frequently involve some form of fairness—such as racially- and/or
gender-neutral access to income-earning opportunity or physical
231
232

See, e.g., Poole v. Copland, Inc., 348 N.C. 260 (1998).
Actually it wouldn’t be reservation price but bargained price. But this is even more fanciful
to “simulate—who “bargains” to be a tort victim—than the case of reservation price, so I leave it
there. On my use of “might” here, please see note 227, supra.
233 The justification offered, for example, of the doctrine of “efficient breach” in the law of
contract. See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Contract Remedies, Renegotiation, and the Theory of
Efficient Breach, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 629 (1988); see also Daniel Friedmann, The Efficient
Breach Fallacy, 18 J. LEG. STUD. 1 (1989); see generally ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN,
LAW AND ECONOMICS 289 (1988).
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capacity-neutral access to public spaces—and certainly may involve the
constitutive CR and CL values of boundedly responsible agency or
autonomy, values which PC itself, in so far as its maximization norm is
ethically intelligible only when reconciled with its fairness norm as
observed above, permits full latitude.
We shall return to these broad policy guidelines, in consolidated
and catalogued form employed here, when we turn in the sequel to fully
elaborated programs by which we may more fully realize the American
OS. What is more interesting for immediate purposes is how these very
general American OS-prescribed policy directions interact with the
constraints placed upon the EEOR’s understanding of asset and
ownership by its other guiding value. For the EEOR, recall, extols not
merely liberty, but liberty understood by reference to the equal
opportunity principle.
B.

Ownership & Responsibility

It is the qualifier “responsible” prefixed to “liberty” that occasions
most challenge to the law’s fortifying agency by delimiting, vindicating
and promoting asset-ownership. In particular, the problem arises
between vindicating and promoting. Theoretically, the problem is
readily surmountable. Such was one upshot of Part II.B’s elaboration of
responsible liberty as equal opportunity. To “vindicate” is simply to
“promote” ownership no more and no less than recommended by the
EOP. Even practically the problem is containable and largely soluble.
Such was one upshot of Parts II.B through II.D. Part II as a whole,
then, was in part the working of a theoretic and in part the working of a
practical, workable “settlement” of the autonomy/externality “boundary
dispute” that we observed at Part I in earlier times to have plagued the
three American political traditions’ attempts to settle upon workable
principles of ownership delimitation and vindication.
This Subpart traces the implications which that settlement bears for
American law’s delimiting and vindicating ownership. As in the
previous Subpart, we find here that endowment effects—again, both in
the path-dependent features of the American legal tradition and as
aspects of empirical ownership-psychology—delimit the boundaries of
the practicable. Or at any rate they recommend some means of
vindicating ownership in keeping with the EOP as more frictionless
than others.
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Once Again in Theory

The general ends entailed by the EEOR’s aim to vindicate
responsible ownership are easiest to characterize. At the highest level
of abstraction, the goal is to realize ownership in keeping with the EOP.
That is the principle of ownership spread recommended by the
American CR, CL and PC traditions, all now synthesized into that
overlapping consensus here called the EEOR—the “ideal type” of a
distinctively American OS.
Realizing the EOP, we saw in Part II.B, in turn requires that we
work to equalize holdings of ethically exogenous opportunity across
owner-citizens, and that we honor unequal holdings of ethically
endogenous opportunities and resources—holdings traceable to
responsible choice. That goal, in turn, sometimes gives rise to a
“tracing problem,” in turn resulting at times in a “boundary dispute,”
both also discussed in Part II. Those difficulties, for their parts, we saw
to be recalcitrant to a “complete,” “definitive” solution. On the other
hand, however, we also saw that it is possible to confine the problem to
a much narrower sphere of “hard cases”—Sorites-reminiscent cases in
which we are uncertain as to how free the will was, and how much of
the end product of will’s exercise is attributable to it, and how much is
attributable to mere luck—than has hitherto been thought. One reason
is that there is a broad terrain of readily measurable opportunity and
resource endowment that we all can agree to be ethically exogenous.
The other reason is that a properly constructed market mechanism
enables us to sidestep the comparability and commensurability
challenges that render the tracing problem in non-market circumstances
less tractable.
But all of this has been at the level of theory. What remains to be
done is to draw a preliminary bead on what it will mean to realize the
theory in policy. It is here that the matter of exogenous opportunity
spreading becomes poignant, for boosting the holdings of the EOPunjustifiably underendowed requires that we diminish holdings—either
present or future holdings—of the EOP-unjustifiably overendowed.
And that sets the stage for conflict, even after we have agreed upon a
practicable range of unambiguously exogenous endowments and a fair
and efficient asset-distribution mechanism per Parts II.C and D, above.
For self-interest, on the parts both of those who stand to gain and of
those who stand to lose through a reapportionment, has a way of
clouding over the clarity with which we perceive even the most clearcut of cases.
In order to deal with this problem, I once again endeavor to grapple
in a bit more detail with the constraints within which our efforts to
realize theory in policy must operate. As in the previous Subpart, those
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constraints are both psychological and legal in nature. But happily, we
shall see, the endowment heuristics observed in Part III.A offer
opportunity as well as constraint here. We can exploit, that is, the
present/future divide noted several subsections up.
And the
“endowment” which is our law offers a great deal of leeway as well.
2.

Using the Heuristics Wisely

Qualifying the nouns “liberty,” “agency,” “autonomy” and
“ownership” with the adjective “responsible” finds policy and legal
expression in two practically related but distinct sides of the opportunity
and resource allocation process. Call them the “endowing” (or
“giving”) and the “delimiting” (or “taking”) sides. In so far as we
circumscribe the prerogatives of ownership in keeping with the equal
liberty or equal opportunity principles, we work from the “delimiting”
side, and might superficially appear to be interfering with liberty or
objectionably confiscating what is owned. In so far as we act
collectively to promote wider ownership of ethically exogenous
resource and opportunity by more agent-citizens in keeping with the
EOP, we work from the “endowing” side and might superficially appear
to be interfering with responsibility, simply giving unearned
“handouts.” When the “unearned handouts” appear to be subsidized by
the (superficially) seeming “takings,” dangers to the perceived
legitimacy of ownership-promoting action are at their most pronounced.
Public delimitation and promoting of ownership in keeping with
the EOP will do well as a strategic matter, then, to take account of
ownership psychology in defining and fostering responsible ownership,
just as we noted at Part III.A.2 that it should do in defining that which is
owned. This is simply a matter of prudence, or, say, avoidable-cost
avoidance. Law and policy that accommodate owner-psychology are
law and policy that are likely to enjoy the widest possible and longest
enduring public support. Such support or its lack are experienced at all
“levels” of the policy-making and -implementing process—the public
deliberating, legislating, agency-implementing, adjudicating, and
private-conforming levels.
The principal feature of ownership-psychology that operates here
has already been encountered. It is the endowment effect seen at III.A
to result in a perceived difference between “hard,” “accumulated”
wealth on the one hand, “soft,” “merely entitled” or liability-ruleprotected future “income” on the other.234 Moreover, when attention
turns from ownership to responsible ownership, the endowment effect
234

See supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text.
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appears to interact in “feedback” fashion with the Part III.A abstraction
effect as well. In other words, limitations upon the use and enjoyment
or alienability of what one already owns—removing sticks from the
bundle, so to speak—is itself seen as a “taking” of the endowment.
The practical and strategic consequence of the endowment
heuristic, both standing alone and in infusing the abstraction effect, is
two-fold. And again it operates at both the “taking” and the
“endowing” sides of the opportunity-allocation process. From the
“taking” side, limitations on future growth in or bundling of assetholdings by those who are over-endowed by EOP lights are likely to
face less opposition than “confiscations” of what already is held. From
the “endowing” side, endowing that takes the form of “refraining from
[perceived] taking,” or of conferring more abstraction rights, is likely to
face less opposition—appear less like a “handout” or “giveaway”—than
will endowing that looks on the surface more like an outright grant.
The policy-optimal strategy, then, in view of owner-psychology, will be
the opposite of that earlier-noted least optimal strategy—the “taking and
giving.” It will be the “channeling of new [and perceivedly exogenous]
wealth” to, and the “refraining from taking or restricting of wealth”
from, those who by EOP lights are presently opportunityunderendowed.
A classic case of “refraining” in recent years is the earned income
tax credit, or “EITC,” a program that has enjoyed widespread support
even among “conservatives.”235 Its success stands in instructive
contrast to the unpopularity of “negative income tax” (NIT) proposals
of the past, surprisingly proposed by other “conservatives” of a
Friedmanite cast, which were perceived more as “givings” than is EITC,
notwithstanding their orthodox finance-theoretic equivalence.236
Suggested cases of the “channeling of the new,” for their part, were
noted at Part III.B.1. And such programs are further elaborated in
considerable detail in the sequel. For present purposes it suffices
simply to flag these two strategies. To some extent, they already find
expression, from time to time, both in law and in policy. But there is
much more room here for policy-design, a fact which the sequel
exploits.
We should take note of a manner of “paradox” here, however.
Apart from the endowment heuristic, one other psychological effect
wrought by asset-holding that we noted at Part III.A.2 is its tendency to
induce in the holder a propensity to view the future as more concrete—
the future itself, then, as more “endowed.” Might it be, then, that
“taking from the future” rather than from what is already accumulated,
235
236

See Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 32 (2000).
See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 75-85, 161-76 (1962); James Tobin
et al., Is a Negative Income Tax Practical?, 77 YALE L. J. 1, 6 (1967).
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per the previous paragraph, faces some manner of “natural limit”
induced by the success of ownership-promotion itself?
Two considerations would seem to mitigate any such challenge
that might arise in this connection. The first consideration is that the
endowment effect still presumably would dominate—the “hardness” of
accumulated assets would be greater than that of the “hardening”
future—in light both (a) of those accumulated assets’ causal role in that
“hardening” of the future and (b) of the greater degree of certainty, as a
matter of law, of risk-attitude and perhaps metaphysics, attaching to
what is had than to what is expected. The second consideration,
dovetailing with the just-noted matter of risk-attitude, is that the
diminishing marginal utility of wealth also presumably would continue
to operate here, meaning that prospective future gains would continue,
as it were by definition, to be less salient to those who do not realize
those gains than are presently possessed increments of the same amount.
Two other strategies are more incremental in nature than the
“rechannelling” and “refraining” strategies. Again they fall one each on
the “endowing” and “delimiting” sides of asset-allocation. On the
endowing side, the strategy is to condition collective endowing of the
underendowed upon recipients’ acting in some manner that can be
easily characterized either as “earning” the perceived “handouts” or as
being otherwise deserving of them on some ground explicitly tied to the
endowed item’s ethical exogeneity. Requiring some manner of
service—e.g., military or community service—as consideration for
receipt then, or requiring that recipients use endowed funds only for
education or medicine or productive investment, is a strategy that both
should be and increasingly already can be seen at work. We find it, for
example, in IRAs, Individual Development Accounts, proposed taxfavored “private health accounts,” “education accounts,” and other
programs that the sequel considers under the rubric of “Piecemeal
Asset-Accumulation Programs.” In essence, the endowment itself is
delimited in these cases in a manner commensurate with delimitation of
the prerogatives of the already endowed by the “responsible”—hence,
equal exogeneity, unequal endogeneity—qualifier.
On the “taking” side, the incremental approach is simply to refrain
from “confiscating” all of the attributes of the overage held by the
overendowed, and to skim what is skimmed from the overage off of the
less tactile “sticks” in that “bundle” of rights which is ownership.
Hence, one does not confiscate the property but instead restricts its use
or alienability, or taxes its use or alienability, or guarantees others some
rights—easements—in its use. Familiar examples are the estate tax, the
imposition of public access rights to the electromagnetic spectrum, and
community reinvestment requirements placed upon depository
institutions. This line of strategy takes us more squarely to the other,
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non-psychological parameters within which ownership-facilitation must
operate. Those are the legal ones.
3.

Using the Legal Endowment

As with “asset”-defining, ownership-delimiting subjects policy to
some of the path-dependent features of American law. As it happens,
however, path-dependence here proves helpful for purposes of
ownership-promotion in vindication of the EOP. For the law appears to
incorporate within its constitutional and property doctrines the same
heuristics, rational or irrational, that characterize the psychology of
ownership. That means that the law permits precisely those strategies
of ownership-delimitation in keeping with responsible agency that were
just observed in Part III.B.2 to be prudent. Barring any radical
departures from established precedent by an activist bench or extremist
legislature, then, the facilitation of responsible ownership in keeping
with the values of the American OS should be legally free to proceed
along the lines sketched just above in Part III.B.2.
The standard forms that ownership-delimitation takes in American
law are, of course, essentially of three types—restrictions on use and
enjoyment, restrictions on alienability, and limited expropriation, the
latter generally in the form of licensing fees or taxes.237 The courts
impose few if any limitations upon legislatures’ powers to employ these
methods.
Restrictions on use and enjoyment are widely accepted, with some
limited exceptions, noted below. And few citizens seem to regard them
as threatening the United States’ status as a property-protecting polity.
That acceptance probably reflects implicit acceptance of the responsible
ownership principle and, with it, recognition of the danger of
illegitimate cost-externalization by owners.
Restrictions upon alienability similarly appear to be widely upheld
by the courts and accepted by the public, though we will see that there is
sometimes more controversy here. Prohibitions on vote-selling, selfindenture, prostitution, organ-sale and child-sale are familiar, and
scarcely controversial, cases in point. Few seem to regard them as
serious threats to U.S. status as a property-protective polity.238
237 These are restrictions apart from limitations on security-provision of the sort observed at
Part III.A.1. The latter do not much come into play when we speak of ownership-delimiting in
keeping with the EOP. They figure more into what sort should be increased among the
underendowed.
238 Milton Friedman noted long ago that the ability to sell “shares” in one’s self or one’s future
earnings would facilitate borrowing for education (human capital expansion projects). See
FRIEDMAN, supra note 236, at 85-107 (1962). But fewer people appear to have taken that
suggestion to heart even than have supported the proposal of Landes & Posner, supra note 160.
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One long-standing form of restriction upon asset-alienability in the
U.S. dovetails with the other principal form of ownership-delimitation,
namely the taxation of gifts and inheritances—which are themselves
forms of wealth-alienation. Like other forms of limited and incremental
expropriation—e.g., property-, income-, and sales-taxation—estate and
gift taxation has not tended to be seen as threatening the U.S.’s status as
a property-protecting polity, although there are of course some fringe
elements who continue to argue that the income tax, since its 1913
inception, has been unconstitutional. Indeed, estate-taxation and
progressive income-taxation have widely been viewed and justified, in
CL terms, as means of partly rectifying perceived injustices in the
distribution of ethically exogenous endowments. And they have been
seen in CR terms as means of preserving the long-term health of the
republic by preventing republic-threatening aggregations of financial
and consequent political power. Such arguments are still regarded as
mainstream. Taxation also has, of course, long enjoyed a special degree
of deference by courts.239
Two relatively recent exceptions to these long American traditions
of ownership-delimitation warrant special notice, however. The first
such departure is the so-called “regulatory takings” doctrine, which
represents a potential—though only a potential—threat to the
incrementalist form of ownership-delimitation in keeping with the
responsible ownership principle recommended above. The familiar
foundational idea here is that since the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution requires that public authorities
award just compensation to those from whom property is fully
expropriated pursuant to the power of eminent domain, regulations
which have the effect of merely diminishing the market value of
property—public access rights or easements, for example—should be
regarded as partial takings also giving rise to a duty to compensate.
Initially the courts were less than hospitable to this orthodox-financially
fair argument, perhaps again revealing that the law is more concerned
with “hard” accumulated assets than with “speculative” future value, or
perhaps simply recognizing that the underlying assets—the airwaves,
access to the ocean, etc.—are ethically exogenous endowments
belonging residually to the public. But in recent years some courts have
shown greater receptivity to the doctrine.240
That the argument is orthodox-financially fair of course does not

239 The classic decision holding legislatures’ taxing authority to be plenary is of course
Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40 (1934).
240 See Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 810 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Seawall
Associates v. City of New York, 542 N.E.2d 1059 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 500 (1989). But
see Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988); Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519
(1992).
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entail that the regulatory takings doctrine promotes fairness. For
example, applied so as to dictate “compensation” to one who purchases
land in full knowledge either that the underlying asset is unambiguously
ethically exogenous, hence public, or that a regulation is impending, and
who thus presumptively purchases the land at a discount in view of that
common knowledge, the regulatory takings doctrine would in fact
dictate a “giving.”
But the real threat posed by the regulatory takings doctrine is
distinct from that. The doctrine as currently articulated and evolved by
the courts does not seem to have any purchase on the sorts of
ownership-delimitation strategies that are in keeping with the EOP
advocated in the previous few Subparts. The principle underlying the
doctrine, however, which is simply that, heuristics notwithstanding, an
incremental delimitation of ownership is a diminishment of ownership,
is of course generalizable. And it has been generalized by some
advocates, even to the point of declaring many forms of taxation itself
to constitute unconstitutional “takings.”241 And here the problem is that
what is trivially true as a matter of rudimentary finance nonetheless is
deeply out of synch with the American value of equal opportunity. For
it entirely—entirely—ignores the fairness or otherwise of the baseline
wealth-distribution from which taxation proceeds.242 Even taxation of
what all would agree to be an overage held by one person by way of
ethically exogenous opportunity endowment therefore is viewed, by this
argument, as prohibited by the U.S. Constitution. The polity is thus
constitutionally debarred from living up to its own equal opportunity
ideals,243 themselves enshrined in the Constitution. That means that the
longstanding American tradition of valuing and vindicating equal
opportunity is inimical to America’s own Constitution. Even to state
this proposition is, of course, in effect to refute it. And happily the
courts have agreed. But the argument has gained some purchase in
some fringe policy circles, from whom also has emanated the second
rudimentary departure from the American tradition of responsible
ownership.
The second exception to the American tradition of responsible
ownership has made its appearance not in the courts, but in the
legislatures and in policy debates. Both for this reason and by virtue of
its even shakier ethical foundations, this movement is more easily
dispatched than was the first. It is the movement, on the part of some
self-described “conservative” pundits and politicians, to curtail or even
241
242

See EPSTEIN, supra note 78.
Hence the market that it would rely upon to value the “taken” increment is not “neutral” in
the terms of Part II.C. Even Nozick at least paid lip-service to the importance of the baseline
question, in his Paretian version of the Lockean proviso. See NOZICK, supra note 78, at 178-82.
243 See U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 2.
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eliminate estate and gift taxation, which they label “death” taxation, and
to lessen the degree of progressivity found in the income tax—a change
that they call “simplification.” This movement simply has no basis in
fairness or in any other American value—CR, CL or PC. It is nothing
more than a naked grab for the long end of ethically exogenous
opportunity inequity by those who have fared well in the birth lottery.
By exploiting the degree to which the U.S. now falls short of its original
republican, deliberative democratic ideals—deciding matters of public
import as it currently does by crude Pavlovian association via
relentlessly repetitive and reinforcing televisual images, slogans and
soundbites—the proponents of these changes deceive those who are too
time-taxed by their wage-occupations or numbed by vulgar Imperial
Rome-reminiscent entertainments to conduct their own investigations,
into thinking that the changes will enable these same people to “keep
[their] own money.”244 And so they enjoy some success in the short
term. But as publicly provided public goods are scaled-back in the
wake of consequent public fiscal deficits, it appears unlikely that this
conjure will continue to succeed. It is nonetheless up to all of us,
however, to ensure that it does not. That takes us to the present
Article’s conclusion and sequel.
C.

From Constraints to Strategies to Schema:
Programmatic Entailments

The constraints elaborated through this Part do not block or
prevent our realizing the core EEOR values discussed at Part II. They
simply counsel that some means of operationalizing our EEOR are
likely both to operationalize it more fully, and to occasion less friction,
than others.
They recommend, then, some broad classes of
implementary strategy over others. They tell us that to realize the
EEOR fully we should indeed act to make of ourselves an OS—a polity
in which core material opportunity endowments of the kind elaborated
at Part II are both widely spread and vindicated by property rules. And
in order to effect that spread, they tell us, we should work, so far as
possible and in exchange for perceivedly “deserving” behavior, to
channel perceivedly “new” resources to, while refraining from
perceived “taking” from, our underendowed, “rather than” perceivedly
244 The claim that “it’s your money,” of course, is either flatly false or vacuous. It is false in
so far as what’s “yours” is a function of legal entitlement and the law does not already entitle you
to it. It is vacuous in so far as the law already confers title. What these people mean to say is that
they want to make it your money. That is, they want to make $300 your money, in return for your
forgoing public services, if you belong to the middle class; and they want to make thousands,
millions or billions of dollars of your money if you are antecedently wealthy.
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“taking” already accumulated resources from our already fulsomely
endowed.
Where we publicly hold vast accumulated material resources, such
as land, the aforementioned strategy is easily employed. We simply
offer up the vast public tracts, in smaller but adequately independenceconferring-sized tracts, to such underendowed citizens as are prepared
to work hard to render the tracts productive. Such, of course, was the
method of the nineteenth and early twentieth century Homestead Acts,
which are discussed in the sequel. Where, on the other hand, we are
lacking in such an already accumulated asset as land, the method of
nineteenth and early twentieth century style “Homesteading” is not
available to us. The “new” resource which we must channel then is not
already accumulated, left over from the past, but is to be accumulated,
reasonably expected to come to fruition in the future in significant part
through the diligent efforts of our beneficiaries themselves. In such
case the method of past Homesteading gives way to the method of
future financial engineering; for finance is the act of facilitating future
accumulation. Our constraints for the foreseeable future, then, as we
now shall see, recommend a strategy of financially engineering our OS
into being.
IV. THE CORE AS PROGRAM: CREDIT INSURANCE, DEBT
SECURITIZATION & TAX POLICY AS PREFERRED MEANS
OF OWNERSHIP-SPREADING
The core American values elaborated at Part II suggest a broad
spread of ethically exogenous material opportunity and risk over the
boundedly responsible agents who constitute our citizenry. And they
counsel that ethically endogenous resource holdings be left to fall where
they may so long as complete and neutral markets constitute the
mechanism by which they are allocated. For such markets both
appropriately commensurate agent-valued goods and services, and thus
appropriately honor the responsible efforts whose fruits are valued by
other agents.
The constraints elaborated at Part III, for their part, counsel that
some strategies which we might employ in seeking to realize the core
values of Part II are likely to prove more effective than others. For
endowment psychology, along with our “legal endowment,” are such
that the core values—in particular, that of agent autonomy—are more
fully realized by some forms of legal entitlement than by others, while
some means of vindicating core rights, in turn, are prereflectively
experienced as more legitimate or less unobjectionable than others.
In this Part we begin the process of translating values and
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constraints into programs, in anticipation of the sequel. For reasons that
will be clear by the end of this Part, the preferred translation process,
which I shall call generically “the Method,” makes use of financial
engineering techniques that would not have been necessary, and
probably would not have been feasible, prior to the early-mid twentieth
century.
In effect, then, we shall be schematizing the general form by which
to modernize—to update to the present—those successful ownershipspreading programs of the eighteenth, nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries which account in large part for many of our political,
economic and societal successes up to the twenty-first century. We
shall be showing how, that is, to develop a contemporary American OS
that both completes and is programmatically cognate and continuous
with our OS-fragments of the past. We will see these claims
corroborated, then we draw specific programmatic conclusions, in the
sequel.
A.

From Values, Constraints & Strategy to Program

Our constraints operate more poignantly on the ethically
exogenous than on the ethically endogenous side of the material
opportunity allocation problem. On the ethically endogenous side, the
only practical constraint is how to ensure that the complete and neutral
market, which in so far as it is complete and neutral “automatically”
allocates goods and ills fairly and efficiently, is to become and/or
remain complete and neutral. If for the moment we divide the neutrality
problem into what we might call “entry” or “substantive” neutrality and
“process” neutrality, and restrict ourselves to both the latter and
completeness, then the completeness and neutrality conditions do not so
much as implicate our Part III constraints. Process neutrality is ensured
by rules that guarantee fair play: contract rules requiring good faith,
appropriate disclosure245 and rough parity of bargaining power between
transacting parties, and antitrust rules that ensure rough parity of market
power among competing parties. And these process-fairness-promoting
norms do not directly offend or even call to mind anyone’s pretheoretic
experience of ownership. Disputes about contract law’s shaping of
bargaining or about antitrust law’s regulation of market-shares, that is to
say, essentially take place at the margins of the subjects, and are about
245 I prescind here from how “good faith” and “appropriate” disclosure should be understood.
It will not be surprising that I would not defend a “lease cost discloser” norm formulated without
regard to the prospect of costs’—least or otherwise—being fairly apportioned. But the question
is sufficiently complex and ancillary to our present concerns as to warrant being set aside for
treatment on another day.
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the comparative effects of incrementally differing drawings of lines—
e.g., determining “how much” should be disclosed in contract
negotiations, or how high the HHI should be before a market is deemed
highly concentrated. They are not about fundamental rights-implicating
legitimacy.
The same holds true of our efforts to complete markets. Public
efforts to complete markets are, in essence, efforts to “jump start” or
facilitate the trading of goods or services that have not been widely
traded hitherto, typically either because people simply have not thought
to trade such goods or services—e.g., “pollution rights”—before, or
because it has been thought, owing either to a lack of imagination or a
lack of any set of legal forms or standards applicable over the
jurisdiction in which the market is lacking, to be impossible.246 Efforts
to make markets notwithstanding such obstacles might draw derisive
hoots of “futility” or “folly” from the pessimistic or the unimaginative,
but like process neutrality maintenance measures they do not typically
offend anyone’s sense of rights-based propriety or ownership.
A partial exception to that claim might be thought present in the
case of objections to the “commodification”—the subjection to market
trading—of some goods or services thought to be too much of the
temple to be appropriately consigned to the money-changers. Babies,
blood and human organs, not to mention intimate activity, come to
mind.247 But even here the objection seems to be rooted more in mores,
aesthetics or communal propriety than in economic morals, ethics or
individual propriation; no fundamental rights appear to be implicated.248
And even were that not the case, our disputes over what should be
commodified and what left out of the marketplace all would lie, again,
at the margins of commodifiability. We argue over babies, blood,
human organs and the means by which they should be allocated, when
scarce, to those lacking and seeking them, all while the overwhelmingly
greater part of the goods and services that we value have long since
been commodified. So again, the appropriate means of allocating
ethically endogenous goods and services—through complete and
process-neutral markets—scarcely implicates Part III’s constraints.
The one aspect of endogenous goods allocation that does implicate
the constraints is what we just above called “substantive neutrality,” or
“entry neutrality.” But this, we now shall see, is of a piece with
246

Here an instructive case in point is that of mortgage insurance and securitization,
considered at length in the sequel.
247
See Landes & Posner, supra note 160 (babies); RICHARD M. TITMUSS, THE GIFT
RELATIONSHIP (1970) (blood and organs); see generally Radin and other sources cited supra,
note 159.
248
I recognize that these distinctions could be challenged. The differences might well be
matters more of degree than of kind. But they nonetheless appear to be a critical feature of the
rights-oriented American valuational episteme.
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exogenous goods-allocation’s implication of our Part III constraints.
For the entry-neutrality feature of those EEOR-preferred markets
schematized in Part II is just the feature whereby agent-citizens entering
those markets do so with equitably spread ethically exogenous
holdings.249 So again, the Part III constraints operate only on the means
by which we seek, pursuant to our EEOR ideals, to spread ethically
exogenous opportunity widely. They tie our hands as we consider
means by which to equalize the spread of material opportunities which
people enjoy or lack simply owing to luck—the good or ill fortune of
happening to have been born with healthy or unhealthy genes, to
wealthy or non-wealthy families, in regions with well financed or
underfunded early education infrastructures, etc. It is a matter of signal
importance to the EEOR to develop means of surmounting such valuesoffending disparities while recognizing the limits imposed upon us by
the Part III constraints. Can this be done?
It is helpful in this context to remind ourselves that the constraints
only constrain us. For it happens that in spreading ethically exogenous
resources widely we can conform to those aspects of endowment
psychology and the legal endowment that define the treadable path of
least resistance.
And we can do so without fundamentally
compromising our core constitutive ideals. The key, we shall see, is in
finance—the means by which macro-economies have always grown.
By rethinking the aims and methods of finance in a way that treats our
infinitely valued individual citizens as microcosms, so to speak, of
macro-economies, we can—and to some extent already do—spread
ethically exogenous material opportunity widely through financial
engineering techniques that make optimal accommodation with—
indeed, even employment of—our psychological and legal endowments
themselves. Financial engineering of a particular sort can give
programmatic expression both to our constitutive EEOR ideals and to
our laws and pre-theoretic proprietary sensibilities. Here is how:
B.

From Program to Finance

“Finance,” both in popular usage and for our present purposes,
broadly denotes the class of means by which something currently
desired and not yet had may be paid for, even when it cannot be
purchased outright.250
It therefore frequently connotes, more

249

This is, of course, a requirement of ethically cognizable equal bargaining power.
See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 630 (6th ed. 1990) (“As a verb, to supply with funds
through the payment of cash or issuance of stocks, bonds, notes, or mortgages; to provide with
capital or loan money as needed to carry on business”).
250
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particularly, the act of borrowing as one such means.251 In this respect
the word also connotes, from a more theoretical point of view, an intertemporal shifting of asset-use:252 One in effect trades future assets (call
them Af) for present ones (Ap)—“borrows against the future”—
typically on the understanding that use of the borrowed asset (Ab) at
present will yield more, in the long run,253 than will deferment of use or
acquisition of the to-be-acquired, presently desired asset Ap until later.
Often the future yield is what affords the means of paying for the
present use of the borrowed asset Ab itself; use of the borrowed Ab is a
critical component of what makes payment for the use of Ab possible.
When that is the case, the project (or “investment”) which yields the
future return, and which is rendered possible by borrowing itself, is
popularly (if potentially misleadingly) said to be “self-financing,” “selfamortizing” or “self-liquidating.”254 The investment that the project
amounts to in such case has, at a minimum, “broken even,” hence is
financially rational to have undertaken; one has not lost in the temporal
aggregate through the inter-temporal shift.
The best investments, a fortiori, are of course those that yield the
highest returns—those that more than break even or more than simply
“pay for themselves.” They yield more than what has been sunken into
them, even after costing interest and discounting returns by the
prevailing market rate over the course of the project’s completion.
Their net present values are not only positive, but are positively high.255
From this point of view, post-secondary education, housing, and even
many possible securities portfolios that one might finance by borrowing
are good investments. If, for example, the U.S. Department of
Education (ED) is correct in estimating that a college degree now adds
an average of about $1 million to one’s lifetime income, and if the
251

Id.
See, e.g., ZVI BODIE & ROBERT C. MERTON, FINANCE 2 (2000) (“Finance is the study of
how people allocate scarce resources over time.”). This is, of course, the way in which finance is
treated in most theoretical finance texts, as well as in most standard microeconomics texts that
devote attention to the subject. See, e.g., ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC
THEORY 732-81 (1995).
253
Typically the “long run” is defined, in orthodox theory, as the individual agent’s full lifespan, and that which is “yielded” and maximized by the intertemporal shift of assets is, of course,
“utility.” This is the operating template of the so-called “permanent income,” or “life-cycle”
hypothesis that figures into most financial theory. See, e.g., F. P. Ramsey, A Mathematical
Theory of Saving, 38 ECON. J. 543 (1928); Truman Bewley, The Permanent Income Hypothesis:
A Theoretical Formulation, 16 J. ECON. THEORY 252 (1977); BODIE & MERTON, supra note 252,
at 146.
254
See, e.g., JOHN DOWNES & JORDAN ELLIOT GOODMAN, DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND
INVESTMENT TERMS 552 (5th ed. 1998).
255
“Discounting,” of course, is the process of converting future values to present values in
view of the rate at which investing a present amount that yields interest grows toward that future
value. The barebones formalization is: FV = PV (1 + r)n, where r is the interest rate and n is the
number of periods over which interest is calculated. See, e.g., BODIE & MERTON, supra note 252,
at 102-18.
252
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average amount paid out of future income for such a degree, including
interest charges but excluding room & board (which would have to be
paid anyway), is $50 thousand,256 then, assuming an employment life of
45 years, the discount rate would have to be about 7%—rather higher
than the 4-5% that has prevailed for many years now—for the “project”
to fall short of breaking even.257 And that is, of course, to ignore
entirely the incalculable nonpecuniary benefits of a post-secondary
education.
Parallel observations hold true for home-ownership and, indeed,
for the holding of a substantial, appreciating and/or dividend and
interest yielding portfolio of securities—ownership shares in firms and
in firm debt. Homes in aggregate typically appreciate in value over the
long run at a significantly higher rate than the discount rate.258 So, of
course, does the value of a broad market-indexed stock portfolio.259
Homes and stock portfolios accordingly would constitute good
pecuniary investments in the long run, even if one had to borrow to
finance their acquisition, provided that the borrowing rate were not
inordinately high. And the security and independence, or at the very
least the “cushion” thereby conferred, both in actual fact and as a matter
of “wealth effect”-inflected perception, probably are priceless for most
people. It would, then, constitute a great advantage for those lacking in
such assets to be able to finance their acquisition by borrowing to
purchase them. Their ownership would yield sufficient long-run
income as to amortize the debt well before the death of the typical
purchaser or the asset’s depreciation to the vanishing point. And that
ownership would yield incalculably more to the holders and to the
society of which they were members.
Why, then, does the United States not constitute an “ownership
society” already, with everybody directly owning a home, a substantial
stock portfolio and at least a four-year post-secondary degree? The
answer is tripartite: First, significant portions of our adult population do
hold the first and last of these three basic, responsible-agencyenhancing assets, while far fewer did before the 1940s in the first case
and the 1970s in the third—the decades when we first took steps to
spread, collectively, the owning of those fundamental assets broadly.260
256

See About ED, http://www.ed.gov/about/landing.jhtml (last visited Sept. 25, 2005).
Per the formula given at note 255, supra, $1M ≅ $.05M (1 + .07)45. I have of course left
out income forgone over the course of the education, and have abstracted from the compounding
rate by assuming interest to accrue only once per year, but the essential result is not thereby
significantly changed.
258
That, of course, is one reason for the popularity of real estate investment trusts—REITs—
as investment vehicles. See, e.g., BURTON MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET
284, 307 (3d ed. 2003).
259
The now classic source is JEREMY SIEGEL, STOCKS FOR THE LONG RUN 51 (2d ed. 1998).
See also MALKIEL, supra note 258, passim.
260
See Hockett, supra note 3.
257
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Second, we have not as yet worked publicly to spread substantial direct
owning of the second asset type—securities—and it shows: Hard capital
is the last remaining of the three chief assets—homes, business capital,
and human capital—that confer the kind of productive, life-building
autonomy, prized both by and in the agent-citizens who jointly
constitute the EEOR, that is not yet widely held directly.261 And third,
absent public action of this sort, things are more than likely to remain
this way, just as would have been the case with homes and higher
education absent our concerted efforts from the 1940s and the 1970s
on—as we shall see.
But why is that? What is the “concerted effort” to which I refer,
and why would it be necessary to facilitation of the spread of ownership
of those three “fundamental assets”? The answer is, again, finance. In
order for investments such as those in homes, in educations or in stocks
to make pecuniary sense, again, their discounted long-run yields must
exceed the costs, including opportunity costs, of their financing. The
rate that one pays for the use of the money that one invests in them—the
interest rate—must accordingly be low enough. But in order for the rate
to be low enough, and indeed, even for it to be less than “infinitely”
high—i.e., for lendable funds to be forthcoming at all—those who have
the funds to lend must not perceive the loans to be too risky. The
lender’s calculus, that is, largely mirrors the borrower’s, though it is
even more severe: She will discount the returns on her loans—the
interest that they yield—by the returns she could earn on alternative
investments of her funds that bear similar risk-features to those
attaching to the contemplated loan;262 and unlike the borrower, she will
not allow the nonpecuniary benefits derived (by the borrower) from the
credit-purchased asset to compensate for added increments of cost. The
lower the risk attaching to the would-be asset-purchaser’s loan, then, the
more attractive that investment to the lender.
Typically, as many of us have experienced, a lender will mitigate
or lessen risk by taking a security interest in some asset already owned
by the borrower; she demands collateral. There is one source of the
venerable adage that “it takes money to make money.” Financing
typically is available to those who, in a sense (though only in a sense),
have least need of it: those who hold loanable funds, and those who own
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See id. A partial—though rather limited—exception here is the ESOP. See id. By
employing the term “directly” I intend to distinguish “beneficial ownership” through defined
benefit retirement pensions.
262
This is of course simply a trivial entailment of the risk-reward trade-off familiar to
portfolio theory. Portfolio efficiency consists in maximizing returns given a specific risk-profile,
or minimizing risk given a specific returns-profile. See Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J.
FIN. 77 (1952). See generally HARRY MARKOWITZ, PORTFOLIO SELECTION: EFFICIENT
DIVERSIFICATION OF INVESTMENTS 52 (1959).
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already-accumulated, collateralizable assets.263
In effect, finance
performs as little more than a temporary liquidation service in such a
world, a means by which to transform one’s hard, accumulated assets
temporarily into immediately usable cash; the financier acts as a largescale, non-custodial pawn-broker.
But here lies also a key to the means of breaking what some have
called this “tyranny of collateral” or “closed circuit of finance.”264 For
collateral is not the only means of mitigating lender risk. Indeed, it is
an exceedingly crude such means. It might indeed be likened to a 100%
reserve or capitalization requirement imposed upon a depository
institution; precious little economic growth would ever occur under
such circumstances.265 If measures can be taken to weed out projects
that are unlikely to succeed, and if at the same time likely failure rates
over a broad swathe of investments can be statistically determined—
rather in the manner that banks carefully evaluate prospective loan
prospects and reserve and capital ratios respectively are keyed to the
rates at which depositors actually tend to spend from or withdraw their
deposits and assets tend to carry sundry forms of risk—then we can
both minimize and pool risk of default, and provide against the latter
with less than 100% collateralization. We can require borrowers simply
to cover pro rata shares of aggregated, pooled default risk—i.e., we can
263
Of course those with accumulated assets have need of financing too. The point here is
simply that those without already accumulated assets often have even more need of financing—in
order to accumulate in the first place.
264
See, e.g., Raghuram G. Rajan, Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice Between Informed and
Arm’s-Length Debt, 47 J. FIN. 1367 (1992); Luigi Zingales, Survival of the Fittest or the Fattest?
Exit and Financing in the Trucking Industry, 53 J. FIN. 905 (1998); Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi
Zingales, Financial Dependence and Growth, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 559 (1998); Raghuram G.
Rajan & Luigi Zingales, The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial Development in the 20th
Century, 52 J. FIN. ECON. 336 (2003); see generally RAGHURAM G. RAJAN & LUIGI ZINGALES,
SAVING CAPITALISM FROM THE CAPITALISTS: UNLEASHING THE POWER OF FINANCIAL
MARKETS TO CREATE WEALTH AND SPREAD OPPORTUNITY (2003).
265
Regulatory authorities impose fractional reserve requirements upon depository institutions
in order to ensure the availability of sufficient cash to cover depositor withdrawal needs and avoid
destructive “bank-runs.” It happens that very low such rates are required in order to effect that
task, freeing up the remainder of deposits to lend and thus fuel economic growth. The
development of “reserve systems” that facilitate inter-bank lending and thus the pooling of risk of
inadequate reserves at any one institution has of course freed up even more deposited funds for
credit-extension.
The US Federal Reserve’s reserve requirements are promulgated as Regulation D, at 12
C.F.R. Pt. 204, per the authorization of 12 U.S.C. § 461(b)(1)-(4). On the mechanics of reserve
requirements, see, e.g., ROSS CRANSTON, PRINCIPLES OF BANKING LAW 127-29 (1997). On the
troubled history of fractional reserves until the modern era—specifically the difficulty, prior to
the advent of sophisticated statistical predictive methods as means of calculating fractional
reserve needs, of finding the golden mean between growth-stiflingly excessive reserves and
systemic risk-incurring inadequate reserves—see, e.g., MONEY: A HISTORY 162-92 (Jonathan
Williams ed., 1997). A remarkable formal treatment is found in 1 MARTIN SHUBIK, THE THEORY
OF MONEY AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 259 (1999).
The capital adequacy regime is grounded primarily in 12 USC §§ 1464(t), 1831o, and
3907.
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move from collateralization to default insurance.
We can then enhance the boost thereby given the pool of loanable
funds by taking another step: Closely associated with perceptions of
and aversions to risk, of course, are the desire and demand for
liquidity266—the capacity to withdraw from an investment, such as a
loan is, as readily as one enters into it. If, then, not only default risk, but
debt obligations themselves (i.e., rights to repayment) can be pooled,
and shares in the pool then sold as resaleable securities, we shall in
effect have “completed” the market for OS-valued capital financing
debt by “securitizing” it and allowing such risk as attaches to the
securities to flow toward its most willing and efficient bearers; and we
shall thereby have optimized the volume of such financing available.267
Such measures, we shall see, constitute precisely the means by
which we have, as a society, spread the ownership of homes and postsecondary degrees so much more broadly than they were spread prior to
the late twentieth century. And they are means that we have yet, thus
far, to attempt in the spreading of that one form of asset that rivals
homes and human capital in importance to agent-citizens of an efficient
equal-opportunity republic: business capital.
C.

Public/Private Acquisition-Finance as “Method”:Conditional
Credit-Insurance, Securitization & Tax-Subsidy

Here, then, is the basic schema, which we shall find recurring in
the most significant, albeit fragmentary, modern American OS
programs and proposals thus far pursued, advocated, or both: First,
society, acting collectively through its elected government, acts to
optimize the amount of capital available for lending to those lacking in
assets by those possessed of assets, by itself directly affording the
security typically afforded by security interests in collateral. In effect,
we insure lenders against borrower default—either directly, by actually
administering the insurance program, or indirectly, by serving as
266
See, of course, J. Tobin, Liquidity Preference as Behavior Toward Risk, 25 REV. ECON.
STUD. 25 (1958). The insight derives famously from JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL
THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY (1936).
267
“Securitization” has grown rapidly in the last decade to constitute both the fastest growing
and one of the largest of securities markets. See, e.g., FRANK J. FABOZZI ET AL., FOUNDATIONS
OF FINANCIAL MARKETS AND INSTITUTIONS 435-97 (2d ed. 1998). It seems to be inadequately
appreciated that all of this began with, and continues to this day to be largely driven by, the
activities of “government sponsored enterprises” (GSEs) like Fannie Mae, more on which infra,
Part V. See, e.g., Leland C. Brendsel, Securitization’s Role in Housing Finance: The Special
Contributions of the Government-Sponsored Enterprises, in A PRIMER ON SECURITIZATION 1729 (Leon T. Kendall & Michael J. Fishman eds., 2000) [hereinafter SECURITIZATION]; Lewis S.
Ranieri, The Origins of Securitization, Sources of Its Growth, and Its Future Potential, in
SECURITIZATION, supra, at 31-43.
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guarantor, as reinsurer, or as guarantor-insurer for non-public or quasipublic agencies that serve as first lines of lender assurance. (The initial
lenders themselves are, of course, nongovernmental financial
intermediaries—primarily depository institutions, which have enjoyed
access to federal deposit insurance since the 1930s and have pooled
liquidity-risk and consequent solvency-risk via the Federal Reserve
System since 1913.268)
In order to ensure the financial solvency of our efforts, we impose
basic quality standards upon both our borrower-beneficiaries and the
projects that they wish to finance through their debt: we require that the
borrowers receive reliable incomes in the case of housing, or make
satisfactory academic progress in the case of education; and we require
that all receive financial counseling. We also insist, of the homes and of
the institutions affording higher education, that they meet basic quality
standards tending to maximize the likelihood that the investments will
indeed bear positive net present values. We also, of course, might exact
a small premium of our borrowers in order to cover the (now
minimized) costs of administration and maintenance of the insurance
fund. Or we can cover the cost collectively in the case of the least
advantaged among us.
Where we have employed these strategies thus far, we shall see in
the sequel, we actually have begun by affording the insurance directly,
then gradually have receded into the background as secondary guarantor
or reinsurer while private insurers or quasi-public guarantors, upon
observing the successes of the government-run insurance programs,
have stepped into the newly created market that previously had gone
unimagined or been thought infeasible.269 The ultimate full faith and
credit of our society’s organ of collective action—our reliable and
enduring, bond-issuing and bond-honoring government—proves to be
enough; the administering can devolve to others.
Second, we “jump start” the development of a secondary market in
the resultantly burgeoning number of low-risk debt obligations that
follow on the success of the first set of initiatives. That is, once many
lenders step in to assist in financing the acquisition of basic EEORvalued assets in response to our public initiative to eliminate their risk,
268

On the origins of the Federal Reserve System in Congressional response to the financial
downturn of 1907, and of federal deposit insurance in response to the bank panic of the early
1930s, see, e.g., ALLAN H. MELTZER, A HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE, VOLUME 1: 19131951 (2003); see also JONATHAN R. MACEY ET AL., BANKING LAW AND REGULATION 11-27 (3d
ed. 2001); HOWELL E. JACKSON & EDWARD L. SYMONS, JR., REGULATION OF FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS 27-45 (1999).
269
We will see in the sequel that this was precisely the case in respect of mortgage insurance.
We will also see that the significant trend in the direction of securitization currently underway
began with the federally created secondary mortgage market-maker—i.e., securitizer—Fannie
Mae. See again note 264, supra, and sources cited therein.
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we commence the pooling and securitizing of the consequently
proliferating debt obligations. We are aided in doing so by success in
the first initiative itself. For one thing, the growth in debt obligations
following on the provision of insurance or guaranty results in debt
enough to pool efficiently. For another, the fact that so large a portion
of the total pool of debt is associated with the insurance or guaranty
program itself, coupled with our imposition of quality standards as a
condition on enjoyment of the benefit of the program, results in the
development of a standard debt-contract/promissory-note form, and that
homogeneity of form itself facilitates the efficient bundling and
securitizing.
Third, we might, though we need not, publicly subsidize, directly
or indirectly, the interest payments made by program beneficiaries on
the debt. We can do so either by paying the interest directly, or we can
render such payments tax deductible. That latter, we will see, has
proved to be the preferred means in our American OS-in-the-making,
particularly for the middle class; while direct subsidy often has figured
into such programs as these that operate for the poor. And this, we shall
see further, probably owes to the same endowment heuristics that render
this “financial engineering” mode of asset-spreading the tried and true
contemporary method in our society thus far.
Before turning to the specific ways in which this method meshes
with those endowment heuristics and other constraints, it might be well
to schematize the method pictorially.270 Figure 1 does so:

270

I will describe this abstract scheme more fully in the sequel to this article, which will
address specific programs.
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Figure 1: General Form of Credit Insurance- & Debt SecuritizationBased Ownership-Spreading Programs
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As we shall see in the sequel, variations on precisely this picture
figure into the most successful—though thus far only fragmentary (i.e.,
single asset spreading)—contemporary American OS programs thus far
implemented. They also figure into the most interesting-looking such
programs not yet tried. It is worth asking why this might be so.
D.

The Method, Our Values & Our Constraints

The fundamental reason for the Method’s success, I suggest, is that
it gives elegant and comprehensive programmatic expression to the
values and constraints elaborated at Parts II and III. Recall, first, those
values and constraints: they are that an enduring American OS should,
first, work to foster the broadly equitable spread of ethically exogenous
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assets—material opportunities—while allowing ethically endogenous
such assets to remain with their producers. The American OS should,
second, seek so far as possible to favor the spread of assets that are
maximally vindicable by property rules—rules that afford maximal
space to agent autonomy, as consistent with the equal ethically
exogenous autonomy of others. In so far as equalizing ethically
exogenous asset-owning involves special solicitude for the exogenously
underendowed, the American OS acts most prudently by, third: (a)
channeling perceivedly “new” resources to the underendowed rather
than overtly “taking” already existing resources from the already fully
endowed; (b) conditioning that channeling of perceivedly new resources
to the underendowed upon the latter’s exercise of responsible,
productively virtuous effort—in effect ethically endogenizing the “new”
resources—and (c) so far as possible, refraining from perceived
“taking” rather than engaging in outright “giving.”
Now note how the Method meets precisely these criteria: First,
decent homes and educations—those assets which, we shall see, have
been spread thus far by means of the Method—are perceived by
American EEOR sensibilities as basic minima. They are “core
endowments,” per Part II, to which all young Americans just starting
out in life are believed to deserve access. At least provided that such
persons as lack such assets lack them in owing to hard luck rather than
through any fault of their own, we hold that they ought, at the very least,
to have them.271 The same, as we noted at Part II.B.3, can be said of
access to productive non-human capital. But as yet we have not worked
to foster its spread save in piecemeal fashion.
Second, homes are as property-like as assets get in American law;
they are fully property rule protected. Education, for its part, is in effect
property rule protected. For not only can it not be taken, once had, from
its possessor at a price below what the rightful possessor demands; it
cannot be taken from the possessor at all, but can only be rented, at a
reservation price set by the possessor.272 Securities portfolios, too, are
271
The “no fault” proviso presumably accounts for our willingness, for example, to disqualify
convicted drug offenders from access to federally assisted higher education finance. See 12
U.S.C. § 43(A). (I don’t here purport to endorse or condemn that policy, only to root it ultimately
in the view held by most that one can become ethically responsible, as one grows older, for one’s
lack of education.)
272
Ellerman argues that it can—that it is in effect partial slavery when one works for hire,
alienating a portion of one’s self and one’s education. See DAVID P. ELLERMAN, PROPERTY &
CONTRACT IN ECONOMICS: THE CASE FOR ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY (1992); see also DAVID P.
ELLERMAN, THE DEMOCRATIC WORKER-OWNED FIRM (1990); JAROSLAV VANEK, THE
GENERAL THEORY OF LABOR-MANAGED ECONOMIES (1970). I will not address that argument
here, confining myself instead to noting that, at least in theory, in the absence of chattel slavery
the hirer must still pay the reservation price of the laborer; hence the human capital is property
rule protected. That is not, of course, by any means to deny that reservation price will be EEORobjectionably low in a substantially non-neutral market—i.e., a market in which some
participants lack equal access to ethically exogenous endowments, including business capital and
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property rule protected, even if of course for most of us a security, being
fungible, is just worth its market value.273
Third, the financial engineering schema—the Method—channels
perceivedly “new” resources to the underendowed. To begin with,
housing and education are not taken from some and given to others.
But more to the point, the credit extended for purchase of homes and
higher education—encouraged though it be by public action—is not,
pursuant to endowment psychology, perceived as taking and
redistributing, even if in orthodox finance-theoretic terms all credit that
flows in one direction does so at the opportunity cost of other directions.
It just is not perceived in the same way that outright taxing and
redistributing would be.
Moreover, the channeling of the credit is conditioned upon
recipients’ responsibly diligent behavior; recipients must work to
amortize their debts, in addition, of course, to working to maintain the
value of the home or complete the education. In the case of the one
successful business capital-spreading program to make (partial) use of
the Method—the ESOP—the same is true of the employee
beneficiaries, who must labor for the firm that sponsors the plan.
Finally, in so far as interest on the loans facilitated by the Method
is subsidized, it typically is subsidized by tax deduction rather than
direct payment. It is a refraining from “taking,” rather than a “giving.”
The one exception here only confirms the rule: Direct subsidy of
interest payments often figures into use of the Method in financing
asset-acquisition by the (means-tested) least advantaged members of
society—those who, to EEOR values, are perceived as warranting
special solicitude.274

productive networks. But that problem—the problem of entry non-neutrality—afflicts the
reservation price charged for parting with any property held by the desperately underendowed,
not just labor. If Essau had as much right to eat from the family porridge pot as Jacob, and paid
Jacob his birthright for lunch because desperately hungry after laboring for the family while
Jacob illegitimately controlled access to the family larder, then the price he charged for parting
with the birthright was EEOR-illegitimately low. The contract between him and his brother
would not be enforceable in the courts.
273
Meaning that property rule and liability rule typically do not diverge in such cases. It
might still be property rule protected if we wish, however. If, for example, before the company
went public one had been attached to her UPS stock for sentimental or familial reasons—say,
because generations of her family had worked for UPS and received stock therein pursuant to the
company’s egalitarian ESOP plan—she no doubt could have insisted upon replacement of the
stock itself by one who had tortiously converted it, rather than settling for estimated market value.
274
We shall see this claim corroborated in the sequel. Federal ownership-facilitation
programs employing “the Method” allow the better-off to deduct interest payments for tax
calculation purposes, while directly supplying interest payments on behalf of the apparently
faultless working poor.
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Why the Method is Modern: Our Values, Our Constraints & Our
Resources, Past, Present & Future

Before we conclude with our preview of the sequel’s application of
the theory developed in this Article to our programmatic history, it is
worth briefly considering why what I am calling “the Method”
characterizes only modern American OS programs and proposals. After
all, haven’t there been ownership-spreading programs in the past as
well? Why would they not have employed the same methods, if those
methods purport to give the fullest financial expression to the Part III
constraints? There appear to be two answers, one having to do with
feasibility, the other with necessity.
The feasibility answer is that it is much easier to make use of the
financial system now, and to securitize and create secondary markets
now, than it would have been until comparatively recently. Indeed, as
noted before there was no centrally managed or regulated system of
depository institutions until 1913, nor was there deposit insurance until
1932. The deepening of the securities markets to the point of rendering
large-scale securitization of retail debt obligations feasible, in turn, has
been critically facilitated by the development of advanced computing
and communications technologies since the 1970s.
The necessity answer probably is the more important one: Until the
early twentieth century there already was a “new,” quite material
resource, abundant and both legally and perceivedly publicly owned,
that could be channeled especially toward the underendowed without
running afoul of endowment heuristics. That resource was federal land.
Though the land was, emphatically, of course taken from the indigenous
inhabitants of North America, those inhabitants were not citizens and
could not vote; they were “conquered.”275 The same holds of such
Spaniards, French and English loyalists as were dispossessed pursuant
to eighteenth and nineteenth century wars.276 The resulting land was
viewed as, and legally treated as, publicly owned U.S. federal land.
It was precisely this land that was distributed by the federal
275
Distribution, to the underendowed, of territory acquired by conquest was the classic means
by which ancient republics maintained rough equity in the allocation of ethically exogenous
productive resources over their citizenries. See, e.g., Simon, supra note 23, at 1335-40. Even if
the native inhabitants of North America did not consider land individually propertizable any more
than they considered air to be so, see Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823), I trust
that it is not controversial to observe that by individually propertizing it ourselves through
conferral of fee simple rights upon European-descended American citizens, not to mention by
ejecting tribes from territories over which they claimed longstanding tribal occupancy and control
rights, and by designating less desirable and previously tribe-uninhabited lands as new tribal
lands, we did indeed in an intelligible sense “take” land from its original inhabitants.
276
See, e.g., GEORGE DARGO, JEFFERSON’S LOUISIANA: POLITICS AND THE CLASH OF LEGAL
TRADITIONS (1975); Elizabeth G. Brown, Legal Systems in Conflict: Orleans Territory 18041812, 1 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 35 (1957); ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 16, at 225-32.
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government to the benefit of underendowed Americans up through the
first twenty years of the twentieth century. Such distributions were in
one case direct, pursuant to the Homestead Acts, which afforded a broad
distribution of the principal material resource out of which a great many
if not most Americans of the time built prosperous lives; and in the
other case indirect, pursuant to the Land-Grant Acts, which afforded
land to fund the endowments of institutions of higher education—the
“land grant” colleges and universities—open to all in order to supply the
human capital that could optimally be conjoined to land capital in the
building of productive precontemporary lives.
It was, significantly, after the land ran out that the Method—the
financial engineering method—was hit upon by fits and starts. And it
was, happily, precisely over this period that national markets grew
sufficiently integrated, and technologies sufficiently sophisticated, as to
render the Method fully feasible. A critical purpose of this Article’s
sequel, accordingly, will be to show the generalizability of the
Method—particularly now as our markets grow yet more integrated and
our technologies yet more sophisticated—in order to complete the
modern American OS anticipated by the land grant programs of the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and begun in earnest by our
now well established and continuing federal home and higher education
finance programs. The point, that is, will be to show how we might
finally become that Jeffersonian republic that we were on our way
toward becoming before the land ran out.
CONCLUSION: FROM THEORETIC COHERENCE TO
IMPLEMENTARY COHERENCE
This Article has covered a fair bit of territory, though more
remains to be covered before a coherent American OS can be
implemented. We have identified three political traditions—three broad
national self-understandings—that mutually exhaust the normative
space of American public policy-making. We have identified a broad
intersection of overlapping consensus among the three traditions, at
least where ownership is concerned, synthesizing one selfunderstanding that affords a normative conceptual coherence to our
coming efforts to realize an “ownership society.” And we have
translated this self-understanding—the efficient equal-opportunity
republic, constituted by agent-citizens endowed with equal opportunity,
pursuing happiness responsibly and freely—into distinctively American
legal and psychological terms of ownership and ownership-promotion.
What remains to be done is to translate those legal and
psychological terms of ownership and ownership-promotion into
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detailed programs—programs that promote and protect ownership in
keeping both (a) with the values of the EEOR, and (b) with the law and
ownership psychology of American citizens. Such is the task of the
present Article’s sequel. That sequel first reinterprets, under the aspect
of the “core” vision distilled in Parts II and III of the present Article,
past “ownership society” programs and proposals. It shows a uniform
ideological and financial engineering trajectory at work in all of them—
a trajectory that is more readily distilled now that the present Article’s
work is completed. The sequel then works to consummate that
trajectory. It does so by forging a cohesive package of proposals that is
informed by the successes and failures of past programs and proposals
as interpreted under the aspect of the theory worked out in the present
Article. It is a package that makes strategic use of the behavioral
finance (endowment effect) and derivative finance (abstraction effect)
lessons highlighted in Part III of the present Article, as well as of
securitization finance lessons highlighted in the historical portions of
the sequel itself. The upshot is a fully specified and designed American
OS that makes liberal use of the market mechanism described above in
Part II and amounts to a practical realization of the EEOR sketched in
that same Part.
Both in summation of the present Article and in anticipation of the
next, it is perhaps worth making explicit one fact that until now has
been largely implicit. It is that an “ownership society” is not simply a
society in which some people own. If that were the case, we would be
inhabiting an OS already, and there would be no purpose save the
purposes of chicanery in holding out “the ownership society” as an
ideal. An ownership society is not a society in which we are all “on our
own.” That would be, among other things, a society without law.
Indeed it would indeed not be a “society” at all. Nor is an ownership
society a society in which armed force labeled public acts solely to
protect the earlier expropriations exacted by select sectional interests
that are private. That would be a banana republic. An American OS or
EEOR, rather, is a community of citizen-agents who act jointly, under
the rule of law, to promote and to protect the independence, equal
liberties and equal opportunities, as manifest in ownership rights, of one
another. Precisely that vision, we have seen, is what animates our three
traditions of self-understanding, at least where ownership is concerned.
And precisely that vision, we shall see, is what inchoately has animated
American OS programs and proposals until now. That view now will
animate, more choately, coherently and self-consciously than before,
that package of programs laid out and proposed in the sequel as well.

